OCHA IDP Unit, External Evaluation, January 2004

In September and October 2003, a team of two independent external consultants ('the team') evaluated OCHA's Internal Displacement Unit ('the Unit'). They conducted interviews with a wide array of informants in Geneva, Rome, Belgrade, Prishtina, Nairobi, Kinshasa, Goma, London, Kabul, New York and Washington, DC. The two case studies selected by OCHA and the Unit were Serbia and D.R. Congo, with additional fieldwork in Nairobi and Kabul. In keeping with its independent nature, the evaluation's conclusions are to be self-standing and public. All interviews were conducted on a not-for-attribution basis.

Findings

Challenges the Unit Faces
It is necessary to place the findings of this evaluation in context. Many of the difficulties faced by the Unit reflect broader and more systemic problems: the inherent difficulties dealing with internal displacement, systemic failings of the UN system, problems OCHA itself has experienced over the past years, and finally the Unit's difficulties are those of every new entity trying to show added-value yet stay focused.

Institutional Relationships

The Unit has suffered from a number of fraught institutional relationships.

Partners on the Senior Network complain of meetings that revolve around a one-way flow of after-the-fact information, of lack of dialogue and lack of consultation.
Strong currents of opinion exist within OCHA headquarters that the internally displaced are OCHA's business and that Unit activities should be mainstreamed.
The Unit's most valuable asset is its direct link to the ERC, the Secretary General's focal point on internal displacement, but this link has not been fully realized.
The operational agencies reproach the alleged lack of consultation on the part of the Unit, and complain that the Unit shows too much operational involvement in the field.
Despite recent efforts, the respective roles and responsibilities of the Unit vis-à-vis the Office of the RSG and the Norwegian Refugee Council remain unclear to many.

Performance Findings

Field Support:

Unit and Inter-Agency Missions: The Unit has undertaken nearly 40 missions to more than 20 countries. These missions have varied in their effectiveness, often because of exogenous reasons: the political sensitivities of national authorities, lack of follow-up by UN country teams, or overly ambitious TORs.
IDP advisors: The Unit has helped articulate the need for, identify, recruit, and in some cases fund IDP advisors in the field in Afghanistan, Côte d'Ivoire, Iraq, Liberia, Serbia, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and soon in Uganda.

Protection:

Response Matrix, Protection Survey: The Unit developed and conducted the Response Matrix and Protection Survey, the former country-specific, the latter thematic, both ready in draft form. (The Protection Survey was conducted together with the Brookings SAIS Project.) They should become powerful advocacy tools for the Unit to advise the ERC on how RC/HCs, UN agencies, and their partners can more effectively meet the needs of the internally displaced.
Protection coalition: The protection coalition was designed to consist of a core group of partners with protection expertise who would act to support the Unit's protection efforts, to be activated in specific countries when needed. A protection coalition had limited success in Liberia prior to the resumption of conflict. Unsuccessful efforts were made in Iraq.

Capacity Building and Training:

Training and seminars. The Unit's training and seminar activities are well received in the field by local and international partners. There is limited progress in getting national authorities to understand the UN Guiding Principles, notably in Serbia and D.R. Congo. However, the lack of follow-through (not necessarily the responsibility of the Unit) has meant lost momentum.

Strengthening the Institutional Framework for IDPs:

National strategies and mechanisms: Working groups were established in Serbia, D.R. Congo, and Sudan (since disbanded), and draft strategies on internal displacement have been established or are being worked on in Uganda and Serbia.

Advocacy and Public Information:

The Unit recently released the book No Refuge: The Challenge of Internal Displacement (with the Migration Policy Institute), a thematic overview of the issues and challenges and the first UN publication on internal displacement. Regardless of the quality of the book, many question whether such a publication was the best use of the Unit's time and energy.
Upcoming projects: The Unit plans to commission a documentary to shed light on internal displacement in "forgotten crises" such as Sudan, D.R. Congo, or Georgia. The Unit also has plans for a photographic exhibit of pictures taking by displaced individuals and depicting the lives of the internally displaced.

Additional Performance Findings:

Mainstreaming internal displacement issues: The team found that the Unit had not achieved substantial progress in mainstreaming internal displacement issues into the work of IASC partners and OCHA branches. This may be because the Unit is still relatively new, or because the Unit's focus on internal displacement "excuses" other agencies from addressing the issue.
Monitoring internal displacement: The Unit is knowledgeable on situations of internal displacement around the world. It should seek to improve the collection of information from outside sources and the dissemination of information to other agencies and actors.

Management Issues

Terms of reference: The Unit's TOR do not contain specific objectives, leading to confusion on what the Unit is "supposed to do."

Staffing: The secondment arrangement confers the Unit its inter-agency nature, but also brings unique difficulties as staff members are thought to favor their 'mother' agency while often being suspected of disloyalty by this very agency. The Unit is trying to do too much with not enough staff. (The solution is not an increase in staff, but better focused activities.) Unit staff display on the whole considerable skills, experience and commitment.

Awkward internal management arrangements: The structure of the Unit is flat-a structure which could encourage flexibility and initiative. But there are too many managers and not enough management. This has resulted in lack of strategic vision, thrust and follow through. The Unit's planning process lacks method and transparency, notably in selecting countries for intervention.

Gender

The Unit has not been effective to date in integrating a gender perspective in its work. Not one interviewee was able to recall a specific focus on gender in the trainings, missions, or in any other interaction with the Unit. Mission reports vary in the extent to which they address gender issues; there is no systematic method of examining gender when conducting missions. Interviewees who specialize in gender spoke of a lack of receptivity on the part of the Unit to broach gender issues. The Unit is clearly aware of these shortcomings, and has already drafted a training module dealing specifically with gender issues.

Conclusions

Specific Conclusions

Busy, committed, but scattered: In its 22 months of existence, the Unit has initiated a wide array of activities. Unit staff has demonstrated energy, hard work, commitment, even enthusiasm in their efforts to promote the cause of the internally displaced. Some of their initiatives have been more successful, better received or better understood than others. Some are objective successes. The problem is that these activities have not amounted to positive change in how the UN responds to internal displacement.

Lack of impact on the UN system. To date, the Unit has not had the impact on the UN system that it was intended to achieve. The Unit has not been able to capitalize on its direct link to the ERC, it has failed to get RC/HCs to follow its recommendations, and has not been effective in reporting egregious failures of the system. The Unit should be aggressively identifying needs and gaps and making clear, practical suggestions to the ERC on how to remedy these gaps. The ERC's explicit, tangible support is a sine qua non condition for any Unit success.

Lack of strategic vision: The Unit lacks strategic vision, clear objectives and a sense of thrust. Examples included the Unit's choice of geographic areas of intervention (the criteria are unclear), of activities (too many), and of advocacy efforts within the UN system (too few, too shy). The Unit has been overly output-oriented, and has scattered its energy in too many different activities.

Lack of follow-through: The Unit has lacked follow-through on many of its initiatives, from reporting to training, to inter-agency missions. Sometimes this has been because the Unit itself has not followed up, sometimes because other actors have been unable or unwilling to follow up.

Bitter lessons from Iraq: The ERC sidelined the Unit in the planning of how internal displacement would be handled by the UN in Iraq. This was an important lost opportunity to assert the Unit's input, notably on protection. It also weakened the Unit's credibility, as operational agencies and others drew the conclusion that the Unit was irrelevant to decision-making on critical issues.

The Unit can do more to promote protection: The Unit has made valuable contributions to promoting the notion of protection, but much remains to be done. The Unit has yet to take on the leadership role it is expected to play in promoting protection (though the Protection Survey is an important step in that direction).

The Unit lacks the security of a continued existence: In the fraught inter-agency context of the UN, the natural concern of a new unit to demonstrate relevance has morphed into pervasive feelings of insecurity that have hobbled the Unit's internal advocacy role. Support from the ERC will help address this. Also necessary is longer-term support from donors.

Where to?

Looking forward, what should the Unit be? A technical support Unit that provides training and advisory services, identifies IDP advisors, collects lessons learned, etc.? Or the premier advocate for internal displacement issues within the UN system, capitalizing on its direct SG-mandated link to the ERC, who himself is the SG's focal person on internal displacement issues?

In the past, the Unit has tended towards the former. It is the strong conclusion of this evaluation that the Unit should gravitate towards the latter. Advocacy within the UN to improve the system's response, both overall and case by case, making the collaborative approach work, is the single greatest contribution the Unit can make to the well-being of internally displaced populations. This is the Unit's most powerful comparative advantage.

Recommendations

Recommendation One: The ERC must activate and empower the Unit as a critical tool in fulfilling his mandate as the Secretary General's focal point for internally displaced persons.

The ERC must clearly state his intention to seek, endorse and follow through on the recommendations of the Unit concerning the shortcomings of the UN system. He must then act along those lines. This recommendation is the single most important recommendation in this report.

Recommendation Two: The Unit must focus all its energy on increasing its impact on the UN system.

The Unit must revitalize its link to the ERC. It must, within the privacy of its relationship with the ERC, name and shame agencies that are failing the internally displaced in specific situations, and advise on practical remedies. The Unit should ensure that its voice in New York is more senior, forceful and articulate, and pursue its effort to re-energize the Senior Network as a working group for consultation.

Recommendation Three: The Unit must develop strategic vision and thrust.

The Unit must try to do less and achieve more. This will include abandoning activities that may have been successful but are not central to the Unit's role as premier advocate for the internally displaced within the system. The Unit should consider reorganizing its management structure to include a non-traveling deputy director and two main pillars: internal (UN) advocacy and protection.

Recommendation Four: The Unit must improve follow-through on existing initiatives.

The Unit should consult with OCHA, the office of the RSG and the NRC to improve follow-up of activities that is has decided to maintain. The Unit must aggressively and proactively follow through on the Protection Survey and the Response Matrix.

Recommendation Five: The Unit must play a strong advisory role in unfolding crises.

Iraq shows that large, unfolding crises are where bad decisions can be made. The Unit must make its voice relevant to the ERC in these decision-making processes.

Recommendation Six: The Unit must strengthen its visibility and impact on protection.

The Unit should make protection one of its two main pillars (with internal advocacy). It should use the Protection Survey and Response Matrix to identify gaps in the international response to protection. The Unit should explore why the protection coalition failed and make appropriate adjustments in other protection mechanisms.

Recommendation Seven: OCHA must empower the Unit as a distinct entity in its midst.

OCHA headquarters (New York and Geneva) should recognize the Unit's distinct inter-agency nature and seek to enhance the Unit's work as critical to the ERC's ability to fulfil his mandate as the SG's focal point for internal displacement. OCHA should help follow up on Unit activities and recommendations in the field.

Recommendation Eight: Operational UN agencies must show real commitment to the Unit as the inter-agency embodiment of the collaborative approach.

The operational agencies must fund their secondees fully and maintain a tight relationship with them. They should invest in the Senior Network process. They should seriously consider, if not follow, the recommendations made by the Unit and endorsed by the ERC.

Recommendation Nine: The donors must provide the Unit with breathing space.

Donors should make a pluri-annual commitment to the Unit, to afford the Unit breathing space, but only if both the Unit and the ERC follow through on the recommendations above. If these changes are not enacted, the Unit cannot be successful and should not be supported. Donors should consider forming a 'Friends of the Unit' group to galvanize support for the Unit's efforts to improve the UN response to the internally displaced.

In short, this evaluation recommends that the Unit be granted a two-to-three-year time frame to make a positive impact on the UN's collaborative approach to internal displacement, but only if three things happen: (i) the Unit must demonstrate a strategic ability, so far lacking, to identify and clearly articulate gaps in the UN's response to specific internally displaced crises and bring them to the attention of the ERC; (ii) the ERC in turn must unequivocally pledge his determination to follow through on the Unit's findings, including by calling on the authority of the Secretary General when appropriate; and (iii) the operational agencies must demonstrate real commitment to making the collaborative approach work.

