Uganda Trip Report
17 - 26 May 2006

Observations

ICVA Coordinator¹

INTRODUCTION

Uganda has been selected as one of the first three countries to implement the cluster leadership approach. This approach is part of the process to reform the humanitarian system, which has been initiated by the Emergency Relief Coordinator, Jan Egeland since the end of 2004. The body for humanitarian coordination at the global level, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), in which ICVA participates as a standing invitee, has generally welcomed the clusters as the way forward in addressing gaps in humanitarian response.

Linked to this humanitarian reform process is the relationship between the UN and NGOs in humanitarian response. Both the UN and NGOs feel that this relationship needs to be strengthened in order to respond more effectively to humanitarian needs worldwide.

As part of the ICVA Secretariat's role in the humanitarian reform process, the ICVA Coordinator travelled to Uganda in mid-May to discuss with members, other NGOs, UN agencies, and other actors, their views and experiences related to humanitarian response and coordination, the cluster roll-out, and their relationships. This report provides a snapshot of these issues. It is hoped that the report will be helpful to those interested and involved in the coordination process and cluster roll-out on the ground, as well as informing the further reform discussions in the IASC context at the global level.

I HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

• A Patchwork
  Although the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), Jan Egeland, described Northern Uganda in 2003 as one of the world's most forgotten humanitarian crises in 2003, humanitarian agencies did not provide a response of a scale and size required to put an to this situation. While few humanitarian agencies have recognised the emergency character of the mass displacement since 2003, most of the agencies, including a number that have been present in (Northern) Uganda for ten years or longer, have responded by beefing-up their developmental programmes and activities.

  International NGOs and the ICRC have dominated the response in the North. The majority of the international NGOs appear as project-driven with too little attention being paid on how their projects contribute to the effectiveness of the overall response. The relatively weak presence of the UN system has been one of the factors contributing to the fragmentation of the NGO dominated operations. On the whole, the NGO programmes and projects come across as a patchwork lacking in structure or pattern. The total of activities appears smaller than the sum of the parts.

• Security
  In mid-May 2006, there were some indications that the humanitarian context may be changing. While the armed conflict in the North is not over, in some areas opportunities for IDPs to move out of camps and/or to return home and for agencies to have unimpeded humanitarian access may be increasing. Whereas in previous years, the security conditions have forced many agencies to concentrate on the IDP camps that are closest to the towns, they should now be prepared to work in more remote areas, further away from the towns.

  The policy of many agencies to use armed escorts for travel to IDP camps in a number of areas needs to be urgently reviewed. While humanitarian agencies may be expected to use armed escorts as a last resort, this practice in Uganda has been put in place before considering other, less controversial, measures to enhance the security of humanitarian staff.² Basic security provisions, such as the designation of security focal points in NGOs, the establishment of common VHF radio channels, a 24-hour radio room, and convening a regular security coordination meeting are not in place in most locations. The Security Management Team (SMT) has remained a UN-only group in Uganda, in spite of global IASC recommendations for this team to be expanded to include NGO representatives.^3. The debate on how to reduce the reliance on armed escorts should shift its focus to realising safe and unimpeded humanitarian access.

• Humanitarian Challenges
  The first objective of humanitarian interventions for IDPs is to reduce the excessive mortality rates among the population in camps. A July 2005 mortality survey which was carried out by the Ministry of Health, WHO, other UN agencies, and one NGO found mortality rates three times higher than in Darfur, Sudan. Meanwhile, the government has distanced itself from the survey's findings with WHO being remarkably silent on this step by the government.

  There is much talk in Uganda about "decongestion," a term which is used by the government to advocate for reductions in overcrowding of camps, in particular by creating smaller 'satellite' camps, to create better conditions than in many of the present camps.

