Uganda Trip Report

Ed Schenkenberg van Mierop
ICVA Coordinator

6 October 2006

INTRODUCTION

This report is based on a visit to Uganda from 13 until 21 September 2006 accompanying the Chair of the UNHCR Executive Committee (ExCom), Japanese Ambassador Ichiro Fujisaki.¹ It has been written to complement and update the report on the ICVA Coordinator's previous trip in May 2006.

The ICVA Coordinator's September visit aimed to provide the ExCom Chair with further insight and understanding on the role and activities of NGOs. Additional objectives for the ICVA Coordinator included discussion of his May report; understanding of the implications of the recent political changes for the IDPs and for humanitarian agencies; and examination of the humanitarian response and coordination with regards to IDPs in some districts not visited in May 2006.

HUMANITARIAN SITUATION AND RESPONSE

Everyone agrees that the recent political changes have opened opportunities for IDPs to return in some of the districts and for humanitarian agencies to step up their activities in view of improved access throughout northern Uganda.²

During his recent trip to northern Uganda in September, Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) Jan Egeland, spent one night in an IDP camp near Gulu to express his solidarity with the IDPs and to demonstrate the significant improved security situation and related increased opportunities for humanitarian action. Only a few NGOs have stayed overnight in the camps with the IDPs in a low profile manner for prolonged periods of time. Such continued proximity may, according to one of these NGOs, contribute to increased understanding of the NGO, its role, and activities.³

Despite improved security, many agencies continue to use armed escorts, provided by the Ugandan military (known under its acronym, UPDF), to travel in and between some of the districts, albeit on a lesser scale than before. The policy of using armed escorts in Uganda, however, is, as in the words of one staff member of an international agency, "in a mess." Agencies continuing to use armed escorts seem to do so because they have become accustomed to them.⁴ What has been sorely missing is leadership calling for an immediate end of armed escorts by all humanitarian agencies.⁵ The reported presence of some LRA units of who have stayed behind in Northern Uganda and the inconclusive character of the peace talks should not serve as a pretext for the UN and NGOs to require armed protection.⁶

It is widely known that humanitarian assistance has been lacking in most of the camps in Northern Uganda. Many of the sectors have not seen adequate services provided. In Lira, for example, one medical NGO reported significant problems with regards the health situation of the population as needs remain unmet. Limited access to drugs, problems with HIV and TB treatment, including a high defaulter rate, and inadequate post exposure treatment for those who have been subject to rape are but a few of the problems this NGO noted.

There are major differences in the return situation of IDPs between districts.⁷ In Lira district, for example, IDPs have started to return in significant numbers. In Aler camp near Lira the population reduced from 14,000 in July to 6,000 in August. In May, the World Food Program (WFP) distributed a three-month resettlement package in exchange for a ration card in a number of camps in Lira. Following this step, which has served as a major push factor, a further 2,000 and 3,000 people left the camp in the first two weeks of September, according to one NGO working in Aler camp.

Further north, in Kitgum district, no returns have taken place. In meeting with IDPs in Mucwini camp, Kitgum district, they noted that they would not leave the camp "until peace had come to Uganda." Years of fearing intimidation, abuse, abductions, and violence have created a prevailing mindset that they are better off in the camps, in spite of the horrible conditions in these camps.⁸ IDPs may also be afraid of losing their return package (of food rations and non-food items), if they were already to return home at this time.

In case of a return movement, those who will stay behind in the camps are likely to include extra vulnerable individuals (known as EVIs). It is worth noting that different agencies use different definitions of those who fall within this category and that agencies may have their own data profiling these cases.⁹ UNHCR has developed a special programme for them, including the provision of shelter materials and community mobilisation to assist with the construction of their homes. In Kitgum district, NGOs such as AVSI and Oxfam also have their own registration system for distribution purposes.

IDP Return

Generally, three scenarios as to what might happen in northern Uganda were noted: 1) Ugandan authorities declare peace and announce closure of the camps, which may result in a mass return movement; 2) three groups of IDPs will emerge including those who stay in the camps, those who move to newer, smaller camps, and those who will go home; and 3) a status quo will emerge with the majority of the IDPs remaining in camps.¹⁰

In view of the IDPs' different options, a blanket policy announcement from the government (possibly in consultation with the UN) to close the camps should not be viewed as an option.¹¹ The IDPs' right to take a free and informed decision should be the starting point of any policy that seeks a solution to their situation. The provision of objective and detailed information, by the government, UNHCR, and other agencies is a prerequisite for such a free and informed decision.

