CAR: A tragedy in the making?

Multidisciplinary Mission to the Central African Republic (CAR)

4 - 11 November 2006

Executive Summary

At the request of the IASC Working Group,¹ a multi-disciplinary mission traveled to the Central African Republic (CAR) from 4 - 11 November 2006. For the first time, several organizations representing a broad spectrum of the humanitarian community, including UN, NGOs and donors, agreed to focus collectively on the level, scale and trends of humanitarian vulnerability in CAR.²

The mission saw a country affected by a multi-faceted crisis in which political / governance, development, security and humanitarian challenges are intertwined. From a humanitarian perspective, several areas of the country, some of which the mission visited, are in the midst of complex emergency. The number of IDPs in these regions has tripled since the beginning of the year and the situation continues to deteriorate. There is no doubt that CAR is experiencing a protracted protection crisis. As of today, despite genuine efforts, the humanitarian response remains insufficient to meet the needs of the affected population. It is urgent that the humanitarian community as a whole gears up. This requires stronger engagement from all: UN agencies at the country and headquarter's level; the NGO community, donors and the Central African government. Building on existing opportunities, the humanitarian country team must review its modus operandi and improve its capacity to bring assistance to those in need, including by expanding its presence in the most affected areas. These efforts must be supported by stronger coordination, so as to ensure a comprehensive humanitarian response, avoid duplication, prevent jeopardizing existing programs and ensure the best use of resources. With the support of the international community, the government must put an end to the on-going gross human rights violations and bring to justice those responsible for these crimes.

Addressing humanitarian challenges in CAR must go hand in hand with addressing the root causes of the crisis. Humanitarian assistance must be accompanied by increased recovery and development programs, within a comprehensive country strategy. Strong actions are also required in the sectors of governance and security sector reform. Donors and Bretton Woods institutions have a critical role to play in implementing this strategy. Timely funding is essential to put CAR back on its feet; so is stronger political engagement and increased advocacy with the Central African government and the international community.

The Head of Mission will present the conclusions and recommendations of the mission to humanitarian partners in Brussels, Geneva, New York, Paris, and Washington. A follow-up mission will take place in April 2007.

I. Introduction

1. At the request of the IASC Working Group,³ a multi-disciplinary mission traveled to the Central African Republic (CAR) from 4 to 11 November 2006. The mission was led by Mr. Ibrahima D. Fall, Senior Special Adviser (UNICEF). It included representatives of FAO, the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), the Swedish government, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF and UNOCHA.⁴ This mission builds on Ramiro Lopes da Silva's assessment of the humanitarian situation in CAR ⁵ and OCHA's review mission last April.⁶ It also follows repeated calls from the Humanitarian Coordinator and the country team for increased attention to the humanitarian situation in the country.⁷ However, in its composition, objectives and timing, this multi-disciplinary mission was unique. For the first time, several organizations, representing a broad spectrum of the humanitarian community, including UN, NGOs and donors, agreed to focus collectively on the level, scale and trends of humanitarian vulnerability in CAR.⁸

2. The timing of the mission is particularly opportune. After years of a lack of attention and subsequent under-funding, important donors have started re-engaging in the country: US OFDA decided to place CAR on its list of emergencies following its October mission to the country and an ECHO assessment mission arrived in Bangui on 13 November 2006. As for Bretton Woods Institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) found that the governments' economic performance in 2006 has been largely good. One can now expect a decision for both institutions to re-engage more fully in 2007.

3. Unfortunately, the mission also coincides with a deterioration of the political and security situation in the country. After two years of relative stability, the country seems again on the verge of sliding back into chaos. President Francois Bozizé is today confronted with increased political, security and socio-economic challenges.⁹ Rebel activities are on the rise. Over the past weeks, rebels of the Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement (UFDR) have reportedly taken control of three towns in the north-east of the country (Birao, Ouanda-Djalle and Sam-Oundja). Areas which the mission visited, further west, are partly controlled by another rebel group, i.e. l'Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la République et la Démocratie (APRD). The strength, leadership and support that rebel groups enjoy remains unclear; as do their political objectives. Reports that former President Patasse backs the rebellion have not been confirmed. Similarly, though the government has repeatedly accused Sudan of fuelling the rebellion in the north-east, these allegations have yet to be supported by material proofs. One can say, however, that the situation in CAR today is extremely volatile. Some Central African parties have obviously decided to seize power by force. Conflicts in neighbouring Chad and Darfur, Sudan are important compounding factors, which definitely contribute to further weakening CAR. The situation in DRC is an additional concern: Congolese armed groups from the Equateur provinces had given Patasse strong support during the 2003 civil war. It is the role of humanitarian agencies to alert the international community to the humanitarian consequences that will result if the country is allowed to slide back into chaos.