  The Ugandan authorities' proposal to create 'satellite' camps as a step before the IDPs' final journey home brings new challenges for the humanitarian agencies. The risk with developing smaller, temporary, settlements is that these locations might eventually turn out to be not so temporary but more permanent in nature, in turn risking the denial of the IDPs' right to return to their original houses and land. When speaking with a group of IDPs in one of the camps near Lira, many expressed a preference for the option of moving to smaller camps before returning home.

  While the UN has produced a strategy paper on decongestion and the relocation of IDPs, it is not publicly available, or easy to obtain for NGOs. It is critical, however, that UN agencies and NGOs, reflect on ways to maintain a balanced approach that allows continuation of protection and assistance activities in existing camps, while preparing for voluntary return by stepping up services in the IDPs' areas of origin and/or setting up satellite camps. Discussion in an inter-agency setting is required to weigh up the benefits of reducing mortality and morbidity that may be realised through the creation of smaller satellite camp settings, against the further continuation of the displacement of the population that may be the result of these new camps.

• Meaningful Coordination
  In Uganda, humanitarian coordination is not an action-oriented process. Actors fail to go beyond the reporting of activities and there is a lack of information-sharing and engage in a collective exercise to analyse and understand how the totality of the response is meeting the totality of the needs. The general consensus is that coordination meetings do not lack in numbers and in duration, they lack in focus. One representative of an NGO noted that had seen inter-agency coordination "nowhere as bad as here."

  Most humanitarian agencies are unaware of the existence of a common humanitarian action plan (CHAP), which is expected to underpin all humanitarian activities.⁴ In Uganda, the CHAP is part of the consolidated appeal (CAP). The lack of knowledge and buy-in to the CHAP may be (partly) compensated by the protection strategy, that has been devised by the UNHCR-led protection cluster since the end of 2005. There does, however, not seem to be consensus on the issue of whether protection is an overarching umbrella that should inform all humanitarian activities or whether it should be treated as an 'ordinary' sector, similar to water and sanitation or food aid. While the IASC country team (CT) has given its blessing to the protection strategy, the relationship of this strategy to an overall humanitarian strategy such as the CHAP is unclear.

  In this context, inter-cluster coordination, a process to ensure that the new clusters are inter-linked with each other and with existing sectors, is also missing. The IASC CT is the forum responsible for organising and leading such a coordination process.

  In Uganda, the IASC CT has been in place since 2004 and operates as an extension of the UN country team with the addition of a few NGOs to the meetings. Particular to the Ugandan context, one donor representative also participates in the IASC CT.

  While NGOs have until now participated in the body on the basis of regional representation, the NGO membership of the IASC CT is presently being revised in order to increase NGO participation. The IASC working group is proposed to include 10 NGOs, while the IASC CT proper would have seats for 5 NGOs. It is unclear, however, whether this revision process is giving consideration to the number of seats for the UN system. Adding a few more NGOs to the IASC is not necessarily making the meeting less UN centric or focused on humanitarian issues.

  As the IASC CT needs to become a forum for discussing humanitarian policy and strategic issues, it should discuss, for example, concerns such as the process of the clusters roll-out, the separation of the Humanitarian Coordinator function from the Resident coordinator, and the policy of using armed escorts.

  In Kampala, a meeting of the government, donor governments, UN agencies, and NGOs, known as the contact group, serves as the broad forum for information sharing at the capital level. The relationship or interface between this group and the IASC CT, and how these bodies benefit from each other is unclear.

  On the ground, the district disaster management committee (DDMC) is a government-led coordination forum aimed at information exchange. DDMC meetings take place once every two months, although it was reported that meetings are sometimes cancelled. Given the dire humanitarian situation, OCHA should have taken the lead in organising separate regular humanitarian coordination meetings on at least a monthly, if not bi-weekly basis. While a constructive relationship with the authorities is essential, humanitarian coordination should not be dependent on the government.

  Part of the poor state of coordination is the lack of consolidated collection of information and humanitarian data. At best, information is compiled by OCHA about who is doing what, where, and when. Much of this information, however, is outdated or irrelevant. In one district, for example, it included agencies that cannot be regarded as being operational humanitarian actors.