The restrictions placed by the UPDF on the IDPs' right to freedom of movement remain a major concern for humanitarian agencies. Years of discrimination towards the Acholi by the government in Kampala may also have contributed to suspicion about the governments' intentions vis-󃂠-vis the population.¹² There are conflicting reports as to whether the IDPs in making up their mind view the deployment of the UPDF contingents as a prerequisite for their protection and return. The replacement of UPDF with civilian police and these forces following the IDPs (instead of telling the IDPs to follow them) is a measure deserving highest priority from the government and international community. Other factors which may prompt further returns include the availability of elephant grass to construct roofs for their houses, said to be ready for cutting in November or December, and the start of the new school year in February 2007.

The biggest push factor, as one NGO reported, will be the decision of WFP to cut or stop the food rations for camp populations.¹³ WFP has been the largest provider of humanitarian assistance in Northern Uganda.

With regards to the creation of the newer, smaller sites, as part of a so-called "decongestion policy" to improve the IDPs' living conditions, several agencies feared that this measure introduced by the government has, in fact, been part of a policy of population movement control in northern Uganda. Evidence of the existence of such a policy has not emerged although it cannot be excluded that it might be part of the government's plans. In Mucwini camp, Kitgum district, IDPs rejected the idea of moving to smaller sites. They expressed the wish to return to their original homes directly.

In other areas, the IDPs may be more eager to move to smaller sites. According the reports of one NGO in Pader district, for example, IDPs have started to trade land for services and walk back to the old camps if they are in need of medical care of water. As reported in May, these smaller sites may turn out to be not a mid-way solution, but become more permanent in character.

Regardless of predicting which scenario will materialise, aid agencies, in any case, need to make up their minds as to the planning of their operations: do they carry out their activities in locations where the IDPs presently are, or should they go where the IDPs might go in the near future? Whereas the first strategy "let the population decide where they want to go," as one NGO put it, it might also imply "running behind the curve," if the population moves. Agencies may not be in time to help the returnees pick up their lives again. The second strategy might imply being part of a return movement, which is more coerced than purely voluntary, as this strategy uses the provision of aid as push and pull factors. In managing this 'tension' between the two strategies one NGO noted: "There should not be an automatic reflex of aid agencies to follow without questioning the responsibility of the government."

A return movement also presents other challenges for aid agencies. Being present and distributing aid to a population dispersed over many small communities in a large area is not an easy task. Moreover, donors view return traditionally as part of a phase of transition, in which they reduce their humanitarian assistance funds. Development funding and actors are not only known for arriving late, but they also work through the government, whose capacity is extremely weak or affected by the different agendas of different authorities in northern Uganda, which, in turn, may imply that development aid will only slowly reach the ground.¹⁴ The risk for the fragile situation in northern Uganda of funds drying up should not be under-estimated. The donor community would be very unwise to yet again repeat the well-known mistake of phasing out too early.¹⁵

From talks with NGOs, IDPs, and returnees in Lira district, it has become clear that the returnees' needs are particularly in the areas of sexual and gender-based violence, psycho-social health, basic health care, education, road construction, and water and sanitation. In Lira district, a major issue is already emerging with regards to the implementation of these activities. From talking with agencies, many feel that Unicef, which leads the health and water and sanitation clusters, a responsibility that brings with it the obligation to deliver services when nobody else has the capacity to do so, has failed to be operational in the return areas so far.¹⁶

The presence of landmines or unexploded ordnance in return areas may be a relatively minor risk, although it would only take one accident for it to become an impediment for return. One issue, which needs urgent clarification, relates to the potential for disputes over land and property rights. Views differ significantly among actors whether or not these disputes are likely to emerge and, if so, to their scale.