4. Taking into account the above mentioned context, as well as on-going debates on the nature of the crisis in CAR, participants agreed that the mission needed first to characterize the crisis: is CAR affected by a structural /development crisis or by a humanitarian emergency? They also agreed that the mission should lead a thorough analysis of humanitarian achievements so far, on-going efforts and shortcomings. The mission should then be able to recommend strategies to be implemented. Participants finally agreed that the mission should send, at the end, strong messages to the government, the UN and other international organizations, NGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement, as well as donors.

II. Itinerary and methodology

5. The mission traveled five days by road through the most affected northern provinces of Ouham Pendé and Ouham. As per UN security regulations in CAR, the mission traveled most of the time with armed escorts, except on the axis Bemal - Bossangoa.¹⁰ The mission also went to Gore (southern Chad), an area that currently hosts about 50,000 Central African refugees. During the week it traveled to CAR and Chad, the mission met a whole range of actors, including Central African and Chadian authorities, UN agencies, international NGOs, the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement and donors.¹¹ The mission also paid particular attention to listening to Central African populations affected by the crisis. Thus, throughout its journey to the north, the mission occasionally stopped in villages and IDPs / refugee locations to speak with the population.

III. Analysis of the situation

6. Having spent only a week in the country, the mission does not presume to offer an exhaustive analysis of the complex situation prevailing in CAR. However, from what was observed and from the various consultations held, the mission was able to confirm that CAR indeed suffers from a multi-faceted crisis in which political / governance, development, security and humanitarian challenges are intertwined; each of these elements fuels the others and contributes to the on-going rapid deterioration of the overall situation.

7. A governance crisis. CAR is, at best, a fragile State in Bangui. In areas that the mission visited, if one assumes the State was even there, it is a failed State. Though it maintains a nominal presence in main towns, it is de facto absent outside the capital city. Rule of law is close to non-existent, with widespread anarchy and impunity throughout the country. There is no democratic tradition either. Power transition often means violent coups: since independence, only two presidents have been democratically elected.¹² Besides, the State is today virtually bankrupt. Civil servants have already accumulated 8 months of salary arrears under this administration (not to mention salary arrears accumulated under previous governments).

8. A development crisis. Decades of recurrent armed conflicts, political instability and poor governance have resulted in a near total absence of development. Today CAR stands as the seventh least developed country on earth.¹³ The Central African population is one of the poorest in the world.¹⁴ Social indicators have been worsening steadily for 20 years.¹⁵ The socio-economic situation looks grim, with the State incapable of fulfilling its roles. As the mission was able to witness, basic infrastructure and social services, such as health and education services, are nearly non-existent outside Bangui. Hence, although the school year was planned to begin in early October, it has not started yet in many areas that the mission visited, such as Paoua. In Bozoum, the local hospital lacks basic resources to minimally perform, such as running water. It relies on COOPI, MSF, UNICEF and WHO for its supply of medicine and equipment. Villages that the mission visited often showed no signs of even basic economic activity. The situation is further compounded by the fact that unlike other countries in transition or in post-conflict situations, the CAR government did not receive the needed recovery / development assistance during the last decade. As previously stated, it is only now that development partners are starting to re-engage in the country. This has resulted in a profound development crisis, which is a major cause of increasing levels of vulnerability amongst the population. As is already the case in various parts of the country, including some areas that the mission visited, in many regions, any shock is likely to throw the population into an acute humanitarian crisis.