  At the district level, OCHA staff are mostly busy with attending sector (or cluster) and sub-sector (or sub-cluster) meetings in order to maintain some overview of the activities. In one district, where OCHA has been present since 2004, a chart that outlines the different coordination structures and how these relate to each other has only been recently developed and is still in draft form.

  With the arrival of the clusters, there is a risk of further fragmentation of information, particularly if inter-cluster coordination remains absent. There is a risk that the two most active clusters in Uganda, protection and early-recovery, are duplicating their activities, as both want to do needs assessments, mapping of capacities, and strategic planning. A general (inter-cluster) coordination meeting at the district level might avoid this problem.

• Humanitarian Coordinator
  Responsibility for the absence of a focussed, action-orientated humanitarian coordination structure, a clear humanitarian strategy, and a lack of consolidated information management systems falls squarely with the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC).

  The Humanitarian Coordinator function has been fraught with problems in Uganda. For the previous 10 months, the head of Unicef, filled this function in conjunction with his agency's responsibilities, having expected to do so for an interim period of 6 weeks. One of the reasons for this conundrum is that the government's rejection of three proposed candidates.

  The majority of UN agencies are of the view that the HC function needs to be combined with the Resident Coordinator function, given a perceived need to work through the Ugandan government. Several NGOs along with UNHCR take a different view. They believe that the situation in the North requires special attention and strong leadership in order to mobilise an effective humanitarian response. A person wearing too many hats is, generally speaking, not able to pay sufficient attention to his/her humanitarian responsibilities. Unlike the RC function, the HC function does not require government approval.

  In both Uganda and the international level, there are deep differences of opinion on the separation of the HC and RC functions. Strangely, however, those advocating for a separation are nearly always drawing the short straw, as a combined HC/RC seems to have become the default position in practice.

  Meanwhile, in Uganda, a new Resident Coordinator was due to enter the country at the end of May. His experience and background in humanitarian coordination is unknown. It is also unknown whether he will be proposed as Humanitarian Coordinator at some point in the near future. In this vacuum, NGOs should continue to advocate for the appointment of a separate HC, who, as a matter of priority, should improve the humanitarian coordination process. In order to ensure broader buy-in to the function, it has been suggested by one UN agency and some NGOs that this person should have an NGO background. To avoid the risk of marginalising the HC position, such a proposal could only work if all UN agencies were in support of it.

  Given the recent dialogue between the UN and non-UN humanitarian actors on enhancing the effectiveness of humanitarian action,⁵ part of the HC's priorities should be to ensure that the coordination process becomes less UN-centric and more action-orientated to the humanitarian context in the North. The HC will also have an important role to play in ensuring that the added-value of the cluster leadership approach being rolled-out in Uganda, including the relationship between clusters and sectors, is understood by all. In addition, the HC must ensure that consolidated humanitarian information management systems are properly established and maintained so as to contribute to an overall improved humanitarian response.

In Uganda, four clusters have been rolled-out: Protection, led by UNHCR; Early Recovery, led by UNDP; and Health and Water and Sanitation, which are both led by Unicef.⁶ The Protection Cluster, and to a lesser degree, the Early Recovery Cluster are the most visible as they have held several meetings. In mid-May, the Health Cluster had just met for the first time, while the Water and Sanitation sectoral group had not yet met as a cluster. Other clusters, including the Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster and the Child Protection Cluster are sub-clusters of the Protection Cluster. As noted earlier, there is no inter-cluster coordination in Uganda. At the capital level, this process should be picked up by the IASC, while at the district level focussed humanitarian coordination meetings should be put in place on regular basis (e.g. once every two weeks).