The increasing presence and violent activities of Karimajong - groups of cattle rustlers from the Karamoja region - and some other thugs involved in banditry may create a further protection challenge. Reportedly, they have replaced their traditional raids on cattle by a more violent tactic targeting the civilian population and seem to have moved further in-land from their districts in the East and North-East.¹⁷ The recent increase in incidents suggests that the Karamajong problem may lead to further insecurity and violence. In this respect, UNHCR's decision to take care of IDPs who are displaced because of the LRA-UPDF conflict, while not caring for IDPs whose displacement has been caused by the Karimajong, might no longer be feasible.

Another challenge with regards to the return of IDPs will be to make them less dependent on external aid. Inevitably, years of life in the camps have created a dependency towards the agencies providing IDPs with assistance, albeit at inadequate levels.¹⁸ Ironically, it will be now up to same agencies to instill an understanding in the minds of the IDPs that they will have to cope with the situation themselves.

HUMANITARIAN COORDINATION

Calls from international NGOs and others for stronger humanitarian leadership and a more effective coordination process led and facilitated by the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) - with the support of OCHA - have gone only half-heeded, so it seems.

On the positive side, a new, interim, head has been deployed to lead OCHA since mid-August. His efforts in trying to get more relevant humanitarian actors around the table included reaching out to agencies that had so far not participated, who to date had not seen the added value of the coordination process. His efforts have led to a more inclusive and inter-active process, including discussions at the field level, to develop the Consolidated Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) for 2007. He is also holding introductory workshops on the cluster approach at the district level.

OCHA has also deployed a liaison officer at the peace negotiations in Juba, Sudan taking place between the Government of Uganda and the LRA, facilitated by the Government of South Sudan, and has issued an appeal to donor governments for USD 4.7 million to support the peace talks and related costs of hosting the LRA and their families.¹⁹

On the negative side, the general coordination process, particularly in Kampala and most districts, remains weak. In spite of the IASC and meetings of cluster leads, several agencies reported that inter-cluster coordination has still not started. Humanitarian leadership, necessary to strengthen the process, is dependent on the Humanitarian Coordinator. After NGOs wrote to the ERC in July asking for the designation of a new, separate HC, the ERC responded that he was willing to look into this option. In turn, the ERC asked the NGOs informally to suggest a name, an interesting move given that he has had a pool with vetted candidates for the HC position at his disposal since June this year.²⁰

As no further action from the ERC has been reported on the issue and with the context on the ground changing, those who oppose a separate HC may win the case. They will argue that for a transition situation to be smooth, the Resident Coordinator should also assume the HC function. They forget, however, that a transition situation requires proper management of the different dynamics of two different contexts: a humanitarian situation, in which aid is directly provided to the population, and a development situation, in which aid is delivered through the government. A single person is likely to meld these two different dynamics into one, which is a recipe for failure, at least on the humanitarian side.

A complicating element is the question of who is in charge of humanitarian coordination. Clearly, the government has primary responsibility for responding to IDPs. In Uganda, the government set up a "Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) Emergency Plan for Humanitarian Interventions for the North" in May. Five months later, the plan and structure remain little more than a policy paper containing all the right language. The donor community and the UN view the JMC as the only forum within which they engage the government on its North Uganda policy.²¹

The capacity to lead in coordination at the district level does not exist. One consequence of the government's limited coordination and response capacity at the district level is that NGOs see little value in sharing their plans and budgets with the authorities as desired by the government in Kampala. As a result, a level of distrust between NGOs and the central government continues to exist.

Whereas in a humanitarian situation, international agencies can become, de facto substitutes for the government and lead coordination efforts, in a situation of transition the government will have to play a more prominent role, not just in words. Transitioning to a situation in which the government will be effectively leading the response in the North, in which it will do the 'right' things with regards to protecting the population and ensuring their human rights, will require significant diplomatic stewardship on the part of the UN Humanitarian and Resident Coordinators.

On a practical level, some new coordination efforts are underway. In Kampala, UNHCR has started a Monday morning coordination meeting to discuss IDP return among UN agencies only. UNHCR has announced that these meetings will also be opened to NGOs.

As reported by the Head of OCHA, "these meetings feed into IASC Working Group in Kampala and have recently informed discussions on the 2007 CAP planning process. It may yet be transformed into a fully fledged Camp Coordination and camp Management Cluster with a big role in coordinating the distribution of non food items for IDPs, returning IDPs, and returnee IDPs."