9. A security crisis. In this context of widespread poverty and lack of prospects, violence has become for many the only source of income. As such, the lack of development is also a primary cause of the prevailing insecurity, which has spread throughout the country. The term "insecurity" includes various types of violence in CAR: highway banditry by coupeurs de route (also called Zaraguinas), rebel activities and abuses by security forces, including the Central African Armed Forces (FACA), the Presidential Guard, and armed groups from Chad. All of these elements are closely intertwined, with armed groups often involved in both banditry and more politically motivated activities. CAR is trapped in a vicious circle: on the one hand, the lack of development and lack of prospects for youth are major causes of increasing violence; on the other hand, growing violence is a major impediment to development. Over the past months the situation has deteriorated sharply: CAR is today embroiled in what some interlocutors in Bangui characterize as an internal armed conflict.

10. Civilians are recurrently caught in cycles of violence and often directly targeted by the parties. This has dire human, as well as economic consequences and contributes to increasing the population's levels of vulnerability. In many parts of the country, trade and agriculture have become impossible because of insecurity. Thus, the international market of Betoko, not far from the Chadian border, used to be the commercial center of northern Ouham where thousands of CAR and Chadian farmers and Peuhl (fulanis) pastoralists used to trade. As the mission was able to witness, the market is today empty and the Peuhls have fled to neighboring countries (Cameroun or Chad) with their cattle, reportedly since the Chadian army looted the village a few months ago. While the presence of the Force Multinationale en Centrafrique (FOMUC) in CAR has had a positive impact,¹⁶ the size and strength of this regional force is too limited to stabilize the situation.¹⁷ By mandate, FOMUC supports FACA troops who are under-equipped, ill-trained, de-motivated and therefore unwilling and incapable of engaging in confrontation with the rebellion and restoring order.

11. A humanitarian crisis. In the most affected areas, including some which the mission visited, a lack of development and widespread insecurity have plunged vulnerable populations into a situation of acute emergency. The Humanitarian Community Partnership Team (HCPT) estimates that 1 million people are affected, i.e. ¼ of the population. A further million stand on the edge of risk.¹⁸ There are today 220,000 Central Africans displaced, including 20,000 refugees in Cameroon, 50,000 refugees in Chad and an estimated 150,000 IDPs.¹⁹ Interviews with refugees and IDPs showed that the prime cause of displacement remains insecurity.

12. There is no doubt that CAR is going through a protracted protection crisis. Gross and systematic human rights violations continue to take place in a climate of total impunity. On the axis Bemal - Boguila, the mission witnessed dozens of villages systematically (and recently) burnt and emptied of their populations. The mission equally heard numerous accounts from survivors of arbitrary executions, torture, rape, etc. Reliable sources indicated that similar violations occurred or are on-going in other areas, such as Kabo, Bottangafo and Kaga-Bandoro. In order to escape abuses, people generally flee to the bush, where they have no access to either clean water or to basic services. IDPs met by the mission were obviously traumatized and afraid to return home. Some of them, like in Boguia, live in desperate conditions: infants, children, women, elderly people, some of them presenting obvious signs of serious disease, living in the forest with no shelter whatsoever, with hardly any food, dressed in rags, traumatized, and of course with very little - if any - access to basic social services. Though they report receiving food assistance from COOPI and health services from MSF, they are in urgent need of further assistance, including health, shelter and non-food items (NFI). The mission only met one such group on this particular axis. Yet, the population indicated that hundreds of other groups live in similar conditions in this area alone. Despite recurring allegations, some of them credible, the mission could not establish with certainty whether crimes that take place in this region are ethnically and / or politically motivated. This must be further investigated. In any case, the mission notes with concern that although individuals responsible for these crimes seem to be well known, including from the highest State authorities, action to bring them to justice has yet to take place. As observed in several reports on the human rights situation in CAR, some of them published as early as 2002, arbitrary executions, rapes, torture and other gross human rights violations perpetrated against innocent civilian population continue in total impunity.²⁰