Many NGOs and other humanitarian actors explained to be aware of the cluster approach. Views ranged, however, on whether the cluster approach was the best way forward. One local government official responsible for coordination at the district level explained that the clusters had been fully in place for a significant time. Many others expressed the need to better understand the clusters and the elements of accountability and last resort. Asked on his experiences in building up the clusters, the HC noted that if the clusters would have to be dropped, "if it turned out that they are not working." ⁷

NGOs noted that Uganda had been chosen for the clusters roll-out, as " a way to solving the problems in the UN Country Team." In this context, the view was also expressed that clusters should not be the prerequisite for effective coordination. Another representative of a humanitarian agency noted that in his eyes the clusters were introducing "a totalitarian approach to humanitarian action." In order to understand the added-value of cluster approach, NGOs explained that further debate will be required. One NGO representative in this regard wondered whether "UN agencies want substantive and critical debate."

Many NGOs view the clusters as a bureaucratic UN-centric mechanism. In their eyes, the clusters come with aspects that may take away attention from the actual delivery of services: need assessments, capacity mapping, paperwork in terms of tables, matrices and reporting, and, in particular, more meetings. "Coordination for the UN is their day job. We have other jobs," one NGO representative noted.

For many NGOs, the added-value of the new coordination framework remains a question. As one NGO representative stated: "With a day's notice, I am asked to participate in a cluster needs-assessment, which means that I will be missing three staff and one vehicle for the rest of the week. But why I should participate is not made clear to me." There is a serious risk of duplication in needs assessments carried out in the cluster context, if these assessments of the Protection and Early Recovery Cluster are not coordinated. In any case, the clusters should attempt to find out what information and data already exist, given that a number of NGOs have had a presence in the North for a significant period. The major problem with their information and knowledge about the situation is that it is dispersed and/or not centralised in database. The clusters, however, should come with effective and centralised information-management, and this approach must include making use of existing information, even if it is not readily available.

At the international level, debate continues on the aims of the cluster approach: it is gap-filling, a new coordination framework, or capacity-building? If it is the latter purpose, what funding mechanisms will be put in place on the ground, which do not only benefit the cluster lead, but the cluster as a whole? NGOs that participate in the cluster process in Uganda were not involved in the revision of the Consolidated Appeal, a revision that was necessary following the introduction of the cluster approach. In addition, NGOs wonder whether UN agencies will be able to disperse funds quickly and flexibly to cluster participants, should donor governments decide to channel their funds through the cluster lead.

The donor community in Uganda appears to be broadly in favour of the cluster approach. One donor representative, however, noted that the added-value of the clusters is not yet visible. Singling out UNHCR as the agency most serious in taking on its new cluster responsibilities, he wondered whether for the other agencies it was not "business as usual," which in his view implied "useless business."

• OCHA
  The UN's top-down approach in terms of rolling out the clusters has resulted in a lack of ownership on the part of field-based NGOs. Unfortunately, OCHA did not develop an orientation process, a role that it logically it should have taken on given that the vision underlying this approach was elaborated by the Head of OCHA, Jan Egeland.

  Clearly, setting up a dialogue with NGOs and others on the specific elements that underpin the cluster approach (addressing gaps, accountability, monitoring of standards, last resort concept, etc.) would have been a golden opportunity to revitalise the coordination process. Instead, OCHA is first trying to come to terms on its own understanding of the clusters and its (new) role within the approach. It can be reasonably expected, however, that OCHA's role would at least involve: maintaining an ongoing dialogue on the added-value of the cluster approach; facilitating inter-cluster coordination; and ensuring the flow of information between the different clusters and sectors. One UN agency stressed OCHA's role "as secretariat for the clusters."

• UNHCR
  Of the UN agencies, UNHCR is clearly the agency that has taken the cluster approach most seriously. The agency has deployed IDP and protection specialists, has set up the Protection Cluster, and has developed a protection strategy within the cluster framework. UNHCR is, however, in a tricky position with regards to its image: many of the NGOs feel the agency is arriving (at least) three years late and with too little staff who are deployed too slowly in the North. Some of them, in addition, wonder about UNHCR's approach vis-󃂠-vis the government in dealing with IDPs. Some say the agency is taking too an autonomous approach, as if it is operating in a refugee situation, whereas others believe that the protection strategy entails too close relations with the government.⁸ UNHCR has also been seriously criticised by NGOs for not sharing the protection strategy earlier on.