At the district level, efforts have been made to improve coordination as well. With regards to Gulu, MSF reported an informal weekly meeting among NGO Heads to discuss common concerns. In Lira, UNHCR noted that the protection working group has looked at the ICVA Coordinator's May trip report to see how it could make improvements in the coordination process.

Surprisingly, in Kitgum, the coordination process shows a different face. Here, an informal process is run by some seven UN and non-UN agencies in addition to the formal coordination structures. A relatively limited group of agencies present in Kitgum, common concerns over the security situation, and the personalities of the individuals leading these agencies are three important factors that have brought these agencies together and that have contributed to a more collaborative and efficient process, particularly at the sectoral level. A security core group, for example, which meets on a bi-weekly basis, has engaged in more strategic and policy related issues.

The (informal) coordination process in Kitgum has led to a relatively good and shared understanding of the priorities. Mapping of activities and actors has revealed duplication of specific health activities in some camps and major gaps in other activities and camps, an issue that needs to be addressed urgently.²²

What is critical, however, in Kitgum and other districts, is the need to improve the general coordination meeting. With the splitting up of the response into sectors, clusters, sub-clusters, and other working groups, there is real risk that the bigger picture and overview will get lost and that cross-cutting issues will be left out. In fact, for every new issue appearing on the horizon, there is the tendency to create a new meeting, instead of looking where it should fit and/or integrating it into the general coordination process.²³ As one NGO staff noted: "I cannot go to more meetings."

With access to the North opening up, new agencies and actors are likely to show up, a phenomenon already seen in Pader. In Kitgum, one NGO staff noted that the general coordination meeting served at least one purpose: "newcomers, who would come to the general weekly coordination meeting, would immediately be pointed in the directions of the relevant sectoral group so as to avoid duplication." Nevertheless, the issue of newcomers will present a challenge to the process in place, especially when these new actors and agencies have preconceived plans as to their activities.

NGOs, be they newcomers or not, should reflect on whether and how they want to fit into the bigger picture. The patchwork of NGO activities, as seen in May, will not show a clearer pattern, if many of them continue to be driven by a project mentality. As one UN staff put it: "NGOs continue to shop around for projects in this country."

Undoubtedly, the most noticeable newcomer in Kitgum will be the US military, which is due to arrive on the ground in mid-October. In a meeting with agencies in Kitgum on 20 September, the US Ambassador noted that US troops will come to assist the UPDF in becoming a more professional army, through measures of confidence building and human rights training. Teams of engineers will also be part of this deployment. They will engage in rehabilitating a number of health clinics and drilling new boreholes. Asked why they will also undertake the latter type of activities, the Ambassador replied that these teams do this everywhere in the world and that they will coordinate and collaborate with existing agencies on the ground.

Clearly, the deployment of the US military adds a new dimension to the humanitarian complexity on the ground with regards to coordination and relationships. For years, at the international level, humanitarian agencies have developed policies on their relationship with the military. When militaries engage in relief activities, humanitarian agencies have stressed the need to maintain a distance from these troops in order to avoid the blurring of vital distinctions between independent humanitarian action and activities mainly driven by political or other motivations. As a matter of priority, the Humanitarian Coordinator should engage in a discussion with the US government with a view to defining the terms under which the US military will undertake relief tasks.

CLUSTERS

General feelings on the roll-out of the cluster approach in Uganda are probably best captured in the remark of a UN official who said, "Overall, the roll-out of the cluster approach has not been stellar in Uganda." As reported in May, the clusters mean different things to different people.

From the four clusters that have been rolled-out in Uganda, the protection cluster, led by UNHCR, is the only one that is seen as active and visible. De facto, it has become the 'super-cluster' ahead of, and leading, other clusters (and sectors).²⁴ UNHCR's approach to taking its new responsibility seriously has also reinforced the notion that the cluster approach belongs to UNHCR and IDP situations only. In Kitgum, UNHCR and the clusters have not yet started.