13. This description of the situation in the protection sector should not eclipse dire needs in all other sectors. Thus, outside Bangui and main rural towns, education is close to non-existent. Infrastructure and equipment that were looted or destroyed during the 2003 civil strife have not been replaced. In Bozoum, there are two teachers for a primary school that normally hosts 400 pupils. Because of insecurity and poverty, school attendance has dropped: still in Bozoum, only 260 children showed up this year (against an expected number of 400). Striking examples could be given for the health sectors: vaccination coverage for diseases transmissible during childhood stands at under 50%; in 2003, maternal mortality stood at 1,355 per 100,000 (compared to 510 in the Republic of Congo, and 590 in the Sudan); infant mortality stood in 2003 at 132/1000, meaning that 17,150 infants die in CAR every year; under-five mortality is estimated at 220/1000 in 2003. CAR has the highest HIV / AIDS prevalence in the sub-region, estimated at 15%.²¹ Although no clear data are available, it is commonly understood that due to insecurity, water availability has decreased in conflict areas and its quality has deteriorated due to low investment in construction and poor maintenance of existing facilities (wells, water points). As for agriculture and food security, staple crop production (cassava, sorghum, corn, groundnut and rice) has dropped by 40% compared to pre-crisis production, while production of cash crops (cotton and coffee) today represents only 20% of the pre-crisis production.

14. Trends. The continuous lack of reliable data makes a thorough assessment of the humanitarian situation and trends difficult. However, there is little doubt that the situation has deteriorated sharply since the beginning of the year. The estimated number of IDPs has tripled between January and October 2006, from 50,000 to 150,000. In the areas of agriculture, economic recovery, education, health, protection, shelter, water and sanitation daunting challenges remain. Moreover, the situation is likely to deteriorate further in the weeks to come if the State fails to restore security and rule of law in the most affected areas, which is probable. The situation is further compounded by reigning volatility in neighboring countries. There is no doubt that on-going conflicts in Sudan / Darfur and Chad are contributing to accelerating the destabilization of CAR, as increased military activity in the north-east of the country already shows. These explosive regional dynamics could entail severe humanitarian consequences in the near future - not to mention the possible impact on CAR of a possible deterioration of the situation in DRC after the elections.

IV. The humanitarian response so far

15. The mission commends the efforts of NGOs, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and UN agencies to address the prevailing humanitarian situation in CAR. CARITAS, COOPI, FAO, ICRC, MSF, UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, WFP are all involved in bringing humanitarian assistance, including to IDPs, through the distribution of food and non-food items, agricultural programs, health services, protection services, water and sanitation.²²

16. However, the mission has identified a series of constraints that hinder a more effective humanitarian response. First, despite genuine efforts, UN agencies continue to experience difficulties to "gear up their humanitarian response." The situation now clearly calls for urgent adjustments to existing programs, including increased emergency response capacity. This should not be done at the expense of development programs where these can be implemented. Secondly, UN and NGO presence in the most affected areas remains insufficient. CARITAS, COOPI, ICRC, the Red Cross and MSF are the only organizations that are present in these zones where they enjoy regular and direct access to beneficiaries. The scant NGO presence and the insufficient number of humanitarian organisations close to the populations in need are major impediments to an effective humanitarian response. UN agencies do not maintain a physical presence in areas where humanitarian needs are greatest (e.g. Paoua and Kabo).

17. The UN does have a presence in Bosssangoa (UNHCR and UNICEF) and there are plans to open offices in Kaga-Bandoro (UNICEF and WFP), where the UN should have established a presence months ago. However, in these areas, access remains very limited since UN agencies are required to travel under military escorts. The use of armed escorts is an additional constraint. They make access to rebel held areas impossible and prevent direct access to vulnerable populations. As the mission was able to witness, affected populations that are traumatized by repeated abuses by the military, flee into the bush when they see armed escorts. In contrast, on the day when the mission had to travel without escorts between Bemal and Bossangoa, it was able to establish direct contact and trust with populations displaced in the bush. People encountered on the road invited the mission to visit sites where they have taken refuge. Finally, according to non-UN partners, the use of armed escorts by UN actors endangers the work and safety of other humanitarian actors working in the area. The mission was pleased, therefore, to learn that one week after its visit, the UN country team decided to follow the mission's recommendations and lifted the use of armed escorts in rebel areas.