If, over the course of the next three years, there is no tangible progress in the UN's accountability for meeting the needs of the internally displaced, then the existence of the Unit becomes a distraction from the real problem, and not longer part of a possible solution. The path then becomes clear. Shut the Unit down. Write up the collaborative approach's post-mortem. Take stock of failure. Seek new solutions. Move forward.

At that point the Unit will have to disappear so that the cause of the internally displaced may advance.

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Introduction

OCHA's Internal Displacement Unit:

The last decade has witnessed mounting awareness of the plight of people who are displaced within the borders of their own state - mounting awareness of both the inherent vulnerability of these populations and of the constraints in the international system's ability to provide them with assistance and especially protection. A number of initiatives - some donor-led, some private, some focusing on the responsibilities of national authorities, others on the ability of aid agencies to help - have in recent years sought to improve conditions for the internally displaced. But a real difference required dramatic change in the UN system.
By the turn of the millenium, it had become clear that, as far as the UN system was concerned, there were in essence three options to improve the response to the needs of internally displaced populations: (i) create a new agency with a mandate for the internally displaced, (ii) extend the mandate of an existing agency to cover the internally displaced, or (iii) create a mechanism that would ensure a greater focus on the needs of the internally displaced. In April 2001, the Special Coordinator of the Senior Network on Internal Displacement recommended the third option in his final report. The Internal Displacement Unit, a non-operational, inter-agency unit within the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), was thus born, launched by the Secretary General in January 2002. Some saw the Unit as the best solution the international system would allow at that point in time. Critics saw the decision to create the Unit as a common denominator so low as to be meaningless - in essence, a non-decision.
The Unit provides advice and support on issues of internal displacement to the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), and the director of the Unit reports directly to the ERC. The Unit is composed of professional staff seconded by agencies and partners, including UNDP, UNHCR, IOM, UNICEF, an NGO consortium, and the office of the RSG. The Unit sits in OCHA/Geneva and has a liaison in the office of the ERC in New York. As well as assisting the ERC in his coordinating role, the Unit provides technical expertise and advisory support to UN country teams in the field. The Unit has undertaken missions to more than 20 countries since its establishment, including inter-agency missions.
Nearly two years after its creation, has the Internal Displacement Unit succeeded in "promoting more effective inter-agency, operational responses to internal displacement?" ¹ That is the question this evaluation seeks to answer.

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This Evaluation

In early 2003, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, through its Policy Development and Studies Branch, commissioned a team of two independent external consultants ('we,' 'the team') to evaluate OCHA's Internal Displacement Unit ('the Unit'). ² The evaluation was mandated in the Unit's terms of reference. ³ The evaluation was to assess the "relevance, efficiency and effectiveness" of the Unit.⁴
The evaluation, initially slated for Spring 2003, was postponed until autumn because of the Iraq crisis and reasons pertaining to the Unit's schedule. Throughout the evaluation, the team operated under the clear understanding that its conclusions and recommendations were to be independent and public. The evaluation's terms of reference (TOR) state that the "results of the evaluation will be made public on OCHA's website." ⁵ In the course of its research, the team found high levels of interest in the evaluation's outcome.
The evaluation followed a review exercise conducted by an external analyst in September 2002 , and an internal review prepared later in 2002. There is substantial agreement between the conclusions of this evaluation and those of the September 2002 review.
We would like to thank all who agreed to share their time and insights with us. Special thanks go to OCHA staff in Geneva, Belgrade, Prishtina, Nairobi, Kinshasa, Goma and New York who worked so hard to keep our days full and our travel pleasant.

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Methodology

The team conducted roughly 200 interviews with individuals from UN agencies, non-governmental and international organizations, diplomats and donor representatives, and local authorities in Geneva, Rome, Belgrade, Prishtina, Nairobi, Kinshasa, Goma, London, Kabul, New York and Washington, DC. The team also reviewed numerous public and internal documents.
OCHA and the Unit selected Serbia and D.R. Congo as the two main case studies that best reflected the breadth of the Unit's work. The team's initial discussions with OCHA had settled on Sudan and West Africa as case-studies, with a third, non-African country to be determined. After the evaluation was postponed, OCHA decided that Serbia and D.R. Congo were better case-studies, due to logistical and institutional concerns. The team agreed to these substitutions, with some reservations.⁷
By design, the team met with few of those most directly affected by whether the Unit - and the UN system above it - is successful in its job: internally displaced persons themselves. The reason for this is that the Unit deals with the system, not with the displaced themselves. Our research focused on the dynamics of institutional relationships, which are remote to most internally displaced populations. Also, we felt that they should be spared having to dedicate time to another set of ignorant visitors. 1
The team conducted most interviews in person and followed a semi-structured interview format. We spoke to key informants who had worked directly with the Unit, been involved in the initial debate on the creation of the Unit, focused on internal displacement or related issues in their own work, funded the Unit, participated in the Unit's workshops, been debriefed by the Unit, or simply followed the evolution of the Unit since its inception. OCHA and the Unit developed the original lists of key contacts for the evaluation team in each country, and this list was then expanded with contacts suggested by interviewees or through the team's own contacts and experience. The list of interviewees expanded and evolved over the course of the evaluation.
The team held phone interviews with informants in countries not visited (e.g., Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea), as well as with people who were unavailable at the time of our visits. Follow-up questions and clarifications were made via phone and email. When necessary, the team split up to conduct interviews in places with a large number of respondents, such as Geneva. The team also split up for certain visits: only one team member visited Prishtina, Goma, Kabul, London and New York. A small number of interviews were held simultaneously with two or more interviewees from the same organization or agency. All interviews were conducted on a not for attribution basis. (Annex Two lists names and affiliation of interviewees).
The team conducted an extensive document review of public documents relating to the Unit (e.g., mission reports and progress reports) and internal Unit documents, such as yearly work plans, self-evaluation reports, budgets and funding reports, previous internal evaluations, training strategies, training modules, TORs of Unit staff, and reports on the collaborative approach, Protection Survey, and protection coalition. We also received internal documents from a number of individual sources, including Unit staff (eg., correspondence, notes on projects in progress), donors (e.g., internal reports to capitals), other UN agencies (e.g., memos on relations with the Unit, thoughts on initial establishment and evolution of the Unit), partners and UN staff in the field (e.g., memos on interaction with the Unit, memos from IDP Advisors on progress and problems). The team also reviewed current publications and grey literature on the major topics and trends in internal displacement, with specific focus on protection, sovereignty, and the on-going debate on the international response to internal displacement.
The team's review of documents and current trends highlighted key issues and questions. We raised these questions in our interviews and considered these issues throughout our fieldwork and analysis. Broadly speaking, we examined the nature and effectiveness of the systematic response to the problem of internal displacement and also considered the broader and more ideological questions of responsibility, resolution, and the role of the international community. For instance: Is the Unit (or has the Unit become) synonymous with the collaborative approach? Is it possible for a Unit that is non-operational and situated within a non-operational agency (OCHA) to have the clout and voice to engender change within the UN system and with recalcitrant country governments? Is the Unit currently "the best" means for the UN to address internal displacement? If not, should the Unit be eradicated or should it be reformed? Does the greatest responsibility for the faults and shortcomings in responding to internal displacement lie with the national governments, the operational agencies, the IDP Unit, or the UN system? If the international community adopts responsibility for the problem of internal displacement, does this excuse country governments from assisting and protecting their own citizens? Does this perpetuate (or even encourage) the continuation of the problem at the country level? Should the international community (and the Unit) seek to engage with governments or to provide assistance to displaced populations in countries where the authorities have intentionally created internal displacement for personal or political gain, such as Sudan or Zimbabwe? This evaluation cannot and does not attempt to address all of these questions, but these issues came up repeatedly in our interviews and our analysis, and form the underpinnings of this evaluation.
The team made a set of preliminary conclusions available to OCHA and the Unit prior to finalization. The Unit and OCHA were given the opportunity to respond via teleconference and in written comments. The team also discussed its findings with a number of key informants. We factored in these exchanges when finalizing the summary note submitted to OCHA on 6 November 2003. The team submitted a draft of the full report to OCHA on 11 November 2003. This draft was widely circulated and comments requested. The team reviewed the comments and made adjustments or corrections where appropriate in preparing the final full report.
Finally, this report has sought to avoid using the acronym 'IDPs' to describe the internally displaced.

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Main Argument of the Evaluation:

The United Nations continues to fall short in its response to the internally displaced. In the 22 months since its inception, OCHA's Internal Displacement Unit has not changed the way the UN addresses internal displacement, and is not likely to do so unless radical changes in outlook occur. The reasons for this are twofold. First, the Unit has lacked focus and strategic purpose. Its activities have been numerous but scattered. It has not managed to leverage its direct link to the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC). It has not played its central role of premier advocate within the UN system on behalf of the internally displaced aggressively enough. Second, and more pointedly, the UN system is not ready for change. The out-going ERC did not effectively use the Unit to fully perform his mandate as the Secretary General's focal point for the internally displaced. UN operational agencies remain more concerned with their organizational interests than with the interests of the internally displaced. They do not display the collegiality necessary for a truly collaborative response to crises of internal displacement
The evaluation's main recommendation is that the Unit concentrates on internal UN advocacy. This is in keeping with the Unit's original terms of reference. The Unit should become the premier advocate for the internally displaced within the UN system, advising the ERC on specific breakdowns or weaknesses within the UN's response to internal displacement crises, and making practical recommendations on how to address these problems. The Unit must, within the confines of its relationship with the ERC, name and shame those who do not step to the plate to respond to the needs of the internally displaced. This will require an increase in conceptual and management focus on the part of the Unit. The ERC in turn must commit to soliciting, endorsing and following through on the Unit's recommendations. Finally, if both the Unit and the ERC appear committed to a real effort on enforcing more accountability in the UN system's response to the internally displaced, donors should offer a pluri-annual commitment to the Unit.
If, on the other hand, after a period of two to three years there is still no progress in the collaborative approach, then the Unit should be shut down - at that point it will have become a veil masking inherent failures of the system.

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Evaluation Findings

The Unit in Context: Challenges of Internal Displacement

This evaluation set out to assess the effectiveness, relevance, and efficiency of the Unit. The Unit, however, does not operate in a vacuum, but as part of the UN system and as a player in the broader international response to internal displacement. It is therefore impossible to evaluate the work of the Unit without also looking at this broader context. Indeed, many of the 'shortcomings' of the Unit are inextricably linked to the actions (or inactions) of other international actors, especially within the UN system, to their collegiality (or lack thereof), to weak (or malfeasant) national authorities, to inexistent or ineffective legal frameworks, and to the dearth of effective international protection mechanisms.
Interviewees repeatedly highlighted the difficult context in which the Unit is expected to perform. Respondents both within and outside of the UN stressed that perceived weaknesses in the Unit were often indicative of broader and more systemic difficulties in responding to internal displacement. These difficulties and challenges lie behind the very creation of the Unit: the UN recognized that its response to internal displacement was inadequate to deal with a growing international problem and sought to create a tool to address this problem. But the establishment of the Unit did not remove the underlying difficulties in addressing internal displacement or the challenges in creating a coherent international response among diverse actors and agencies. The challenges that the Unit faces fall into the following four categories:⁸
- The Unit's difficulties are indicative of broader problems in addressing the issue of the internally displaced: lack of access to populations and countries, high political sensitivity with governments, lack of international commitment, lack of clear benchmarks, and lack of adequate protection instruments.
- The Unit's difficulties in achieving greater UN responsibility for the internally displaced mirror systemic failures of the UN in dealing with internal displacement. These problems are widely recognized both within and outside of the UN system and include: lack of accountability, lack of responsibility, lack of collegiality amongst agencies, and lack of commitment to the collaborative approach. ⁹
- The Unit's difficulties in establishing itself within OCHA reflect the problems OCHA itself has experienced over past years: the ERC's lack of authority within the UN, tension between New York and Geneva, and difficulties weighing in with operational agencies.
- Finally, the Unit's difficulties are those of every new entity: how to show added-value without being over-extended; how to relate to more powerful, better established partners; how to curry favor with diverse partners and yet stay focused; how to establish a strategy with no clear timeframe for existence.
There is a further issue that one must address when speaking of the internally displaced. Despite widespread agreement that internally displaced populations are especially vulnerable, there remains a concern that concentrating specifically on the internally displaced will lead to other vulnerable populations being ignored. This is a real concern in places like D.R. Congo and Liberia where non-displaced populations are vulnerable to the abuses of armed groups and unable to meet their basic needs. The Unit has responded well to this by broadening the scope of its protection focus to include non-displaced populations as well.

