Note from ICVA: This report was compiled by Anne Paludan, the consultant who worked on putting together recommendations of the Inter-Agency Task Force on Staff Security. They were submitted to the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group in May 2001 and adopted. Modifications to the recommendations have subsequently been made based on the suggestions of the UN Office of Legal Affairs. Those modified recommendations will be posted on the website as soon as they are made available. Other documents related to the Task Force on Security are posted on the Information Resources of the ICVA website.

Final Recommendations to the IASC Working Group, amended 18 January 2002

1.1. The IASC WG Staff Security Task Force

At its meeting in Rome, February 17th 18th 2000, the IASC Working Group decided to establish a short-term Staff Security Task Force chaired by WFP with the aim of exploring arrangements for UN-NGO field collaboration on security for humanitarian actors.

The participants in the Task Force were UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNSECOORD, WFP, OCHA, and IOM, as well as the NGO consortia ICVA (International Council of Voluntary Agencies), InterAction (American Council for Voluntary International Action), SCHR (Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response) and, as invitees, the Red Cross Movement.

At the first meeting of the Task Force in Geneva on May 23rd 2000, it was decided to initiate a consultative process among a range of operational humanitarian actors on issues related to inter-agency field collaboration on staff security. This process would evolve from two consultations, one in Europe and one in North America, whose aim would be to provide practical input into the process.

To facilitate the consultative process I was seconded to the IASC WG through WFP as a DANIDA funded consultant from September 18th 2000 to May 15th 2001. My terms of reference included: preparing the consultations in close collaboration with the organizers, (WFP together with ICVA and InterAction); writing a discussion paper for the consultations; acting as rapporteur; and editing a report based on the findings of the consultations for the Staff Security Task Force.

The two consultations - in Geneva December 6th-8th 2000 and in Washington January 11th 2001 - gathered a total of about 65 participants from UN and non-UN humanitarian actors. Reports are available from the organizers, ICVA, InterAction, and WFP.

The present Final Report is based on a draft final report I submitted the Security Task Force at its meeting on February 27th 2001. After subsequent discussions of the report's proposals, the Task Force finalized its own recommendations on April 26th 2001 and submitted them to be endorsed by the IASC Working Group at its meeting on May 11th 2001.

In an appendix to the Recommendations the Task Force submitted to the IASC WG an outline of a Menu of Options intended as a tool to facilitate UN/non-UN security collaboration in the field. A more elaborate version, reflecting input from the consultative process, is attached to the present report for consideration and possible further development, based on input from the field.

The present Final Report, submitted to the Chairperson of the Task Force on May 15th 2001, should be read in conjunction with my discussion paper ("Programme Notes") to the Geneva and Washington DC consultations and my reports from these two meetings (available from the WFP and at ICVA's website).

1.2. The larger context

The question of collaboration 1 among humanitarian actors 2 on staff security in the field is part of a larger context. It is first of all an integral part of the overall arrangements for inter-agency collaboration in the field, and indirectly or directly influenced by larger organizational collaborative structures at the HQ levels, be they UN or non-UN.

Security collaboration is naturally linked to the local security context, but is also highly influenced by general trends in modern conflict such as the lack of knowledge and respect of the international rules guiding humanitarian action3 . It cannot either be separated from the discussion among operational agencies on what constitutes security (as in the triangle "acceptance - protection - deterrence" 4), just as it is linked to the question of "People's security5 " or the security of the populations whose needs humanitarian action attempts to meet.

Local security collaboration6 may be influenced by some humanitarian actors' integration of political objectives and humanitarian assistance ("the new humanitarianism"), or by other actors' claim that according to "the humanitarian imperative7" the main criterion for humanitarian response is need, no matter whose. The, sometimes tense, relationship between civil and military actors in humanitarian actions is also relevant for the concrete forms that security collaboration may take in specific field situations 8.

1.3. Focus on recommendations for the field

For the purposes of the present report I shall however concentrate on UN/non-UN staff security collaboration, focusing specifically on recommendations for practical arrangements at the field level.