18. Poor and late funding over the past years has hampered the humanitarian response. All three CAPs that the UN launched between 2003 and 2005 were less than 40% funded. As of 18 November, the CAP 2006 (USD 36 million) is 59% funded. This relatively good funding must be put in perspective however: in 2006, the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) is the biggest donor in CAR (USD 5.5 million); UN un-earmarked funds come second.²³ Besides, funds arrived late in the year, which has prevented the implementation of some programs. In the agriculture sector, most of the funding was made available when the farming season was in an advanced stage making it too late for the distribution of sorghum and millet seeds, which are the staple crops in CAR.

19. Finally, weaknesses in coordination, monitoring and information management, partly due to a lack of access and a weak humanitarian presence in the field, also prevent a more effective humanitarian response. The mission was hence unable to obtain a comprehensive overview of the humanitarian situation beyond the areas it visited. The eight month gap between the departure of the previous Humanitarian Coordinator and the arrival of his replacement (October 2005 - June 2006) did not facilitate a more effective humanitarian response. Interim arrangements, with the HC a.i. juggling multiple priorities with little support from headquarters, did not create the conditions for an optimum humanitarian response. The situation has approved though since the arrival of the new HC in June 2006.

V. The way forward: key recommendations

20. The CAP 2007 defines a clear strategy that aims: to promote the human security of those affected by the conflict and IDPs in particular; to reinforce the capacities of national and local actors including civil society to lead humanitarian action and future development, including risk reduction; and to strengthen coordination. The mission fully endorses the approach presented in the CAP. In order to implement this strategy, the mission recommends the following:
    • Improve in-country coordination and inclusiveness as a matter of urgency. The UN / NGO coordination forum must be convened more regularly. Sector leads must ensure the full participation of non-UN humanitarian actors. Furthermore, it is essential that sector leads abide by the principles agreed during last September's CAP workshop, i.e. accountability, predictability and leadership. As regards cross-sectoral coordination, information management and advocacy must be strengthened (RC / HC; OCHA).²⁴

    • Increase UN agencies' in-country emergency programming skills / response capacity, including within the top management. Each agency should review its emergency capacity and commit the resources required. So as to avoid gaps and duplications and ensure best use of available resources, the process should be led in close consultation with the Humanitarian Coordinator (ERC / UN agencies; RC / HC).

    • Increase the UN's presence in the most affected areas, by opening - for instance - joint UN offices in key locations. The opening of UN offices must help to improve access to populations in need and ensure better protection to populations through UN presence. In order not to jeopardize on-ongoing activities, the establishment of UN offices must be done in close consultation with organizations already present in these areas (RC / HC).

    • Increase the presence of NGOs in CAR, which is essential to address urgent needs in all sectors, including agriculture, health, emergency education, protection, food and non-food, as well as water and sanitation. The increase of emergency NGOs should be in tandem with an increase of NGOs that are more focused on development and the relief to development link (ICVA, InterAction, SCHR, VOICE).

    • Explore possibilities to carry out trans-border humanitarian operations from southern Chad (Gore), as access to the most affected provinces in CAR seems easier from this area. (RC / HC).

    • Review on a regular basis the use of armed escorts. In order not to put in danger other humanitarian organizations and the population, it is of prime importance that the UN comply with the IASC Guidelines for the Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys (2001) in all their movements, and not only in rebel held areas. (RC /HC).

    • Increase advocacy with the government and local authorities, including the military in order to guarantee unhindered access for humanitarian organizations. As deemed necessary, contacts with non-state parties should be established (RC / HC).

    • Remind the government of its obligations under human rights and international humanitarian law to protect civilians and investigate and prosecute human rights violations. This reminder must be accompanied by a strong sensitization campaign on human rights and International Humanitarian Law, targeting central and local authorities, in particular military. Advocacy at the country level should be complemented by strong messages to Central African authorities from higher UN officials and donors (RC / HC; OHCHR; ERC; donors).

    • Dispatch a human rights investigation mission to northern CAR OHCHR should increase its attention on CAR as a matter of urgency. In addition to an investigation mission, OHCHR should increase its capacity in the country, including establishing a field presence in the most affected areas. (OHCHR).

    • Increase focus on the situation of IDPs in CAR and engage in a dialogue with the government on the matter. (Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of IDPs).