  Clearly, as mentioned above, OCHA could have made UNHCR's position in implementing the cluster approach easier by developing a cluster orientation process. In addition, UNHCR needs to be aware of some potential turf battles with other UN agencies: with Unicef, in relation to protection, as Unicef was earlier expected to lead on protection for the UN system; with OCHA, given the temptation for UNHCR to fill the coordination lacuna; and with UNDP, with regards to decisions on when to organise IDP returns. Although new funds were said to be on their way, donors must realise that only prompt and sufficient funding will put UNHCR in a position to increase and implement its operations for IDPs in a credible manner.

  With regards to starting IDP operations, UNHCR noted difficulties in finding sufficient NGOs capacity for carrying out activities within the framework of UNHCR's new responsibilities for IDPs, in particular for tasks related to camp management and coordination, and protection. While UNHCR made it clear that it will have to work with the agencies that are present, questions can be asked about the experience and quality of NGOs selected by UNHCR at this time. Not all NGOs may have (yet) the competence to work in areas such as camp management or protection.

  Asked about this problem noted by UNHCR, some NGOs reacted quite angrily about this perception noting UNHCR's arrogance. Others expressed their surprise about this perceived lack of potential NGO partners. One NGO noted that her NGO "had no discussions with them [UNHCR] about partnerships other than 1 meeting where they requested us to submit proposals for Lira. I still have no official information on a request for proposals for Gulu or other districts, although I have the impression that plans for this are underway. I would say most NGO participants still feel that UNHCR is simply doing things and then (maybe) informing us after the fact."

  From the NGO side, UNHCR has been criticised for the approach it took in formulating of the protection strategy. Rather than involving NGOs from the start of the process, UNHCR decided to widen the circle of consultations gradually as it circulated different draft versions of the strategy. The NGOs did not get to see the strategy until its third draft. UNHCR should have realised that partnership requires co-ownership of process and substance. Informing NGOs after the fact (i.e. after internal UN consultations) harks back to doing things the old (pre-clusters approach) way. Asked about its strategy in developing the paper, a UNHCR official explained that in leading the cluster the agency has chosen "to be inclusive, but not all encompassing."

One qualification that was repeatedly heard with regards to the quality of international NGOs' performance is that their interventions in Northern Uganda come across as a second-class operation. Too few international staff, insufficient strategic thinking and a piecemeal operational approach are examples given in support of this criticism. In citing a specific example of how some of the international NGOs need to be taken by the hand, one UN agency explained that it had even written a project proposal for one of them.

The NGO community lacks cohesion and the capacity to strategically interact at the inter-agency level. While some international NGO directors meet monthly on an informal basis, there is no NGO forum to provide a mechanism for dialogue and reflection on strategic issues of common concern. Even more worrying than the absence of such a mechanism, however, is that few see the need for more proactive and strategic NGO dialogue, especially given that the current UN-led coordination structures are ineffective.

It should be added that many of the international NGOs have multiple agendas, which include aspects of humanitarian assistance, but also contain many other elements relating to advocacy, human rights, development, peace-building and reconciliation. In fact, some international NGOs focus their activities on advocacy without having a sizeable (international) presence on the ground in the North. Asked for the reason why NGOs combine their humanitarian assistance with a peace agenda, some of them explained that they want to be seen as offering proposals for solving the conflict. National and local Ugandan authorities have accused the international humanitarian community for prolonging the conflict or from "taking over the North" as one NGO noted. Asked about his relations with the international NGOs, a local DDMC official explained that he found it "a challenge to understand NGOs. We do not have full transparency yet on their activities, " he added.