With regards to the implementation of its cluster responsibilities, it should be noted that UNHCR has had the wind in its back. The progress made on the political front has resulted in a significant potential for increased humanitarian operations and IDP protection and return. For UNHCR, the ultimate success will also depend on the agency's capacity to sustain its operations. It has done well in bringing in experienced and/or capable staff to implement the agency's new responsibilities. Many of them are, however, are on temporary or particular contractual arrangements. A longer-term vision from headquarters with regards to the agency's internal capacity and resources to take care of IDPs also in the future is urgently wanted.

Due to the confusion over the clusters and related cluster concerns, OCHA reported that it will host a review of the 'coordination architecture' on 6 October, which, according to the Head of OCHA, "shall start a dialogue and process to revise how we coordinate." It can be assumed that this meeting will also look at the difference between sectors and clusters. WFP has been quite unhappy with priority given to clusters, as it looks that this approach has created a two-tiered system where clusters are seem to be superior to sectors.

With the protection cluster becoming further operational in Lira and Gulu, the other three clusters (Early Recovery, Health, and Water and Sanitation), conversely, appear as running further behind. In districts where return is taking place, such as Lira, the Early Recovery cluster has conducted needs assessments. Making the next step in translating these assessments into action is, however, the missing link. Furthermore, the Head of the UNDP office in Lira appeared highly reluctant in accepting that 'his' cluster would have to do follow-up on information collected by agencies participating in the protection working group (as the protection cluster is locally called), which is looking at returnees' needs and take on priorities as defined from a protection point of view. Instead, he stressed the early recovery cluster's won needs assessments at the point of departure.

Reportedly, it has been decided by the IASC within the framework of the 2007 CAP that the Early Recovery cluster lead (UNDP) will retain cluster coordination functions, such as leading assessments, but the implementation of early recovery activities will remain with specialised agencies.

The Health and Water and Sanitation clusters are said to have remained a sectoral meeting, not noticing any difference with the new cluster approach.²⁵ Relations between Unicef, which is the lead for the health cluster, and WHO that wants to become the lead, are still said to be constrained over this issue.

Comparing the status of the clusters with the situation in May, there is still a feeling, as worded by one UN official, that it is "too early to tell whether the clusters have an added-value." In this respect, the question must be asked what the benchmarks are to assess the added-value of the clusters and what needs to be done to avoid that, at the end of this year, (theoretically 12 months into the process) this feeling continues to predominate.²⁶

In this context, it might be wise to rationalise the cluster concept and bring it back to its original idea of gap-filling. Many of the elements that have been related to the cluster concept, such as making coordination a more action-orientated process that goes beyond information-sharing, should be matters of good coordination and should be standard practice anyway, regardless of whether the coordination structure is labeled as clusters, sectors, or anything else. Furthermore, the application of the clusters also needs clarification. Do they apply exclusively to IDPs in camps, as seems to be a general belief among NGOs, or do the clusters apply also for other situations?

One issue that deserves urgent attention from the IASC at the global level relates to the emerging confusion between cluster coordination and coordination with implementing partners. In Uganda, two clusters lead agencies, UNHCR and Unicef, have been given funds by donors to implement cluster activities. Subsequently, they turn to NGOs to become implementing partners. Working as an implementing partner of a UN agency often means that the NGO is told by that agency what to do. Such a relationship is quite different from cluster coordination, which is expected to work on the principle of the equality of partners and the joint definition of priorities.

One example of this confusion has been seen in Lira between UNHCR and one international NGO. Whereas UNHCR may find it easier to work with smaller NGOs, as these may be more inclined to follow UNHCR's priorities, in Lira it asked a relatively large international NGO to take on protection monitoring. In the eyes of UNHCR, however, this NGO was unnecessarily holding up the implementation process by bringing in its own protection specialist to examine and adjust a protection monitoring form. In addition, the NGO also wanted to discuss with UNHCR the objective of data collection through the protection monitoring tool. "Collecting protection information for the sake of collecting information is not an effort of which we see the purpose," according to the NGO. The NGO wanted to ensure that protection information flowing from the data collection would be followed up and/or be fed back into a coordination process to adjust response strategies, if necessary.

Unicef might have been susceptible to the similar problems and critiques in Kitgum, where it has been, in the words on an NGO staff, "quite aggressive in mobilising actors to step up the response." However, there is one significant difference with the situation in Lira. Instead of introducing a new coordination framework or defining a new, single approach, the current Unicef representative in Kitgum has carefully been searching for common denominators between different approaches. She has been highly instrumental in making a committee on population movements an effective body for discussing issues of protection and return. Ideas have now emerged in this committee to ensure IDP participation in it.