    • Ensure adequate linkages between emergency and recovery and development. Humanitarian organizations must respond to the emergency while thinking about the future. Some areas of the country call for relief and development activities so as to prevent more people from experiencing an emergency, rather than needing a humanitarian response at this time. This implies that emergency operations must be run in tandem with longer-term activities. (UNDP to lead).

    • In urban centers of affected areas and in close collaboration with parent committees and local authorities, accelerate the return of children to schools through the provision of comprehensive packages of multi-sector activities around schools. In areas where villages were burnt and the population is still hiding in the bush, consider providing mobile educational activities in close collaboration with IDPs' parents committees and village chiefs. (UNICEF to lead)

VI. Benchmarks / Critical success factors

21. To monitor the situation and successes and / or failures of humanitarian organizations, the CAP 2007 includes several indicators per sector. It also includes a comprehensive monitoring plan. The mission does not wish to add another layer of monitoring. In its follow-up of the situation in CAR, the mission will however by guided by the following benchmarks:
    • levels of violence against the civilian population and improved / worsened protection;

    • Numbers of displaced persons;

    • Improved access for humanitarian organizations;

    • UN presence in the areas most affected by the crisis;

    • Numbers and types of NGOs active in the country;

    • Improved levels of funding;

    • Strong NGO engagement (more actors, especially greater involvement in the areas of protection and the emergency / recovery nexus)

    • Strengthened and inclusive in-country coordination amongst all actors, including between humanitarian and recovery partners.

22. The mission is fully aware that improvements of some of these benchmarks are only partly contingent on an improved humanitarian response (e.g. levels of violence against civilians and / or number of IDPs). However, the mission also believes that these are important indicators of the humanitarian trends and therefore should be monitored.

VII. Opportunities and threats

23. There are numerous opportunities upon which humanitarian partners in CAR can build in order to improve the humanitarian response. Contrary to a few months ago, today all actors seem to share a common understanding of the situation in CAR, including donors present in the country. Humanitarian capacity is increasing albeit slowly. Action Contre la Faim (ACF) started operations in CAR three months ago and is slowly expanding its programmes. IPHD and IRD are said to be establishing a presence in the country. ICRC will increase its budget and programs in 2007, as will some UN agencies.²⁵ Established networks, such as CARITAS and the CAR Red Cross, could help implement new programs. The RC / HC has very good access to the highest State authorities compared to other countries, which makes advocacy possible. Finally, the humanitarian community now enjoys in-country humanitarian air services, which will further facilitate access to remote and inaccessible areas.

24. At the same time, risks also exist and various elements could impede the implementation of humanitarian programmes in CAR. The near total absence of the State structure and local partners is a major obstacle to effective humanitarian operations. As capacity building is hardly possible until recovery starts, humanitarian organizations need to find alternatives during the emergency phase. To avoid institutionalizing the emergency situation by substituting for State functions and creating humanitarian dependence, it is vital that emergency activities are carried out in tandem with longer term interventions, which are essential to reduce the vulnerability of the population and to avoid the further deterioration of the humanitarian situation. The used of armed escorts is another challenge: as already noted, it is essential that humanitarian agencies strike a balance between the safety of aid workers on the one hand and access to the population on the other.

25. The establishment of UN offices in the most affected areas also raises concerns. It may put at risk on-going operations of organizations already present in these areas (e.g. NGOs' local staff could be tempted by higher UN salaries; coordination will become an issue). The perception of the UN by parties to the conflict is another issue. Already some humanitarian organizations, including WFP, have been accused by one party of supporting the rebellion. Others have experienced serious security incidents over the past months. The perception that the humanitarian community is not impartial could increase with its stronger involvement, including in protection and human rights issues. Finally, CAR is today on the brink of a more severe and larger humanitarian crisis. Should the worst case scenario unfold, it is doubtful that humanitarian organizations are ready to respond.

VIII. Follow-up plan

26. A follow-up mission led by Mr. Ibrahima D. Fall will take place in April 2007 with the aim of assessing the status of implementation of the above recommendations. In the meantime, the head of the mission will present the conclusions and recommendations of the mission to humanitarian partners in Brussels, Geneva, New York, Paris, and Washington from 26 November to 6 December.