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Findings on Institutional Relationships

The Unit's relations with other agencies and actors are critical to its success in improving international response to internal displacement.
Lack of commitment within the Senior Network: The IASC established the Senior Inter-Agency Network on Internal Displacement to make proposals for the improvement of inter-agency response to the needs of internally displaced populations. In turn, the Senior Network conducted a series of country reviews and recommended the creation of the Unit. The IASC opted to retain the Senior Network as an inter-agency support and advisory mechanism for the Unit. The Network is mandated to carry out two main functions: (i) to act as an advisory and consultative body on issues of internal displacement, and (ii) to function as a forum for information sharing between the Unit and agencies. ¹⁰
At present, the Senior Network is not able to fulfill these functions as initially envisioned. Partners on the Network complain of meetings that revolve around a one-way flow of after-the-fact information from the Unit to them, of lack of dialogue and lack of consultation. In turn, agency representatives on the Network have often been inconsistent in presence and junior in rank, and are thus unable to act effectively as conduits to convey information to their agencies. The lack of constructive dialogue and information sharing at the Network creates a bottleneck that blocks the Unit's interaction with the IASC members. ¹¹
The Senior Network needs to be revitalized. The Unit recognizes the need for improving the Network as the critical link to the IASC, and has initiated discussions to that effect. Concrete improvements will require a sustained effort as some partners have grown skeptical of the Senior Network's potential for reform, and weary of attending long meetings which entail little more than a review of the Unit's most recent missions. The IASC endorsed a revised terms of reference for the Senior Network following the inception of the Unit, and these TOR should be made to function effectively and with greater buy-in from the partner agencies.
Poor access to the IASC: The Senior Network is the Unit's natural gateway to the IASC, which is in turn the critical link to the operational agencies. The Senior Network is not functioning as an effective forum for dialogue, and therefore the Unit has limited and unproductive access to the IASC. This creates further distance between the Unit and the inter-agency partners, makes it more difficult for the Unit to identify specific gaps and call for agencies to take responsibility for these gaps, and increases the ambiguity and misperceptions among agencies in regard to the work of the Unit. ¹²
Relationship with the IASC: The Unit also has access to the IASC through the internal displacement "standing item" mechanism on the IASC agenda. A recent external review of the IASC found that the IASC took decisive steps to solve its gap in mandate and capacity regarding internal displacement through the establishment of the Senior Network on Internal Displacement and the Unit. While these actions have diminished inter-agency tensions over internal displacement, they have not brought accompanying improvements in response mechanisms. ¹³ But the IASC (or the Unit, or OCHA) cannot repair the flaws in the systematic response to internal displacement without the active and continued cooperation and support of the operational agencies and other partners. In our analysis, if the Unit is functioning as designed and operating as a tool of the ERC, then the Unit should be able to garner the support of these agencies and partners for country-specific responses and system-wide improvements. The "shared" inter-agency findings should then be presented to the IASC, ideally through the existing standing item on the IASC agenda. Some within OCHA and on the IASC, however, have pointed out that the Unit has not made effective use of the standing item of internal displacement on the IASC agenda, and that issues were presented through mission reports instead of substantive analysis.
Malaise within OCHA: The Unit's relationship with OCHA remains awkward, characterized on both 'sides' by a general lack of consultation.¹⁴ Competition over resources increases tension and hinders transparent information sharing. Strong currents of opinion exist within OCHA headquarters that the internally displaced are OCHA's business ("so why the Unit?") and that Unit activities should be mainstreamed. These feelings are particularly strong in Geneva (RCB), with some individuals questioning the size of the Unit ("too big"), lack of accountability ("no benchmarks, no indicators of success,"), and lack of transparency. Relations with the desk in Geneva are workable, even cordial, at the desk level, but remain tinged with lack of clarity and lack of mutual understanding at management level.¹⁵ Some within RCB management say that positive interaction with the Unit has decreased over time: Unit staff members initially consulted with OCHA desk officers about specific countries or missions, but these meetings have since dwindled in frequency. Communication is clearly a two-way process, and while the Unit must make efforts to include RCB staff both before and after missions, RCB staff should also seek to engage with the Unit on technical matters, for specific expertise, and as links to other agencies involved in internal displacement.
Relations with the desks in New York (HEB) are distant. HEB desk officers have little interaction with the Unit, little understanding of the Unit's strategy, and a poor appreciation of what the Unit does. In part, this distance mirrors the hamstrung nature of OCHA's transatlantic stretch, and the political-humanitarian dichotomy that exists between New York and Geneva. But it also reflects two of the Unit's main weaknesses: the lack of strategic vision, and its weak representation in New York.
Relations between the Unit and OCHA field offices are for the most part very positive. OCHA field staff see real value in the Unit's activities, even if following up on Unit initiatives remains a problem due to lack of resources, capacity, or presence in certain areas. When the work of the Unit is viewed as helpful and positive (as are most of the trainings that the team discussed), this helps advance the reputation and stature of the OCHA office. This is because most non-OCHA partners in the field see the Unit as 'OCHA' - as opposed to an inter-agency body. ¹⁶
The Unit as a discrete entity: In general, interviewees outside OCHA felt it was preferable that the Unit retain its status as a discrete, inter-agency entity, rather than incorporate its activities into OCHA. Mainstreaming the Unit within OCHA, it was felt, would undermine the effort to build an inter-agency approach to the problem of the internally displaced, deprive the ERC of a tool necessary to his role as the UN's focal point for the internally displaced, and minimize the Unit's potential to play a forceful advocacy role within the UN system. Most of these problems relate to the way in which OCHA is perceived by other agencies and non-UN actors: OCHA tries to cover too many disparate aspects (CAP, internal displacement, natural disaster reduction, humanitarian training, Chernobyl recovery, etc), OCHA has difficulty in coordinating the bigger and better funded operational agencies, OCHA lacks authority within the UN. Respondents who stressed the need to keep the Unit as a discrete entity (or "quasi-independent," as one NGO interviewee described it) feared that the Unit would become mired in the same issues and problems that OCHA already faces.
The link to ERC has not been realized: The Unit was established with the explicit purpose to advise and support the ERC in his role as the UN focal point on internal displacement. The Unit's most valuable asset is this direct link to the ERC-a point made time and again by interviewees. The Unit should be acting on the behalf and at the request of the ERC, and the ERC should refer to the Unit for support, information, and concrete assessments and recommendations from the field.
This link between the ERC and the Unit has not been fully realized. In the team's analysis, several factors are at play: a lack of engagement on the part of the former ERC, reluctance on the part of the Unit to push for a stronger link to the ERC's office, a weak liaison position in New York, and the ERC's inability to make strategic use of his link to the Secretary General for assistance in weighing in on operational agencies. Although the ERC is faced with a great many responsibilities and has a large number of people reporting to him, it is essential that the direct reporting line between the Unit and the ERC be not only maintained but also strengthened. The onus is on both the Unit and the ERC to vitalize this link.
Mixed feelings among operational agencies: The operational agencies, especially those with the largest roles in internal displacement crises (UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP), continue to harbor misgivings about the Unit. These misgivings range from alleged lack of consultation on the part of the Unit to the complaint that the Unit shows too much operational involvement in the field. On this latter point, there is a fair amount of resistance, especially in agency headquarters, to the idea that a Unit within OCHA should be involved in making recommendations on the conduct of operations. On balance, the agency most skeptical of the Unit's 'operational' role is UNHCR.
Although respondents within operational agencies express skepticism about the work of the Unit, the team was told by interviewees at both UNHCR and UNICEF that there are country-specific instances in which "the Unit should be going in and telling [respective agency] to take responsibility for the internally displaced." This implies that although the agencies are generally hesitant about the role of a strong coordinating body, they recognize the necessity and value-added of such an entity in certain cases.
The team found that personnel of agencies in the field made no distinction between the Unit and OCHA. As mentioned above, this might bolster the reputation of OCHA in instances where the Unit's initiatives are seen as particularly useful, but this equation can be problematic if it detracts from the inter-agency image and clout of the Unit. In other words, if staff of operational agencies such as WFP and UNHCR were to acknowledge that their organizations (and therefore presumably their interests) are represented by Unit, then these field offices might be more responsive to the Unit's initiatives and recommendations. As it is, the inter-agency nature of the Unit seems to become lost or muted during fieldwork, and other agencies see the initiatives as little more than another coordination effort on the part of OCHA.
Collaboration between the Unit and OHCHR needs to be strengthened -- there still is no OHCHR secondee to the Unit, which hampers the Unit's ability to focus on broader protection and human rights issues.
Relations with NRC and Office of the RSG: Despite recent efforts, two key partnerships remain at times tinged by a lack of consultation and collaboration. The Unit has documents of understanding with both the Norwegian Refugee Council and the Office of the Representative of the Secretary-General for the Internally Displaced, but outside observers claim that the roles and responsibilities of the Unit vis-à-vis these two institutions are unclear. For instance, some interviewees wondered why the Unit was conducting trainings when the NRC had proven capacity in this regard and was able to run trainings for less money. Others commented that the data collection of the Unit (e.g., the Response Matrix) seemed to duplicate the NRC's Global IDP Database, and said that the information resources of the NRC were much superior to those of the Unit. Many respondents, especially in the field, expressed confusion over the difference between the advocacy efforts of the RSG and the advocacy strategy of the Unit. The MOUs not withstanding, interviewees both within and outside the three concerned organizations pointed to a lack of coordination on missions and other activities, follow-up to these activities, and public statements.

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Performance Findings

Field Support:

Unit and Inter-Agency Missions: The Unit has undertaken nearly 40 missions to more than 20 countries, usually at the request of the UN country teams, national authorities, or the ERC. These missions have varied in their effectiveness, often because of exogenous reasons: the political sensitivities of national authorities, lack of follow-up by UN country teams, or overly ambitious TORs. Some mission reports were seen as unhelpful because of a plethora of recommendations lacking prioritization (Colombia). Interviewees in the field often credited the missions with raising awareness of important aspects of internal displacement in a given country, introducing the Guiding Principles, and initiating dialogue between country teams and national authorities. Comments on missions and fieldwork in select locations follow.
Serbia: The Unit's work in Serbia appeared generally positive, especially in regard to the trainings on the Guiding Principles (discussed in more detail below). The OCHA Belgrade office and a local NGO enjoyed a good deal of support and positive relations with the Unit, and inter-agency officials were also mostly positive about the Unit's work. One criticism of the Unit's work focused on the need for greater technical resources and support. For instance, a member of the UN country team said that the Unit could have assisted local work by providing lessons learned from the handling internal displacement in other situations, such as Bosnia. It was felt that these and other examples might serve as a useful resource for agencies, organizations, and government officials in Serbia.
Many interviewees in Serbia felt that the Unit should keep better pace with the political developments on the ground. In particular, they worried that the Unit was pushing prematurely for high-level discussions between authorities in Prishtina and Belgrade on internal displacement, and feared that efforts to hold talks on this highly sensitive topic could derail measured progress on other political issues. In a few cases, UN officials questioned the overall value of the work of the Unit in Serbia, stating that the Unit had provided "useful support in the background, but haven't made much of a difference or done anything that the [UN country team] would not have done on their own." ¹⁷ For the most part, however, the work of the Unit in Serbia was considered positive and points to the value of follow-up, multiple visits to a region, and the benefits of having a positive relationship with an OCHA field office.
D.R. Congo: The Unit led an inter-agency mission to D.R. Congo in January 2003.¹⁸ The inter-agency mission is credited with 'articulating' the issue of internal displacement, and for providing a framework that assisted the UN country team in raising the issue with national authorities. ¹⁹ The mission report identifies a key gap in the response strategy to internal displacement: "No formal commonly adopted UN strategy exists regarding the provision of assistance to IDPs and their host communities," and then details the conceptual framework under which all assistance activities should occur. ²⁰ This framework calls for all actors to agree upon principles and objectives, and highlights the underlying reasons for displacement that should be addressed in a comprehensive assistance strategy. The report goes on to recommend the establishment of thematic groups on population movements at the provincial level, and the identification of an internal displacement focal point in local administrations. Overall, the report is insightful and offers concrete recommendations, but the ultimate test in relevance and effectiveness lies in the follow-up and response on the ground.
To date there have been various initiatives in the wake of the mission and report, including a pilot project implemented by UNFPA and a working group on internal displacement created by the UN country team. Both of these initiatives, however, were established only recently (the working group was launched the very day the evaluation team arrived in Kinshasa in late September) - nearly nine months after the mission. This delay in response is not the direct responsibility of the Unit, as a number of interviewees stressed that the Unit had repeatedly and almost tirelessly sought to follow up on its recommendations. But it is indicative of the challenges facing an over-stretched country team under changing leadership, and of the lack of weight afforded to the Unit's recommendations, even when they emerge from an inter-agency mission. The Unit should ensure that clear lines of responsibility are established following the release of recommendations, and should remain in communication with the relevant actors to assess progress and to provide further advice or technical support when appropriate.
Some critics of the Unit's work in the D.R. Congo said that Unit personnel lacked sufficient understanding of the issues in the country, and that the teams "blew in and blew out" too quickly to have an impact or make a real difference in a complex political and humanitarian landscape. Others spoke of lack of sufficient attention to protection, which remains the most pressing concern in D.R. Congo.²¹ Of note, while the mission report from February 2003 states that the inter-agency team learned that roughly 40 rapes per day were reported in the Uvira area between October 2002 and early 2003, the report does not mention any specific protection needs of women or recommend a strategy for the reduction of gender violence.
Internal displacement advisors: The Unit has helped articulate the need for, identify, recruit, and in some cases fund internal displacement advisors in the field (for an initial period of 3-6 months) in Afghanistan, Côte d'Ivoire, Iraq, Liberia, Serbia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, and soon in Uganda. Once deployed, these advisors do not report to the Unit, but to the Resident / Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) or other appropriate field personnel (e.g., the UNAMA chief of staff in Afghanistan). This reporting line is appropriate, but the Unit should be able to draw on the work of the advisors to improve its own analysis and pursue the advisor's recommendations with the ERC and other agencies. Also, the Unit should be prepared to offer political support to advisors who become caught in inter-agency tangles within a given UN Country Team.
Afghanistan: The Unit recommended sending an internal displacement advisor to Afghanistan following a mission to the country in March 2002. This idea was initially welcomed by the UN country team, including UNAMA and UNHCR, but three sources of tension later arose. First, there was confusion over where the advisor would best be located (i.e., with UNAMA, with UNHCR, or with the government). Debate over the location (and hence the reporting line) of the advisor continued throughout his posting, and limited the extent of the impact he was able to make in his position. Second, debate also arose over the appropriateness of the TOR for the advisor position. There were significant changes - in both the political structure and the humanitarian situation-in Afghanistan between the time of the Unit's mission in early 2002 and the deployment of the advisor in late October 2002. Officials in Kabul reported that the Unit seemed unable or unwilling to take these shifts into account, and felt that the final TOR for the advisor did not adequately reflect the needs on the ground. Third, there was tension following the advisor's arrival over how he would carry out his work, where he would be based, and what issues he would focus on. Some respondents felt that there was no need for a coordinating advisor on internal displacement in Afghanistan, as the consultative group system (sector-specific groups of government ministries and UN agencies) already handles coordination.
The internal displacement advisor in Afghanistan experienced a great deal of trouble getting his recommendations considered by the appropriate authorities. In an instance such as this, the Unit should seek to work with the UN country team or with agency headquarters to identify the problem and seek a more effective solution. In Afghanistan, the solution may have been to raise points with senior officials in other agencies, to relocated the advisor to another host agency or to a field office where he would have had a greater impact, or to revisit the initial terms of reference in order to ensure that the job description matched the job that was most needed on the ground.

Protection:

Protection is the largest gap in the international response to internal displacement. The Unit took steps to address this gap through the Protection Coalition, Response Matrix, and Protection Survey. The Unit also sent internal displacement advisors to key countries in times of crisis, such as Iraq and Liberia. These are all positive steps, but critics continue to question the overall impact of such measures on the UN system and on the protection needs of internally displaced populations.
Response Matrix, Protection Survey: The Unit developed and conducted the Response Matrix and Protection Survey (the former country-specific, the latter thematic, both ready in draft form) in order to highlight gaps in the international provision of protection and assistance to internally displaced populations. (The Protection Survey was developed in collaboration with the Brookings-SAIS Project.) Many interviewees expressed skepticism as to the usefulness of these exercises, citing cost, duplication with other efforts, and lack of focus on local responses. These criticisms miss the point. If successful, the reports will point to gaps and opportunities within the UN system, particularly in regard to protection. As such they should become powerful advocacy tools for the Unit to advise the ERC on how RC/HCs, UN agencies, and their partners can more effectively meet the needs of the internally displaced.
Protection Coalition: The Protection Coalition was designed to consist of a core group of partners with protection expertise who would act to support the Unit's protection efforts. This coalition was to be activated in specific countries when needed. According to Unit staff as well as coalition partners, the initiative proved simply too difficult to get off the ground. The Protection Coalition had limited success in Liberia prior to the resumption of conflict, but some partners boycotted coalition meetings in Monrovia citing misgivings on how the Unit addressed protection issues. Unsuccessful efforts were made to launch the coalition in Iraq. Problems with the Protection Coalition include an overly ambitious initial concept, difficulties in practical implementation in the field, and lack of commitment of partners. The Unit should take stock of these lessons and apply them to other protection efforts.

Capacity Building and Training:

Training and seminars. The Unit's training and seminar activities are well received in the field by OCHA staff, local and international humanitarian partners, and local and national authorities. The quality of the training, the materials, and the subject matter all receive high marks. The training and seminars appear to have led to progress in getting national authorities to understand and recognize the Guiding Principles, notably in Serbia and D.R. Congo. However, a frequent criticism is that the lack of follow-through (not necessarily the responsibility of the Unit) has meant that the momentum generated by the workshops has often not been seized upon. This lack of follow-through has hampered effective capacity building. Participants in some training of trainers programs also raised criticism about the lack of accessible training materials. Placing all training materials on a CD would allow for better sharing and greater access, but this has not been done by the Unit. Multiple versions of training materials exist, and material is difficult to access off the internet. Interviewees said that they had raised this point with the Unit, but had not seen any progress to date.
Serbia: The Unit conducted trainings on the Guiding Principles in Belgrade, Kosovo, and Montenegro, and interviewees felt that these sessions were critical in initiating dialogue on internal displacement at the official level as well as amongst the UN country team and civil society organizations. People commented that the sessions were particularly effective in introducing the Guiding Principles as a non-political tool to discuss the sensitive political topic of internal displacement. Much credit was given to the trainers at the workshops, who were said to be relatively well versed in the issues in Serbia and also adept at running sessions. Dialogue around internal displacement and the Guiding Principles has continued in Serbia, with the creation of an internal displacement Working Group (and more technical sub-working groups) and the initiative of policy discussions on internal displacement.
One of the greatest successes of the Unit in Serbia (assisted by the OCHA Belgrade office) has been the follow-up with Group 484, a local NGO. This organization adapted the materials for the Unit's training sessions and has initiated a training of trainers program to reach internally displaced people and local authorities. Group 484 had the initiative to develop these trainings, but stated that they could not have implemented the program without extensive support from the Unit and the OCHA office.
D.R. Congo: Working closely with the Norwegian Refugee Council, the Unit has conducted an extensive training program in D.R. Congo with the aim of "responsibilizing" the various political and armed actors to respect civilians according to basic human rights and international law.²² These trainings have been considered successful in raising awareness about a rights-based approach and the Guiding Principles, but repeated comments were made regarding problems with follow-up after the trainings. Civil society groups and local authorities responded well to trainings and, in some cases, began to establish collaborative mechanisms based on information received in the trainings. However, these groups required some follow-up support and advice on organization and protection mechanisms. In many instances this support was not available. This shortcoming is largely due to the limited capacity of OCHA in the vast D.R. Congo, and it is neither the role nor the responsibility of the Unit to remain on the ground after the trainings to provide such support. It is, however, the responsibility of the Unit to ensure prior to organizing such trainings that there are people or offices willing and able to take the responsibility for this sort of follow-up, and the Unit has a clear plan as to how to shift responsibility from the Unit for "trainings" and to OCHA offices for "coordination and protection." Only through such clear lines of responsibility will longer-term positive results be realized.
The presence of OCHA is now expanding in D.R. Congo, and the Unit has recently hired an assistant to conduct follow up and work on internal displacement issues in the east. These steps will hopefully result in greater follow-up and a more forward-looking strategy in the Unit's work in the country.

Strengthening the Institutional Framework for the internally displaced:

National strategies and mechanisms: The Unit aims to work with UN country teams and governments to realize the introduction of strategies, policies, working groups, or other mechanisms to address internal displacement. Some successes have been achieved in this regard. For instance, working groups were established in Serbia, D.R. Congo, and Sudan (since disbanded), and draft strategies on internal displacement have been established or are being worked on in Uganda and Serbia.
The Unit and its supporters place a great deal of emphasis on formulating national strategies and legislation. However, some interviewees pointed out that getting legislation or policies tabled in countries without a working democracy, rule of law, or effective means of implementing legislation was a hollow victory. This is especially true in countries where the government continues to forcibly displace populations or exacerbate conditions for those already displaced, such as in Uganda. According to critics, the Unit should not emphasis legislation in these countries, but should rather focus on its role as an internal advocate within the UN system to call for greater responsibility of agencies. ²³ It is important not to over-emphasize legislative victories in countries that lack respect for rule of law or effective legislative processes. In Uganda, however, the Unit has worked both with the government on national policies and with the UNCT to increase assistance and protection capacity in the north. The Unit's mission report from August 2003 indicates a careful strategy that seeks to increase the resources and UN presence in the north through the appointment of an IDP Advisor, and also to work with UNICEF to strengthen protection initiatives. ²⁴ Some have suggested that the Unit has not done enough to push UNICEF to take the lead on internal displacement in this region, but we feel that it is too early to judge the outcomes of the most recent mission and the progress that may be achieved by the IDP Advisor and UNICEF's new child protection officer. In the final analysis, the combination of legal pressure at the central level and the appointment of qualified field staff in the problem area may prove an effective model. In recent months there has already been increased international attention on internal displacement in Uganda, including a visit by the ERC in October.
The team heard a variety of thoughts on the role of the collaborative approach in strengthening the institutional framework for the internally displaced. Although the concept of the collaborative approach pre-dates the Unit, many respondents said that the Unit and the collaborative approach have since become "synonymous." Such respondents were often the Unit's greatest detractors, and pointed that there have been no clear "successes" of the collaborative approach since the creation of the Unit. Others would say that-by its very nature-the success or failure of the collaborative approach is beyond the control of the Unit and requires the commitment and buy-in from all agencies. The fact remains, however, that the Unit is tasked with creating collaborative mechanisms, and that the presence and activity of such mechanisms will be used to measure the value-added of the Unit. With this in mind, the Unit should seek to establish collaborative mechanisms (such as working groups on internal displacement among UN agencies, local organizations, and government offices) in every country in which it works.