With the coordination process working relatively well and some NGOs having stepped up their activities, UNHCR will need to be careful in integrating its approach and priorities when it comes to Kitgum in October. Unicef, so far, has been quite effective in leading the protection working group. In this context, the UNHCR representative in Kampala stressed that her agency "has no intention of taking on the protection lead in Kitgum. As an illustration of this cautious approach, UNHCR has asked an NGO to take on the lead in protection and return monitoring in Pader. "We do not have to take the lead, if it is effectively done by others," according to the UNHCR Head.

With regards to avoiding a conflict of interest between cluster leadership and coordination on the one hand, and agency responsibilities on the other hand, OCHA has suggested a separation of these two functions. According to OCHA, "one of the problems - in protection and other clusters - is that cluster coordination is a task added to the shoulders of someone who already has a full time job." In reaction to this suggestion, it must be said, however, that ultimately the personality of the individual is probably the most important factor for success (or failure) in leading the cluster and effective coordination efforts.

The question of whether Uganda can become a success story for the cluster approach can only be answered if there is agreement on the benchmarks to assess the added value of the clusters. Many view the clusters in Uganda as exclusively the domain of UNHCR and, therefore, relate the success of the clusters to a successful IDP return. Others put the cluster approach in more general terms and stress this approach as a way to improve coordination and collaboration.

The most apt comment on the state of the cluster approach in Uganda, however, comes from Dr Lucy Hovil from the Ugandan Refugee Law Project: "There is something ironic and more than a little sad that, in some of the worst affected areas we are only just seeing the establishment of offices [by the UN] on the eve of a potential peace agreement. If the worst happens and war should resume, it will be a real test-case for the viability of the clusters, and in particular, for the lead agencies to assume the responsibilities that have been granted to them under the cluster approach."²⁷

Ed Schenkenberg van Mierop
ICVA Coordinator
Geneva, 6 October 2006

Notes

1. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Ambassador Fujisaki and to UNHCR for having offered me this possibility and for their time, interesting discussions, and colleageality during the visit. I also wish to thank those who provided me with helpful comments on an earlier draft of this report. Readers are invited to make comments on this report by e-mail: ed.schenkenberg@icva.ch The May 2006 report can be found at http://www.icva.ch/cgi-bin/browse.pl?doc=doc00001845 Back

2. At the time of writing this report, the peace process is at the risk of falling apart with the UPDF declaring that it will resume military operations against LRA rebels that have failed to show up at the two assembly areas in Southern Sudan. Back

3. Another representative of this NGO explained that, based on several discussions with IDPs, the population has no clue what aid agencies are doing. In addition to proximity, staying overnight in the camps serves two objectives according to this representative: "increased security by spending less time on the roads and, thus, improved assistance in the camps." Back

4. The 2001 Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) policy on the use of armed escorts, albeit a non-binding document, has, unfortunately, not been followed by either the UN or many NGOs. The Department for Safety and Security (DSS) requires UN agencies to use armed escorts on a number of routes. UNHCR refuses categorically to travel with them as they would run counter to creating a sense of security for IDPs concomitant with UNHCR's protection mandate. UNDSS is reportedly carrying out an assessment of the security situation together with the UPDF. Such an assessment, however, risks ignoring humanitarian principles, such at the humanitarian imperative and independence. Moreover, the UN Designated Official, who is responsible for security matters, is the Resident Coordinator, a position usually not known for prioritising humanitarian principles. Back

5. Some donor governments or agencies have also insisted on the use of armed escorts in Uganda in the past. Such policies interfere with the independence of humanitarian agencies. Back

6. In early September, the LRA assembled at two designated areas in Southern Sudan as part of a cessation of hostilities agreement signed on 26 August 2006. Back

7. It is also reported that the differences in IDPs' return not only exist between districts, but also between camps in the same districts and, even, within the camps. Back

8. There is no doubt that the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is primarily responsible for the violence and abductions. Yet, government forces are also said to be implicated in intimidation and abuse of IDPs. It should not be forgotten that the government created the IDP camps in northern Uganda as a war tactic against the LRA. Such a tactic amounts to a violation of International Humanitarian Law, which only allows for the relocation of the civilian population under very strict circumstances. Back