IX. Conclusion

27. CAR suffers from a multi-faceted crisis in which political / governance, development, security and humanitarian challenges are closely intertwined; each of these elements fuels the others and contributes to the on-going rapid deterioration of the overall situation. There is no doubt that some areas of CAR - mainly the north-west of the country- are affected by a serious humanitarian crisis and the situation is deteriorating. Thus, the number of IDPs in these areas has tripled over the past 8 months. Needs in the sectors of agriculture, education, food, health, protection, shelter and water and sanitation have yet to be met. It is urgent that the humanitarian community gears up, i.e. works harder, better and faster. This requires stronger engagement from all: UN agencies at the country and headquarters level; the NGO community, donors and the Central African government. The humanitarian country team must review its modus operandi so as to bring better assistance to those in need (e.g. stronger UN and NGO presence where required; ending the use of armed escorts for UN agencies). These efforts must be supported by stronger coordination, so as to ensure a comprehensive humanitarian response, to avoid duplication, to prevent jeopardizing existing programs and to ensure the best use of resources. With the support of the international community, the government must put an end to impunity and bring to justice those responsible for the on-going gross human rights violations. Addressing humanitarian challenges must go in tandem with addressing the root causes of the crisis in CAR. Increased humanitarian assistance must not be provided at the expense of development programs: humanitarian and development activities must be coordinated and go together according to a comprehensive country strategy. There are numerous opportunities upon which humanitarian partners in CAR can build in order to improve the humanitarian response and to help put the country back on its feet. In doing so, donors and Bretton Woods institutions have a critical role to play: timely funding is essential; so is strong political engagement and increased advocacy with CAR and international partners on humanitarian and non-humanitarian issues, such as security sector reform.

28. In any given country, the need to bring more humanitarian assistance is, in itself, the symptom of a failure. It is first and foremost the failure of politics, governance and development: the root causes of complex emergencies. It is also the failure of the humanitarian community itself which fails to respond effectively to a humanitarian situation. The months to come will tell whether the government and the international community have decided to succeed and help Central African people live a better life or whether they have opted to abandon this population for another generation.

Ibrahima D. Fall
New York, 24 November 2006

Annexes

Terms of Reference

Background:

1. In its meeting of July 2006, the IASC Working Group agreed to look at ways to draw attention to and increase support to the humanitarian situation in CAR through an interagency mission of interested agencies. The IASC Working Group requested OCHA to take the lead in organising this mission.

2. More than three years after the end of hostilities, the CAR continues to exhibit all the characteristics of a complex emergency, the impact of which on the Central African population has never been addressed. Last year's elections did not yield the expected peace and stability. Instead, the situation deteriorated sharply in the first half of 2006. As administrative and security authorities remained literally absent of vast areas of the territory, armed rebellion reformed, banditry and insecurity spread throughout the country, and systematic human rights violations were reported. The situation was further compounded by the spill-over of the crises in Chad and Darfur and the involvement of external actors in northern CAR. The devastation of lives and villages in the North of the country led to the displacement of 80,000 Central Africans in CAR and into neighbouring Chad and Cameroon. State authorities were unable to tackle these challenges. With no access to basic social services, the level of vulnerability of the population continued to rise. Limited access as well as lack of funds and implementing partners made the humanitarian response difficult. ICRC and MSF were the only humanitarian organisations with an established presence in the north of CAR. As a UN multi-disciplinary team led by the RC / HC noted while travelling across the most affected northern regions (10-14 July), the area is in "a desperate humanitarian situation" which requires the Government, the UN and its partners "to immediately increase supply of standard emergency relief."

3. All the three CAPs the UN launched between 2003 and 2005 were less than 40% funded. As of 18 September, the CAP 2006 (USD 36 million) is 49% funded. This good mid-year funding must be put in perspective though: In 2006, CERF is the biggest donor in CAR (USD 4.5 million); UN un-earmarked funds come second. Besides, some sectors considered life-saving, are experiencing serious funding shortfalls (e.g. Water and sanitation which is only 37% funded).

4. Unless the international community increases immediately and significantly its assistance to the country, the overall situation in CAR will likely continue to deteriorate. This would entail serious humanitarian consequences for a population whose coping mechanisms are already under extreme pressure. Inaction in CAR would also undermine all efforts to restore stability in the sub-region.