Advocacy and Public Information:

The Unit has carried out a variety of public advocacy activities, including the recently released book No Refuge: The Challenge of Internal Displacement (with the Washington DC-based Migration Policy Institute). This thematic overview of the issues and challenges is the first UN publication on internal displacement. The book's approval reportedly caused tension between the Unit and OCHA, and publication was delayed repeatedly. Some members of the Unit pointed out that the book project could have served as a unifying common cause for the Unit and OCHA, but instead generated tension and frustration. The book has been positively received, but many interviewees questioned whether a publication was the best use of the Unit's time and energy when there are other organizations better positioned and more experienced in terms of research and publications.
Response Matrix and Protection Survey: These two reports have the potential to serve as highly effective advocacy tools, particularly within the UN system. The reports provide a gap analysis of international response to internal displacement, and also contain information on the use of tools and resources in the field, perceptions of who is supposed to do what at the field level, and highlight agency thoughts on their roles vis-à-vis each other and the national authorities. The Unit is in the process of developing advocacy strategies to follow-up on the conclusions of these exercises and to advocate for change and specific goals.
Upcoming projects: The Unit plans to commission a documentary to shed light on internal displacement in "forgotten crises" such as Sudan, D.R. Congo, or Georgia. The Unit also has plans for a photographic exhibit of pictures taking by displaced individuals and depicting the lives of the internally displaced.
Turf battles: The Unit has encountered problems within the system when trying to take initiative on advocacy efforts. For instance, the Unit Director and the RSG for the internally displaced planned to release a joint-statement on the crisis on Colombia, but OCHA management reportedly ruled that the Unit was not entitled to make such statements and that this should have come from the ERC. While such statements are likely more effective from higher levels, the occurrence of this sort of struggle derives from poor communication between OCHA and the Unit, lack of clarity of mandate, and a vague TOR, and ultimately wastes time and resources that would best be directed to an activity in which the Unit could actually make a difference.

Additional Performance Findings ²⁵

Mainstream internal displacement issues into the work of IASC partners and OCHA branches: Overall, the evaluation team found that the Unit had not made progress in mainstreaming issues of internal displacement into the work of IASC partners and OCHA branches. This may be due simply to the relative newness of the Unit. However, some agency representatives and outside observers feared that the creation of the Unit had "excused" UN agencies from taking responsibility for the internally displaced, as these agencies believe that "the Unit is taking care of those concerns." As discussed above, the Unit's link to the IASC through the Senior Network is weak, which limits the extent of the Unit's influence on IASC partners. Furthermore, by seconding their internal displacement experts to the Unit, agencies may be diminishing their own capacity to address internal displacement, making mainstreaming this issue more difficult in the short term.

We found that the interaction between the Unit and the OCHA branches depends more on personal relations than on institutional links, and the creation of the Unit does not appear to have resulted in a great deal of institutional change within OCHA. For instance, some RCB staff members said that their respective departments had not changed their focus on internal displacement since the creation of the Unit-they had dealt with internal displacement before the Unit was created, and continued to do so now. Based on this opinion, the Unit has not made progress towards mainstreaming internal displacement, but has duplicated existing efforts. However, the evaluation team finds that it is necessary for one UN entity-presently the Unit-to deal specifically with internal displacement. The Unit does provide relevant advice and technical expertise to OCHA branches and IASC partners, but the ultimate success of this entity will depend on the quality of the institutional relationships with other agencies and branches and the support (financial, personnel, and otherwise) for the Unit from these agencies and branches.
Monitor situations of internal displacement: The evaluation team finds that members of the Unit staff are extremely knowledgeable and well versed on situations of internal displacement. Some staff members and outside observers questioned the logic of the process allocating countries or regions to specific staff members, but the team recognizes that any assignment of geographic responsibility will be somewhat arbitrary (except when a staff member has extensive knowledge of or field experience in a particular country or region). Monitoring alone is not sufficient, however, and the Unit must seek to improve its information collection from and information dissemination to outside agencies and actors, including NGOs, UN country teams, operational and seconding agencies, OCHA branches, and the office of the ERC.

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Management Findings

Vague terms of reference and lack of benchmarks for success: A central, practical problem for the Unit has been that its terms of reference are vaguely worded. They do not contain specific objectives, benchmarks, or success criteria for the Unit's accomplishments. The resulting lack of clarity has contributed to confusion on the part of outsiders, who state often that they do not understand what the Unit is 'supposed to do.' The lack of clear benchmarks or objectives also makes evaluation of the work of the Unit difficult, as there are no clear criteria against which to measure achievements or shortcomings.
Pros and cons of secondments: The Unit counts secondees from UNHCR, WFP, UNDP, IOM, OCHA, UNICEF, as well as a secondee from the NGO consortia, all under varying funding modalities. The secondment arrangement lies at the heart of the Unit's existence and effectiveness as it confers the Unit its inter-agency character, which makes it an embodiment of the collaborative approach. By seconding staff, agencies are taking a step in support of a cooperative mechanism, and this initial step should, in theory, be followed by on-going support for the work and recommendations of the ensuing inter-agency entity. But the secondment arrangement also brings unique difficulties: staff members are suspected by third parties of favoring their mother agency while often suspected of disloyalty by this very agency.²⁶ In many cases, ties between the mother agencies and their secondees seem to have withered - a loss for both the Unit and the collaborative approach. Some agencies continue to not pay for their secondees, or to expect reimbursement, or get a free ride from external donors. Interviewees outside of the UN stressed the need for all agencies to propose secondees of the highest caliber possible, and to pay for them, as a means of demonstrating agency commitment to the collaborative approach.
Sustainability of staffing: The Unit's ability to follow through on activities (training, missions) or to maintain consistent communication with partners in the field is limited by the number of Unit staff. In essence, the Unit is doing more than it can with the staff it has. The Unit's thrust, focus and follow-up are casualties as a result. (But let it be clear: the solution is not an increase in staff, but greater focus in activities.) As to the appropriateness of the Unit's staffing structure, this evaluation could examine each position in detail, but it would seem that the skills and experience that Unit staff bring to their jobs are both relevant and appropriate. What is clear - and very encouraging - is the clear sense of commitment that individual Unit staffers demonstrate to the 'cause' of the internally displaced.
Awkward internal management arrangements: The structure of the Unit is quite flat: four clusters with mixed thematic (protection, recovery, capacity-building, inter-agency relations, donor relations and funding, and advocacy) and geographic responsibilities. This multi-use structure could in theory confer lack of hierarchy, flexibility, and freedom for initiative. But this has not happened. Unit staff spoke of lack of practical management and the absence of workable reporting lines within the Unit. There are too many managers, but no deputy director to oversee the daily operations, provide guidance when needed, and ensure that the work plan is more or less on track - it is not the role of the Director to provide this level of management. And the combined geographic and thematic structure means that every time a Unit staffer is on mission, both a key activity and a set of countries are no longer covered.
The functioning of the Unit. The Unit's planning process was unclear to many interviewees. A recurring complaint was the lack of transparency in selecting countries for intervention. The Unit has seemed overstretched in the first year of its work, a criticism shared by Unit staff. The challenge for the Unit is to establish transparent country criteria and a feasible work plan with clear priorities and clear indicators of success.

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Gender

A thorough analysis and understanding of gender dynamics and gender-specific vulnerabilities is central to any strategy, policy, or response to population displacement. The Guiding Principles, which inform much of the work and motivation of the Unit, appropriately afford substantial attention to gender, including the specific needs of women and children for assistance, protection, and access to rights and services. The mission statement for the Unit states, "The Unit will seek to bring increased attention and greater understanding to the needs of the displaced, especially women and children, by issuing reports, studies and providing field-focused training." To date, however, the Unit has not been effective in integrating a gender perspective in its work. No interviewee was able to remember a specific focus on gender in the trainings, missions, or in any other interaction with the Unit. The focus on gender in the Guiding Principles provides the Unit with a clear opportunity to bring gender into all aspects of training, but the Unit has not taken advantage of this opportunity. Some interviewees who specialize in gender spoke of a lack of receptivity on the part of the Unit to broach gender issues. On the other hand, one woman who participated in trainings run by the Unit felt that it would be inappropriate to include gender in the workshops on the Guiding Principles. She felt that the workshops' strength was in the introduction of "very basic issues" of internal displacement to authorities and partners, and felt that the inclusion of a specific section on gender would be "too much" for this setting. ²⁷
The Unit's mission reports vary in the extent to which they focus address gender issues. A few reports, such as the report from the November 2002 mission to Sudan, make specific mention of gender-related vulnerabilities and the need for gender-specific assistance and protection strategies.²⁸ The Sudan report, however, is the exception, not the norm, and most reports include little or no analysis of gender or women's issues. There is very little reference to gender even in the reports from missions to countries where gender results in well-publicized conditions for internally displaced women, such as Afghanistan (where women have very little access to services, the legal system, or relief) and D. R. Congo (where the widespread sexual assault of displaced women has been well documented). The Unit should make a more systematic analysis of gender in each mission report, and should highlight gender issues in its debriefings, interactions with donors and partners, and recommendations.²⁹
The Unit is clearly aware of its shortcomings regarding the integration of a gender strategy. To this end, the Unit has already drafted a training module dealing specifically with gender issues. The Unit stands to be able to make the greatest contribution towards a greater understanding of gender in internal displacement through its trainings and in mission reports. In its trainings, the Unit should focus on the different roles, experiences, risks, and vulnerabilities faced by men and women (and children and the elderly) in situations of internal displacement. The Unit can and should use its mission reports to call attention to the specific assistance and protection needs of different gender groups (male, female, young, old), and should advocate for greater awareness of and response to these varying needs in the UN system. In order to be able to more thoroughly integrate a gender perspective into all areas of its work, the Unit may need to hire outside gender experts to conduct trainings to ensure that all staff members are equipped with the appropriate background and analytic tools.

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Conclusions.

Specific Conclusions:

Busy, committed, but scattered: In its 22 months of existence, the Unit has initiated a wide array of activities. Unit staff has demonstrated energy, hard work, commitment, even enthusiasm in their efforts to promote the cause of the internally displaced. Some of their initiatives have been more successful, better received or better understood than others. Some are objective successes. The problem is that these activities have not amounted to positive change in how the UN responds to internal displacement. The Unit is at once the embodiment and the barometer of the UN's collaborative approach. It should also be its chief promoter. It is not. This failure reflects both the Unit's lack of focus and systemic failings within the UN. Specific conclusions follow.
Lack of impact on the UN system: To date, the Unit has not had the impact on the UN system that it was set up to achieve. The Unit has not been able to capitalize on its direct link to the ERC (and, through the ERC, to the SG), has not been able to apply pressure on RC/HCs who are weak in internal displacement, and has not been effective in reporting egregious failures of the system. The Unit should be aggressively identifying needs and gaps, pointing them out to the ERC, and making clear, practical suggestions to the ERC on how to remedy these gaps. The Unit cannot perform its role as the premier internal UN advocate for the internally displaced unless it has the ERC's explicit, tangible support.
Lack of strategic vision and unclear objectives: The Unit lacks strategic vision, clear objectives and a sense of thrust. The Unit has tried to do too much in too many places, and lacks clear objectives for where, when, and how the Unit will work. The lack of vision and focus is apparent in the Unit's choice of geographic areas of intervention (the criteria are unclear), of activities (too many), and of advocacy efforts within the UN system (too few, too shy). This shortcoming is not due to a lack of effort-the Unit has held numerous meetings on country criteria and strategy sessions and has conducted internal reviews. The problem is rather the size of the problem (internal displacement) that the Unit is attempting to tackle, and the system (the inter-agency UN bureaucracy) in which the Unit is attempting to work. But the Unit must find a way to operate within this context and these parameters. To do this the Unit will have to decide what it is best able to do well (e.g., training, advocacy, technical support), and where its work will make the greatest difference. Prioritizing may require cutting back on some aspects of the Unit's work and employing greater selectivity in country selection.
Lack of follow-through: The Unit has lacked follow-through on many of its initiatives, from reporting to training, to inter-agency missions. Sometimes this has been because the Unit itself has not followed up, sometimes because other actors have been unable or unwilling to follow up. In some cases, such as the trainings in eastern D.R. Congo, the absence of follow-up to the trainings resulted in a loss of momentum among participants who had been eager to establish working groups or put protection mechanisms in place. In others, such as the training for UN staff in Nairobi in 2002, the paucity of consistent communication after the trainings decreased the levels of enthusiasm that the trainings had generated among staff from other agencies for the work and value of the Unit.
The Unit will not have a positive impact on the international response to internal displacement unless all activities and initiatives consist of follow-through from beginning to end. If there is not sufficient capacity, a concrete plan, a budget, a timeline or sufficient personnel for support following trainings or other initiatives, then the Unit should not undertake activities in these areas. Similarly, missions need to be followed with a report in a timely fashion (one of the central complaints in Afghanistan was that the report was not released for a month) if the Unit is to maintain pace with developments on the ground and are to ensure that recommendations remain relevant.
The bitter lessons from Iraq: Both the ERC and the UNCT disregarded the Unit's contributions to pre-war preparations in Iraq. The Unit was subsequently sidelined in the planning of how internal displacement would be handled. The Unit should have been the leading advocate for ensuring that protection was the central consideration in assigning responsibility, and also should have served as a resource for other agencies on pre- and post-war planning on internal displacement. In reality, the Unit was neither, and, in our analysis, appears to have been unable to exert its leadership at a critical and highly visible moment. This was an important lost opportunity to assert the Unit's input, notably on protection. It also weakened the Unit's credibility, as operational agencies and others drew the conclusion that the Unit was irrelevant to decision-making on critical issues in large-scale crises and could safely be ignored. The large unfolding crises can be daunting because the stakes for the operational agencies are high and therefore these agencies are likely to be at their least collaborative. Nevertheless, and precisely because of that, the Unit must seek to fulfil its advisory role to the ERC in such situations, as it can make a difference before problems become ossified.
More to be done on protection: Protection is the most pronounced gap in the international response to internal displacement. The Unit has had made valuable contributions to promote protection by deploying internal displacement advisors, conducting the Protection Survey (with the Brookings - SAIS Project), and attempting to get the Protection Coalition off the ground. However, based on the importance of protection in addressing the needs of the internally displaced, a great deal more needs to be done. As the UN entity tasked with improving the international response to internal displacement, the Unit should be viewed as an invaluable resource on protection issues. In order to accomplish this, the Unit needs to provide technical advice on protection, to work more closely with agencies with strong protection mandates (e.g., ICRC, UNICEF), and to offer leadership in coordinating protection, improving protection mechanisms, and fostering dialogue on protection within the international system and with country governments. To date, the Unit has not adopted the leadership role it is expected to play in promoting protection (though the Protection Survey is an important step in that direction).
The Unit lacks the security of a continued existence: Every new entity is concerned with demonstrating value added. This is also true of the Unit, which was established for an undetermined period of time and relies on yearly contributions from donors. In the fraught inter-agency context, this natural concern has morphed into a pervasive feeling of insecurity that has hobbled the Unit's internal advocacy role. A stronger link to the ERC and the IASC will help created a greater sense of security and validity. Also necessary is longer-term support from donors, which will enable the Unit to develop a strategic plan over a longer period and to tailor objectives accordingly.

Concluding Thoughts:

Whither the Unit?

Looking forward, what should the Unit be? A technical support Unit that provides training and advisory services, identifies internal displacement advisors, collects lessons learned, etc.? Or the premier advocate for internal displacement issues within the UN system, capitalizing on its direct SG-mandated link to the ERC, who himself is the SG's focal person on internal displacement issues?
In the past, the Unit has tended towards the former. Most interviewees, even some operational agency staff, said they strongly felt the Unit should gravitate more towards the latter. Advocacy within the UN to improve the system's response, both overall and case-by-case, making the collaborative approach work, is the single greatest contribution the Unit can make to the well being of internally displaced populations. This is the Unit's most powerful comparative advantage.
These two activities - technical support and internal advocacy within the UN system - need not be mutually exclusive. In fact, they build on one another: support activities (training, policy resources, best practices, advisory services, etc.) are key to obtaining access and offering support once gaps have been identified. But it is critical that the Unit not focus on deliverable-oriented activities to the exclusion of its internal advocacy role. This seems to have been the case so far. The Unit's comparative advantage lies in its link to the ERC, and the Unit should use this position to capitalize on internal advocacy within the UN system. This does not mean sidelining technical support activities, but rather focusing on internal advocacy-making the system work where it is not working in responding to internal displacement-as the first order of business.

A concluding caveat:

Those who argued that the creation of the Unit was an arrangement too flimsy to really address the inadequacy of the UN's response to the problem of the internally displaced, yet one that relieved pressure for real change, made a powerful point, one that continues to resonate. The Unit's record of the past 22 months has so far failed to prove them wrong. Some of this has to do with the Unit's own shortcomings. But mostly it must be chalked up to the UN system's broader failures, as a whole, to address crises of internal displacement. The fact remains that the mechanisms that exist within the UN system for assisting and protecting the internally displaced do not function. No one can ensure the effectiveness of the collaborative approach, and indeed by and large it does not work.
If change has not taken place over the course of the next three years-if there is no tangible progress in the UN's accountability for meeting the needs of the internally displaced-then the existence of the Unit ceases to be acceptable. At that point, it will become a distraction from the problem, rather than part of a possible solution. For the UN system, NGO partners and concerned donors, the path then becomes clear. Shut the Unit down. Write up the post-mortem of the collaborative approach. Take stock of failure. Seek new solutions. Move forward. At that point the Unit may needs to disappear so that the cause of the internally displaced may advance.
The evaluation team proposes a two-to-three year time frame as a trial for the Unit. This would give the Unit sufficient time to set concrete goals with clear and transparent benchmarks and to seek to meet these goals. Based on our conversations with donors and other partners, we believe that OCHA will be able to garner support for a further three years of support for the Unit, with the understanding that new solutions will be necessary if the collaborative approach (as embodied in the work of the Unit) has failed to make a difference in the systematic response to the needs of the internally displaced.

Back to Contents

Nine Recommendations.

Common sense would dictate that the sequence of recommendations start with the most immediate target audience - the Unit itself - and proceed further afield from there. However, this evaluation has concluded that the ERC - and his commitment to following through on the Unit's recommendations - is the single most important factor in the determining whether the Unit will have impact or not. Therefore the first recommendation, the most important one, is to the ERC.

To the Emergency Relief Coordinator:
90. Recommendation One: The ERC must activate and empower the Unit as a critical tool in fulfilling his mandate as the Secretary General's focal point for internally displaced persons.

The new ERC must emphasize that he perceives his role as the lead on internal displacement within the UN system.
The ERC should use the Unit as his eyes and ears in the field, his constant reference on internal displacement. The ERC should be able to request the Unit to undertake specific missions. The ERC should indicate to the Unit director how that direct link will be handled (e.g., regular phone conversations).
The ERC must unequivocally articulate his determination to follow through on the Unit's recommendations to improve the UN response to the internally displaced. The ERC will receive widespread support from outside the UN for such a move. He in turn must generate the necessary support within the UN system.
The ERC must be prepared to engage with heads of agencies to ensure that they act upon his recommendations and, if and when necessary, to enlist the Secretary General's support to that end.
The ERC must use his authority to hold the RC/HCs accountable for implementing the recommendations of the Unit, as endorsed by him.
The ERC must ensure that the rest of OCHA recognize and support the Unit's efforts to improve the collaborative approach. The Unit should not be mainstreamed into OCHA. The ERC should continue to have the Unit director report directly to him.
The ERC must take any management measures he deems necessary to make the Unit a more effective, more proactive advocate on behalf of the internally displaced.

< name="unit">To the Unit:
91. Recommendation Two: The Unit must focus all its energy on increasing its impact on the UN system.

The Unit must strengthen its link to the ERC, be more forceful in articulating its recommendations and findings to the ERC, and seek to get the SG involved when necessary. The Unit must, within the privacy of its relationship with the ERC, name and shame.
The Unit must strengthen its link in New York with the appointment of a senior, forceful and articulate advocate of the Unit's recommendations.
It is critical that the Unit Director push harder within the system (heads of agencies, RC/HCs), and more aggressively develop support within and outside the system to do so.
The Unit Director should proceed with his plans to revitalize the Senior Network as a substantive forum for consultation and consensus building on substantive and thematic issues relating to the Unit and to internal displacement. There is no need to re-work the Network's TOR, but rather to make the Senior Network function as originally designed.
The Unit should encourage an active relationship between Unit staff and seconding agencies.

92. Recommendation Three: The Unit must develop strategic vision and thrust.

The Unit should focus on what it (and no one else) can do: advocate within the system for a more effective, accountable, predictable, and collegial UN response to the needs of the internally displaced. The Unit should focus this analysis at UN country team level and call individual agencies on their failures.
The Unit should consult with other partners (NRC, Office of the RSG, IASC members on the Senior Network) to jettison activities in a specific sector or a specific country that others can do just as well (or better, or cheaper).
The Director of the Unit should tirelessly reiterate what the Unit is able to do and what the Unit is not able to do within the UN system.
The Unit should seek consensus at the Senior Network with IASC partners on country criteria and other issues (such as inter-agency missions)
The Unit should seek to make a difference on a limited number of countries.
The Unit should seek clear benchmarks of progress in every country in which it works, such as the establishment of an active internal displacement working group or a dialogue with national authorities on internal displacement. The Unit should experiment, analyze and mainstream these mechanisms country by country.
The Unit should incorporate a gender perspective in all areas of its work - in training, missions, and reporting. The Unit should be sure to highlight country-specific gender issues in its briefings and recommendations. The Unit should consider bringing in experts to provide training for Unit staff to ensure that all Unit staff members are well versed on gender and internal displacement, and are able to adequately incorporate a gender perspective in trainings, field research, and report writing. The Unit should seek greater gender balance in its professional staff at senior levels.
The Unit needs to re-think its structure. (i) The Unit should appoint a non-traveling deputy director to manage day-to-day management operations. (ii) The Unit should streamline its thematic clusters: the Unit's two most important 'pillars' are protection and internal UN advocacy, and these should have more emphasis. (iii) The Unit should identify one or two traveling staff who have less responsibility for day-to-day policy and advocacy work.

93. Recommendation Four: The Unit must improve follow-through on initiatives.

The Unit must initiate a proactive, open debate within OCHA on how to follow up on missions, training and workshops, report writing, etc. Key agencies and RC/HCs should also be included in these discussions. The Unit should take into account the likelihood or capacity for follow-up before committing to work in a given area.
The Unit must improve its collaboration with NRC and the Office of the RSG on follow-up on training and workshops.
The Unit must proactively and aggressively follow through on conclusions of the Response Matrix and the Protection Survey, using them as advocacy tools to show gaps in UN response.

94. Recommendation Five: The Unit must play a strong advisory role in unfolding crises.

The Unit should engage in strategic thinking on what crises will be next (Palestine? Sudan? Korea?) and be more proactive in discussions over designation of responsibilities, at the Senior Network and with the IASC.
The Unit Director as advisor to the ERC must be proactive in seeking greater input and involvement in major decisions.
If Unit does not have the expertise on a given topic or area, the Unit must not hesitate to look outside: consult with key partners and hire expertise for the short term.

95. Recommendation Six: The Unit must strengthen its visibility and impact on protection.

The Unit should make protection one of its two main pillars (with internal advocacy) and hire an individual who is widely recognized in the humanitarian field as a leading thinker and practitioner on protection. This person could then divide responsibilities (field versus policy) with the current protection focal point in the Unit.
The Unit should use the tools of the Protection Survey and the Response Matrix to identify gaps in international response to protection and should seek broad inter-agency support for filling these gaps.
The Unit should take stock of the failure of the efforts of the Protection Coalition, a promising mechanism at country level, to make appropriate adjustments in other protection mechanisms.

< name="toocha">To OCHA:
96. Recommendation Seven: OCHA must offer greater support to the Unit.