9. Most recently, UNHCR and WFP have harmonised their definition and have agreed on single one. Back

10. The Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) for 2007 reportedly also outlines three scenarios and related strategic priorities. Back

11. Recently, UNHCR also started internal discussions on the closure of the camps. According to UNHCR, a question in this context is what to do with camps that have been deserted for the large part, as they may attract bandits, who become new inhabitants, or see the decay and collapse of camp buildings and water and sanitation facilities becoming a health threat. Back

12. The Acholi population is the largest ethnic group in Northern Uganda. Back

13. At a meeting in Brussels on 5 October, the WFP Deputy Director General explained that WFP's decision to cut food rations from 70% to 60% is based on the IDPs' access to increased land, and that a further cut to 40% is based on increased access to local markets. Back

14. Uganda has often been referred to as the "Pearl of Africa" with regards to offering a success story for development aid. One of the crucial factors for the successful return of IDPs in northern Uganda is likely to be the ability of donors to convince the Ugandan government to invest development funds in the North. Back

15. Some donor governments are reportedly looking for agencies, in particular their 'own' NGOs, i.e. originating from the same country as the donor, to develop agriculture and water and sanitation activities, in areas of return. Back

16. In Lira, a discussion has started on the concept of last resort in relation to the provision of water and sanitation facilities in return areas, which so far has not been implemented. The last resort concept, which initially was understood as the responsibility of the cluster lead to step in if no other agency was delivering services, has been subject to controversy. Back

17. In the second week of September, reports were made of the beheading of two civilians by Karamajong in Pader district. Back

18. For this reason, agencies seem to have different views on the issue of dependency. As one NGO put it: "people in Northern Uganda are more resilient then dependent." Back

19. One reason why OCHA is extensively involved in the peace process, a role which can be seen as going beyond humanitarian affairs, is said to relate to weaknesses in the UN Department of Political Affairs to play such a role at this time, although, reportedly, they have a staff member deployed in Juba. Unicef is said to be prepared to deliver services to the LRA families, in particular women and children. Back

20. The strengthening of the HC function has been one of the priorities in the UN humanitarian reform process. In spring 2006, the IASC agreed on a profile for the HC function and approved a pool of pre-vetted candidates who would be able to fulfil the HC function. Back

21. Meanwhile, a senior OCHA representative noted at a meeting in Brussels on 5 October that OCHA would prioritise the new "Peace, Reconciliation, and Development Plan" (PRDP) as the governments' framework for leading the response. Back

22. For example, a number of NGOs are carrying out HIV sensitization projects in camps. The availability of donor funding is probably one reason for the over-representation of this health activity. In the same camps, other health problems, such as malaria and diarrhea, which are also major causes of mortality, continue to be under-treated, according to a medical NGO in Kitgum. As one representative of this NGO put it in Kampala: "in practice, the donors are coordinating humanitarian assistance in northern Uganda." Back

23. For example, return is an issue that will affect every sector and activity and should therefore permeate the coordination process. Back

24. Sub-clusters of the protection cluster have also been set up. They include: sexual and gender-based violence and child-protection, led by Unicef, human rights led by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. It is not known whether these sub-clusters, however, report to the protection cluster in order to keep a general overview and consolidated strategy. One NGO commented on these sub-clusters: "the other UN agencies had to be given something in order to keep them satisfied." Back

25. In a paper on the cluster roll-out in Northern Uganda, which was recently presented by a representative of the Refugee Law Project at a meeting in Geneva, one interviewee was quoted as: "The water sector meeting is now the same useless meeting, but it's called the water cluster." Op.cit. note 27. Back

26. The IASC, which generally welcomed the cluster approach at its meeting in December 2005, decided that 1 January 2006 would be the starting date of the clusters. In reality, it has taken until May before the cluster approach was rolled out in northern Uganda. Back

27. Initial NGO Responses to the Roll-out of the Cluster Approach, Dr Lucy Hovil, Refugee Law Project, paper presented at annual consultations between UNHCR and NGOs, Geneva, 28 September 2006. Back