A report of a large NGO coalition that is aimed at peace-building hugely upset the government in April. ⁹ In essence, the report cites humanitarian concerns as a reason for the international community to put Uganda on the agenda of the UN Security Council. A lack of consultation in drafting of the report created some crisis in the NGO coalition. Some NGOs part of the coalition clearly had preferred a softer report in order not to upset the government. Rejecting the antagonistic attitude of his colleagues, one NGO representative explained this culture as: "You don't dialogue with the government, you just criticise."

It is remarkable, however, that very few humanitarian NGOs call into question the advocacy approach to link humanitarian concerns with a peace and security agenda, an approach which is also taken by the ERC. Humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality are necessary to maintain the confidence of the government (and other parties) about the NGOs' humanitarian intentions. NGO advocacy, in particular to promote the international community's engagement with Uganda through the Security Council, is likely to be perceived by the authorities as politically motivated, wondering about the NGOs' non-political intentions. In this context, is important for humanitarian NGOs to reflect on the extent to which they should combine their operational humanitarian concerns, including a need to achieve unimpeded access, with an advocacy agenda.

While the cluster roll-out in may still have been in its early days, a number of observations made in this report will hopefully be of use as the process continues. ICVA has committed to following the cluster process and contributing in a constructive way to try to improve this approach, as well as to improving humanitarian coordination in general. This report, along with other members' and partners' input and feedback on experiences in rolling out the clusters in Uganda, will continue to provide a contribution from the NGO side into ongoing discussions on humanitarian reform in general and the cluster leadership approach in particular. ¹⁰

Ed Schenkenberg van Mierop, ICVA Coordinator, July 2006

1. The observations as expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect a consensus of the ICVA membership or from the NGOs in Uganda, but are based on the various opinions and views as expressed by UN agencies, NGOs, and other (humanitarian) actors in Uganda added with my analysis. I would like to take this opportunity to thank everyone who agreed to meet with me during my visit for their time and effort in sharing their views and, in particular, the staff of IRC and NRC in Uganda for their facilitation of my trip.

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2. See: Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys, Discussion paper and Non-Binding Guidelines, IASC, September 2001.

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3. "Menu of Options," recommendations to strengthen the collaboration between the UN and NGOs on staff security, IASC 2001.

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4. An OCHA Geneva staff member pointed me to the CHAP for Uganda after my return. In Uganda, nobody appeared to know of the plan. A donor mission was apparently also unaware of the CHAP's existence as their report in March 2006 called to the "establishment of an agreed CHAP."

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5. Dialogue between the UN/IASC and NGOs at on enhancing the effectiveness of humanitarian action, 12/13 July 2006, Geneva.

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6. The cluster roll-out in Uganda differs significantly from the global clusters both in terms of the number of clusters (four in Uganda, while there are nine clusters at the global level) and in terms of cluster leadership. Instead of WHO, Unicef is the cluster lead for Health in Uganda, because of a stated lack of capacity on the part of WHO. Questions, therefore, remain as to whether WHO intends to take the cluster leadership role after it has built up its capacity and whether Unicef is willing to pass this role onto WHO.

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7. This position raises a question on whether the clusters are 'piloted' or tested in the roll-out countries or whether the approach is here to stay regardless. At the global level, the IASC seems to be divided on this issue.

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8. One international NGO informed ICVA recently that it does not want to endorse the protection strategy, as it believes that the policy would entail too close a relationship with the government. UNHCR, however, has made the endorsement of the protection strategy conditional on participation (or membership) of the Protection Cluster. As a result, the NGO wonders whether it is now excluded from coordination on protection issues, while the NGO fully subscribes to the principle of coordination with other humanitarian actors on key issues of common concern, such as protection.

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9. "Counting the Cost, Twenty Years of War in Northern Uganda," Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda (CSOPNU), March 2006.

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10. Information on the humanitarian reform process and the clusters, including an ICVA Secretariat report on the clusters in DRC (March 2006), is available on the ICVA website http://www.icva.ch/cgi-bin/browse.pl?doc=doc00001560

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