OCHA must recognize the Unit's inter-agency nature, and cease to see the Unit as a threat to its reputation or funding.
OCHA must, to the extent possible, seek to follow-up on Unit initiatives as part of the ERC's effort to coax greater collaboration from the operational agencies.

To the Operational Agencies
97. Recommendation Eight: Operational UN agencies must show real commitment to the Unit as the inter-agency embodiment of the collaborative approach.

Agencies must act upon recommendations made to them by the ERC on internal displacement issues at the headquarters and especially the field level.
Agencies must send to Senior Network meetings staff who have the experience and seniority to represent their agencies and provide the Unit with guidance.
Agencies should always send highly qualified and senior secondees to the Unit. It is imperative, if their commitment to the collaborative approach is to be taken seriously, that agencies maintain regular, positive contact with their secondees.
Agencies should fully fund their secondees. No reimbursable loans, no partial payments, no donor-funded secondees. The commitment to the collaborative approach of agencies that refuse to put their money where their mouth is cannot be taken seriously.
OHCHR should send a secondee to the Unit.

To the Donors: 98. Recommendation Nine: The donors must provide the Unit with breathing space.

Donors should make a pluri-annual commitment to the Unit, to afford the Unit breathing space, but only if both the Unit and the ERC commit to the main points of the recommendations above. If these changes are not enacted, the Unit cannot be successful and should not be supported. ³⁰
Donors should consider forming a 'Friends of the Unit' group to better mobilize their action in support of the Unit's recommendations to improve the UN response to the internally displaced.

Elizabeth Stites
Victor Tanner
January 21, 2004

Annex One:
Evaluation Terms of Reference

1. Background

In July 2000, the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) and Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)³¹ established a Senior Inter-Agency Network on Internal Displacement. Comprising senior focal points from key humanitarian organisations, the Network was mandated to review a selected group of countries experiencing crises associated with internal displacement and propose ways of improving the international response to internally displaced persons (IDPs) needs. OCHA served as the Secretariat of the Network.

In April 2001, the Special Coordinator of the Network on Internal Displacement issued a report on the activities and findings of the Network. The report found that the United Nations (UN), international organizations and NGOs need to increase their focus on, and support to IDPs. To ensure increased focus, the Special Coordinator recommended the establishment of a non-operational IDP office within OCHA. Based on the Special Coordinator's recommendation, the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) proposed to the Secretary-General (SG) the establishment of such an office, which was endorsed by the SG on 25 May 2001.³²

The Internal Displacement Unit was established in the Geneva office of OCHA in January 2002 for an initial one-year period with the primary aims of promoting an improved inter-agency response to the needs of the displaced, and supporting the ERC in his role as the coordinator of the international humanitarian response to IDPs' needs. In order to preserve the system-wide approach of the Senior Inter-Agency Network, the staff for the IDP Unit was seconded from UNHCR, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, IOM, and the NGO community. During its first year of work the IDP Unit has particularly focused on the following five activities:

Field Support: In close collaboration with its various partners, the Unit encourages greater emphasis on protection of IDPs, undertakes targeted field visits to provide assessment and guidance in situ, and lends its support to resource mobilization efforts for IDP activities.
Protection: Based on the widespread concern about the insufficient protection for internally displaced persons, the Unit created a "coalition" of like-minded actors interested in working together to improve protection at the country level as well as to ensure a more predictable and efficient institutional response.
Capacity Building/ Training: A basic training course on IDPs is provided to IASC actors in selected countries and aspects of the training have also been integrated into existing training initiatives of individual UN agencies and NGOs.
Strengthening the Institutional Framework for IDPs: Enhancing the system wide approach to IDPs in order to provide a complete and coherent response.
Advocacy and Public Information: Targeted campaigns will contribute to increase awareness on the plight of IDPs, and serve as tools to improve their welfare. Additional public information tools include the Unit's website and the publication of a thematic volume examining internal displacement challenges.

2. Purpose of Evaluation The terms of reference for the IDP Unit call for an evaluation of the IDP Unit in 2003 to assess its relevance, efficiency, and effectiveness. To that end, and at the request of the ERC, the Policy Development and Studies Branch of OCHA is commissioning an evaluation.

3. Issues to be addressed by the Evaluation:

A. The performance of the IDP Unit in its five core areas of activities (see background), with a focus on:

The degree to which the IDP Unit has achieved the objectives established in its Terms of Reference.
The extend to which the IDP Unit's activities produce desired outcome regarding:
- The degree to which its work shapes the planning of the humanitarian community in countries with which it has been engaged.
- Whether and how the work of the IDP Unit stimulates further or additional action by the humanitarian community in countries with which it has been engaged.
- The level of implementation, by IASC members at headquarters and in the field, of recommendations from the IDP Unit.
- What impact the IDP Unit has had on the policies of members of IASC.
The functioning of the IDP Unit, with regard to:
- The planning process employed by the IDP Unit, including its methods for determining priorities within its major area of work.
- The criteria used by the IDP Unit to target its support to specific countries.
- Indicators the IDP Unit has established to measure its impact in the five core areas of activities (see background).

B. Inter-Agency & Management Issues, with a focus on:

The nature and quality of the IDP Unit's key inter-agency relationships with:
- The Senior Inter-Agency Network
- IASC (all members and standing invitees)
- OCHA
- The Emergency Relief Coordinator
- The RSG on Internally Displaced People
The organizational structure of the IDP Unit, particularly with regard to:
- The advantages and or drawbacks of the IDP Unit's inter-agency staffing composition
- The appropriateness of the IDP Unit's staffing structure given its stated aims and other emerging issues relating to IDP crises (e.g. post-conflict transition and administration of justice).
- The role of seconded officials within the IDP Unit in communicating findings and recommendations to their "home" agencies.
- Line-management and reporting relationships.
Sustainability of the Unit with regard to:
- Funding
- Staffing with secondments.

C. Integration of a gender perspective:

How has the IDP Unit worked to implement the call in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement for special efforts to promote the full participation of IDP women in the planning and management of relocation, assistance, return or resettlement and reintegration efforts ³³.

4. Outputs

Context - The evaluation will briefly establish the context within which the IDP Unit works by identifying the principal characteristics and emerging issues (including post-conflict transition) relating to the global IDP crisis, and the major challenges facing the humanitarian community in addressing that crisis.
Findings and analysis (conclusions) - The evaluation will provide direct responses to each of the specific matters raised in section 3 above ("Issues to be addressed by the Evaluation").
Recommendations - The evaluation will provide practical, action-oriented recommendations that complement its analysis and findings.
Reporting - The evaluation team will submit a succinct and fully edited report in English of no more than 15,000 words in a printed and an electronic version. The report will include an executive summary (up to 2,500 words) and will address all of the key issues indicated above. The report should be structured to provide succinct conclusions for each issue as well as specific, targeted and action-oriented key recommendations. The annex will include a description of the method used, a bibliography, list of persons interviewed and the terms of reference.
Implementation of the evaluation
The evaluation will be organized and managed by OCHA's Evaluation and Studies Unit, who will carry out ad hoc consultations on its scope and focus with members of the IASC, the Senior Inter-Agency Network on Internal Displacement, OCHA staff and relevant Government officials. Preliminary findings will be shared with IASC members as well as the Senior Inter-Agency Network at the November 2003 IASC working group meeting in Geneva.
Proposed Method
To be specified by the consultants, but will include desk review of relevant literature, reports, document, etc., interviews with key stakeholders, as well as case studies (field work in two countries which were visited by the IDP Unit during its first years of work).
Composition of the Team
The team will be composed of two members with a thorough understanding of the UN humanitarian system, familiarity with the working of humanitarian agencies and an in-depth knowledge of issues related to IDPs. One member will be appointed team leader and be held responsible for the timely production of the evaluation report.
Timing:
It is foreseen that the evaluation will require two consultants to work for a period of 37 days. The fully edited report shall be submitted to OCHA's Evaluation and Studies Unit no later than 20 November 2003. The report will be shared with IASC members as well as the Senior Inter-Agency Network.
Deliverables:
- an inception report describing the proposed evaluation method - submitted in June 03
- a short briefing note for the IASC, highlighting key findings, conclusions and recommendations - to be submitted by 27 October, 2003
- a draft report to be submitted by 6 November
- A final, edited report submitted by 20 November 2003.
Use of the evaluation:
The evaluation is expected to provide input to a strategic planning process and should translate into an IASC supported and IDP Unit owned plan of action. The results of the evaluation will be made public on OCHA's website.

Annex Two:
List of People Interviewed We have divided the interviewees into five groups: (i)Unit staff, (ii) other OCHA, (iii) United Nations operational agencies, (iv) non-governmental organizations, (v) governmental bodies (donors, diplomatic missions, national authorities). Unless otherwise indicated, the interview was conducted in person. If only one of the evaluation team consultants conducted the interview, this is indicated by the consultant's initials (es = Stites, vt = Tanner). A number of interviewees were interviewed several times.

UNIT: <
> Asomani, Kofi Geneva
Bagshaw, Simon Geneva
Baiocchi, Allegra Geneva (now OCHA New York), New York (vt)
Bélanger, Julie Kinshasa
van Heese, Carmen Geneva (by email)
Linde, Anne-Marie Geveva (vt, by phone)
Neussl, Peter Geneva (es)
Peterson, Geoffrey Geneva (es)
Rogge, John Geneva (es)
Suzuki, Shigehiro New York (vt)
Vincent, Marc Geneva (also vt, by phone)
Vidal, Denis Geneva

Other OCHA:
Abbashar, Amjad, PDSB, New York (vt)
Bessler, Manuel PDSB, New York (vt)
Bidder, Mark IRIN, Nairobi
Boutroue, Joel RCB, Geneva (vt)
Bowden, Mark PDSB, New York (vt)
Bungudu, Musa OCHA Eritrea, (vt, by phone)
Clark, Christian IMB, New York (vt)
Deck, Peter UNAMA, Kabul (es)
Delbreuve, Thierry RCB, Geneva (es)
Duthoit, Eliane OCHA Uganda (es, by phone)
Gaouette, Mike OCHA (former Save the Children UK), New York (vt)
Gentiloni, Fabrizio RCB, Geneva (vt)
Gleason, Stephen HEB, New York (vt)
Groves, Robyn PDSB, New Yorl (vt)
Hebert, Paul OCHA`Ethiopia (fmr. OCHA Belgrade) (es, by phone)
Heymans, Luc OCHA Kinshasa
Hilfiker, Claude PDSB, Geneva
Julliand, Valerie RSO-CEA Nairobi
Keane, Brian Patrick PDSB, New York (vt)
Khalikov, Rashid OCHA Geneva
Loupforest, Christelle HEB, New York (vt)
Madi, Kirsi IASC, Geneva (es)
Marjanovic, Jelena OCHA, Belgrade
McGoldrick, Jamie RCB, Geneva (es)
McLean, Calum OCHA Somalia, Nairobi
Mensah Kumah, Opia IMB, New York (vt)
de Meritens, Jahal RCB, Geneva (vt)
Stankovic, Nenad OCHA consultant, Belgrade (vt)
Scott, Megan OCHA Goma (vt)
Simba Dunia, Lucien OCHA Goma (vt)
Susuri, Bashkim OCHA Prishtina (vt)
Todorovic, Alex OCHA, Belgrade
Tsui, Ed OCHA New York (vt)
Tull, Stephen PDSB, Geneva
Ushiyama, Hiroko OCHA New York (vt)
Wahlstrom, Margareta UNAMA, Kabul (es)