Objectives of the mission

1. Provide a rare opportunity for a collective focus and attention on the level, scale and trends of human vulnerability in the Central African Republic and take stock of the efforts already accomplished with limited resources, a small number of actors and a volatile humanitarian space. In that regard, particular attention should be paid to the situation of IDPs.

2. Take stock of linkages between humanitarian action and relief/development activities in CAR and analyze coordination between mid/long term rehabilitation strategies and short emergency measures.

3. Draw attention to slow-coming funding and low capacity on the one hand, and immediate needs to preserve a vital lifeline ("plancher vital") to an estimated 1.1 million Central Africans on the other hand.

Proposed dates and participation

1. The proposed dates for the mission are 4-11 November.

2. The mission will be held at technical level and led by UNICEF. FAO (also representing UNDGO) and UNHCR will complete UN agencies' participation. ICVA (on behalf of the NGO community) and donors will also participate. OCHA HQ will be represented by CRD and IDD.

3. The mission will visit the most severely affected northern regions of Ouham and Ouham Pende, as well as the area of Gor󃂩 (Chad) where 50, 000 Central Africans have sought refuge. The mission will hold discussions with the UN Country Team and representatives of the UN Peace-Building Office (BONUCA), the Government, donors and NGOs present in Bangui, as well as with the ICRC and the Red Cross.

Expected outcomes

At the end of the mission, participants are expected to:

1. Share a common understanding of the scope and nature of humanitarian needs in CAR.

2. Support the implementation of the IASC Country Team's strategy and priorities for 2007 through increased advocacy with relevant organisations and donors to address the needs of vulnerable groups, in particular IDPs. Participants will determine potential for expanding and extending humanitarian presence and resources to the affected locations, in particular the northern provinces of the Ouham and Ouham-Pend󃂩.

3. Recommend/propose best ways to improve linkages between the humanitarian response and development activities and advise on required partnerships for longer term responses.

Multidisciplinary mission to the Central African Republic

List of Participants

20 October 2006

Multi-disciplinary technical mission to the Central African Republic (CAR)

Schedule, 4-11 November 2006

Notes

1. See IASC Working Group 5-7 July 2006. Back

2. See Annex, Terms of References of the mission. Back

3. See IASC Working Group 5-7 July 2006. Back

4. See Annex for list of participants. Back

5. 22 February - 10 March 2004. Back

6. 8 - 15 April 2006. Back

7. See UN's mission report on the situation in Ouham and Ouham-Pendé, 10 - 14 July 2006. Back

8. See Annex, Terms of References of the mission. Back

9. In September 1999, Ange-Felix Patasse became the first democratically elected Central African President. He was overthrown by Francois Bozize in March 2003. Following a 2 year transition, Francois Bozize was elected President in June 2005. The international community unanimously considered these elections free and fair. Back

10. The military refused to escort the mission on this axis, reportedly under the rebellion's control. Back

11. See itinerary and program. The mission also tried to visit Kaga-Bandoro (Nana-Gribizi prefecture) where villages were recently burnt along 90 km of roads, but was unable to land at this location. Back

12. Ibid 9. Back

13. Based on UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI). Back

14. According to UNDP studies, in 2004 73% of the population lived on less than USD 1/day. Back

15. Life expectancy dropped from 48.7 years in 1988 to an estimated 41 years in 2007. Back

16. FOMUC was critical in ensuring security during the election for instance; see report of the Secretary General to the Security Council S/2005/414. Back

17. 380 troops from Gabon, Republic of Congo and Chad. Back

18. See CAP 2007. Back

19. See CAP 2007. Back

20. See Fédération internationale des Droits de l'Homme, République Centrafricaine : oubliées, stigmatisées : la double peine des victimes de crimes internationaux, Octobre 2006 Back

21. See CAP 2007. Back

22. See CAP 2007, for an exhaustive review of the 2006 response and sector plans for 2007. Back

23. See OCHA financial tracking system. Back

24. Note that each recommendation identifies an organization / individual who should ensure follow-up / monitoring. Back

25. OCHA is almost doubling its budget in 2007 (compare to 2006). Back