OPERATIONAL AGENCIES (and Peacekeeping Operations):
Aasen, Bernt UNICEF OLS, Nairobi
d'Almeida, Lohic Alain MONUC, Kinshasa
Berner, Patrick FAO, Nairobi
Bertrand, Pierre UNHCR New York (vt)
Boneva, Danila UNDP, Kinshasa
Brandstrup, Nina FAO, Rome
Bugandwa Zigabe, Innocent OHCHR Goma (vt)
Carminati, Dario UNHCR Belgrade
Cels, Johan UNHCR New York (vt)
Cisse, Cheikh Tidiane UNFPA Kinshasa
Cisse-Gouro, Mahamane OHCHR Kinshasa
de Clercq, Peter UNHCR, Geneva (es)
Conan,Claire WFP, Rome
Costy, Alexander UNAMA, Kabul (es)
Crowley, Peter UNICEF New York (vt)
Deng, Francis Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for the internally Displaced, Washington DC (vt)
Dimond, Marie UNDP New York (vt)
Elhag, Hassan UNAMA Jalalabad, Kabul (form. OCHA Somalia) (es)
Endres, Daniel UNHCR, Kabul (es)
Eriksson, Anne-Christine UNHCR Prishtina (vt)
Fisher, David Office of the RSG, Geneva (vt)
Forsythe, Maureen WFP Herat, Afghanistan (es, by email)
Gonzalez, Gustavo UNDP Kinshasa (vt)
Grandi, Filippo UNHCR, Kabul (es)
Gruden, Sheila WFP, Rome
Hagona, El-Balla UNDP Somalia, Nairobi (vt)
Hicks, Peggy UNMIK Prishtina (vt)
Hossaini, Reza UNICEF, Kabul (es)
Jury, Allan WFP, Rome
Kapila, Mukesh UNDP Sudan, Nairobi
Khan, Sikander UNICEF Geneva (vt, by phone)
Lazic, Maja OHCHR, Belgrade
Leclerc, Philippe UNHCR, Kabul (es)
Lippman, Betsy UNDP, Geneva (es)
Loretti, Alessandro WHO, Geneva (es)
Lund, Michael UNDP, Nairobi
M'cleod, Herbert UNDP, Kinshasa
McNamara, Dennis UNHCR, Geneva (es)
Mihoubi, Isabelle UNHCR, Belgrade
Mimica, Misko UNHCR Prishtina, (vt)
Narayan, Geeta UNICEF New York (vt)
Norton-Staal, Sarah UNICEF, Nairobi (es, by phone)
O'Donnell, Francis UNDP, Belgrade (es)
Oduol, Elly UNDP, Nairobi
Poole, Sarah UNDP New York (vt)
Renson, Jean Pierre FAO, Kinshasa
Rodehaver, James UNMIK Prishtina (vt)
Singer, Hanaa UNICEF Geneva (es, by phone)
Sleewenhoek, Tanya WHO, Geneva (es)
Strippoli, Francesco WFP, Rome
Sundh, Lena MONUC, Kinshasa
Symington, Rebecca UNMIK, Belgrade
Towle, Richard UNHCR Geneva (formerly Belgrade), Geneva (vt)
Vincent, Charles WFP New York (vt)
Weisberg, Laurie OHCHR, Belgrade
de Wilde, Jan IOM Geneva (vt)
Yacoub, Rukia FAO, Rome
Zulu, Leonard UNHCR, Nairobi

NGOs, IOs:
Alarcon Diaz, Adriana International Committee of the Red Cross, Prishtina (vt)
Anonymous One International Committee of the Red Cross, Goma (vt)
Anonymous Two International Committee of the Red Cross, Goma (vt)
Aruna, Alain Norwegian Refugee Council Goma (vt)
Asante, Edwin World Vision, Nairobi (vt)
Barriga, William International Organization for Migration,
Geneva (vt)
Bishop, Jim InterAction,Washington DC (vt, by phone)
Charny, Joel Refugees International, Washington DC
Cohen, Roberta Brookings-SAIS Project, Washington DC
Contat Hickel, Marguerite International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva (es)
Danevad, Andreas Norwegian Refugee Council, Geneva (es)
Emes, Paul International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, Belgrade
Fawcett, John Consultant, New York (vt)
Fenton, George World Vision, Nairobi (vt)
Fenton, Hugh Danish Refugee Council, Belgrade
Golic, Vesna Group 484, Belgrade (es)
Guiton, Philippe World Vision, Nairobi (vt)
Hawkins, Peter Save the Children (UK), London (vt)
Keserovic, Dejan IOM, (formerly Deputy Commissioner for Refugees), Belgrade
Kibira, Elizabeth Plateforme des femmes du nord Kivu pour un développement endogène Goma (vt)
Kostic, Ivanka Norwegian Refugee Council, Belgrade
Linde, Thomas MSF Switzerland (formerly OCHA focal person for internally displaced), Geneva (vt)
Lumsdon, Sarah Oxfam Goma (vt)
Mabrucky, Evaristes Solidarité pour l'assistance et défense des droits des déplacés, Goma (vt)
Markovic, Dragan Danish Refugee Council, Belgrade
McClellan, Joel SCHR, Geneva (es)
Miruha, Baudouin Association des jeunes pour la défense des droits de l'enfant et la lutte contre le racisme et la haine, Goma (vt)
Mitchell, Sandra International Rescue Committee, Wash. DC (vt, by email)
Multanen, Elina Group 484, Belgrade (es)
Norlov, Steen Danish Refugee Council, Belgrade
Pack, Mary InterAction, Washington DC
Rankovic, Dragana ICRC, Belgrade
Rasmusson, Elisabeth Norwegian Refugee Council, Geneva (es)
Schenkenberg, Ed Int'l Council of Vol. Agencies, Geneva (vt)
Sevrin, Eric Norwegian Refugee Council Oslo, Goma (vt)
Thomas, Manisha Int'l Council of Vol. Agencies, Geneva (vt, also by email)
Turner, Neil Save the Children (UK), Nairobi (vt)
Zeender, Greta Norwegian Refugee Council, Geneva (es)

Annex Three:
List of Acronyms

CAP Consolidated Appeals Process
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
DFID UK Department for International Development
ERC Emergency Relief Coordinator
ESU Evaluation and Studies Unit, OCHA
HEB Humanitarian Emergency Branch, OCHA
IASC Inter-Agency Standing Commission
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ICVA International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IOM International Organization for Migration
IRIN Integrated Regional Information Networks, OCHA
MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the D.R. Congo
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MSF Médecins sans Frontières
NGO Non-governmental Organization
NRC Norwegian Refugee Council
NSC National Security Council
OCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
PDSB Policy Development and Studies Branch
PRM Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
RCB Response Coordination Branch
RC/HC Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator
RSG Representative of the Secretary-General
RSO-CEA Regional Support Office for Central and East Africa
SCHR Standing Committee for Humanitarian Response
SG Secretary-General
TOR Terms of Reference
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNCT United Nations Country Team
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children Fund
UNMIK UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WFP World Food Programme
WHO World Health Organization

Notes

1 "Terms of Reference for an IDP Unit Within OCHA," OCHA, no date: p. 1.

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2 Elizabeth Stites and Victor Tanner (team leader) make up the evaluation team.

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3 Ibid.: p. 2.

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4 "Internal Displacement Unit Evaluation, Terms of Reference (final version)," OCHA, 15 July 2003: p. 2.

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5 Ibid.: p. 5

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6 "Internal Displacement Unit, Interim Review," Jon Bennett, Oxford Development Consultants, Oxford, September 2002.

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7 OCHA has explained that the choice of West Africa was not practical or preferable due to the large number of missions to West Africa in summer 2003 and the focus of UN agencies on the crisis in Liberia. It was felt that it was not appropriate to deploy another assessment mission to this region. The arrival of a new HC in Sudan with plans for reforming the response to internal displacement made the recent work of the Unit in the country less relevant. The team accepted OCHA's argument for the change in case studies, and found value in the case studies eventually selected (especially Congo), but does wish to point out that OCHA did not retain the team's original choice of cases.

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8 The challenges of working within the UN came up repeatedly in interviews with NGO staff and donors. . In Serbia and D.R. Congo, the team was repeatedly reminded of the difficulties of the internal displacement situation, and how difficult this problem was to address due to sensitivity with authorities, lack of access to populations, and lack of adequate protection or legal mechanisms. Many interviewees pointed to the tensions that accompany the work of a new entity, with some respondents pointing out that it was "too early to conduct an evaluation" because the Unit had not had sufficient time to prove its merit and capabilities.

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9 The team found that the unclear role and varied experience levels of RC/HC's on matters of humanitarian assistance was a recurring problem in the response to internal displacement. There is much discussion within the UN agencies and partners about the appropriate qualifications and terms of reference for the Humanitarian Coordinators (HCs), and until this issue is resolved the problems of responsibility and accountability for the internally displaced at the country level are likely to continue.

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10 Terms of Reference, Senior Inter-Agency Network on Internal Displacement, Endorsed by the IASC WG in September 2002.

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11 Views on the Senior Network taken from interviews with, inter alia, UN official, non-UN Senior Network participant, NGO representative.

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12 IASC points from, inter alia, interviews with former participant in the Senior Network and a UN Official.

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13 Dr. Bruce Jones and Abby Stoddard, "External Review of the IASC: Issues Paper for the IASC Working Group Workshop," New York: Center on International Cooperation, New York University, September 8, 2003.

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14 Information on relations between the Unit and OCHA come from interviews with RCB staff in Geneva, HEB staff in New York, and Unit staff. Outside observers from the NGO community and donors also expressed concern about the nature of this relationship and the effectiveness of communication.

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15 Relations between specific Unit staff members and some desk staff are very good and reportedly involved regular communication. Interviews with Unit staff member, OCHA staff, Geneva.

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16 This was particularly the case in Serbia, where non-OCHA interviewees spoke of the work of the Unit as the work of OCHA and vice versa. Some governmental bodies also seem to combine the activities of OCHA and the Unit, and assume that any OCHA initiative on internal displacement is automatically the work of the Internal Displacement Unit.

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17 UN official, Belgrade.

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18 The Unit also conducted a mission in May 2003 aimed at national authorities, which was reportedly well-attended and generated useful dialogue. However, the interim government was formed shortly thereafter, and the Unit and OCHA have decided to wait until the ministries are more established and operational before continuing with government-focused workshops and trainings.

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19 Interview with a UN official, Kinshasa.

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20 IDP Unit, "Inter-agency mission on internal displacement in the Democratic Republic of Congo," 16 January - 8 February, 2003, p 6.

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21 Opinions expressed by UN and NGO staff members.

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22 OCHA, Internal Displacement Unit, IDP Training Programme, Democratic Republic of Congo, no date.

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23 Discussion with NGO representative.

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24 IDP Unit, "UN system response to the IDP issue in Uganda and recommendations for enhanced support to national and local authorities," A Report of the Internal Displacement Unit, August 2003.

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25 These performance findings address some of the activities listed in the Unit's TOR, but not listed as activities of the Unit for evaluation in the TOR of this report (see Annex One). As explained below, the Unit's TOR are vague and do not contain specific objectives or indicators of achievement.

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26 Interviews with Unit staff, UN operational agency staff, donors.

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27 Interview with Unit partner, Belgrade.

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28 Internal Displacement Unit, "Re-integration and recovery of displaced persons in Sudan: A report of the inter-agency mission, 1-17 November 2002," IDP Unit, Geneva, December 2002.

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29 Leonardo Franco made a very similar recommendation in his review of the work and missions of the Senior Network, titled "Meeting the Protection Challenge in Crises of Internal Displacement," 27 July 2002, p. 11.

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30 When canvassed, a number of donors expressed support for this point.

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31 Current membership includes: FAO, InterAction, International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), the Representative of the Secretary-general on Internally Displaced Persons (RSG/IDPs), Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR), UNICEF, UNDP, UNHCHR, UNHCR, UNFPA, World Bank, WFP, WHO in addition to ICRC, IFRC and IOM under a standing invitation.

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32 Visit www.reliefweb.int/idp for further information on background )

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33 OCHA is committed to bringing a gender perspective into the mainstreaming of the humanitarian response: In 1999 the IASC adopted a Policy Statement on "The Integration of a Gender Perspective in Humanitarian Assistance", see http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/IASConGender.doc ECOSOC Humanitarian Segment agreed conclusions, direction from the SG, Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), etc.

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External Evaluation of OCHA's Internal Displacement Unit Final Report

Table of Contents

External Evaluation of OCHA's
Internal Displacement Unit
Final Report