2.1. Basic assumptions

The debate at the two consultations evolved from the following assumptions:

• That the question of UN/non-UN collaboration on staff security needs a fresh and less legalistic approach.
• That the emphasis of such an approach would be on security collaboration in the field.
• That inter-agency field collaboration on security is a necessity in so far as it enhances or does not jeopardize staff security.
• That a precondition for inter-agency security collaboration is mutual respect for each others' roles, mandates and personalities, and an understanding of the resulting operational opportunities for common action, and of restraints to such common action.
• That guidelines and principles for common action need to be practical, informal, based on trust, and not legally binding.

2.2. Main issues

The discussions in plenary and groups on UN/non-UN collaboration centred around a number of main issues. One was the need for a change of attitudes towards mutual trust and a culture of partnership. This would imply broadening the concept of partnership, exploring what it involves, who are the partners, what are the main areas of common concern (e.g. security planning), and breaking down mutual stereotyping ("the UN" and "the NGOs").

A second major issue was the relationship between the identities, roles, and responsibilities of UN and non-UN humanitarian actors that find themselves working together in a specific field situation. This is illustrated, for example, by the relationship between the independence and relative flexibility of most non-UN actors' in security matters and the unified, though still complex, UN security system.

A third major issue was the ways in which parties to a conflict and local populations and authorities perceive the various humanitarian actors, their organisational characteristics and commitments. These perceptions may vary substantially from the ways in which the humanitarian actors perceive themselves, and thereby create a security risk.

A fourth important issue was the commitment expressed by all participants to join in the covering of security needs with human and material resources in field operations, according to each agency's capability and mandate, and to engage in joint advocacy to increase resources for security.

Finally, there was widespread concern that the findings of the Task Force consultative process and the operationalization of its recommendations not be unduly delayed.

2.3. Partnership revisited

It was felt that the term partnership9 needed a broader definition. The traditional understanding of partnership is now moving beyond the idea of "implementing partners" towards a relationship based on common goals and shared commitments. For example, the UNHCR-NGO Framework for Operational Partnership (FAOP) extends the term "partnership" to include all humanitarian NGOs, (i.e. both operational and advocacy-oriented NGOs) involved in refugee operations, not just those which are implementing partners under a sub-contract.

In terms of the need for security collaboration in the field it was stressed that partnership implied mutual respect and trust. This would require proactive participation from all those involved, and not dependency by one side on the other, as was sometimes seen to be the case with NGOs vis-à-vis the UN security system. Partnership also implied honouring the fact that all humanitarian actors, in a given operation, are interdependent and constantly influenced by each other's decisions and behaviour.

Staff security, it was agreed, is first of all the responsibility of each individual humanitarian actor, or groups or "families" of actors. Thus, the UN system, according to its rules, is expected to produce its own security plan for each humanitarian operation. While in practice the UN security umbrella has been extended to implementing and operational partners, - which at times has been encouraged by donors - , all those interested in opting for partnership in security collaboration need to work actively for the development of their own security preparedness and resources. In fact, an increasing number of NGOs are already actively developing their own, agency specific security arrangements and professional competence which they may bring into the common security planning of the local humanitarian community.

It was recognised that not all humanitarian actors could realistically be expected to opt for partnership in security, or at least not to the same degree. First, not all are interested or willing, and secondly, among those who are, some are not able to honour the mutual obligations of committed security collaboration. A number of NGOs and IGOs, either on a case-by-case basis or following a general agency policy and security analysis, choose to depend on their own integral security system and not to participate in security collaboration, or only to a limited degree. Practice in the field shows, however, that these actors would often opt for varying degrees of local collaboration or regular, informal and reciprocal consultation. The Red Cross Movement, for example, according to its mandate, plans its security measures independently but may choose to contribute to information sharing or joint training. These experiences support the idea of a "menu of options" for security collaboration at the field level.

At the core of partnership and collaboration in security, both the Geneva and the Washington consultations placed joint security planning in the field. While each agency would be responsible for its own security planning, partnership in this area of common concern would comprise the joint security planning for the humanitarian community10 as a whole as well as its continuous updating, preferably starting at the outset of a humanitarian operation. It was recognized that, for security reasons, the collaborating agencies would have to respect a degree of confidentiality. For that reason, and in order for such planning to be manageable, some form of representation would have to be agreed, e.g. by NGOs collaborating to select one or a few NGO field security focal points

2.4. NGO independence and flexibility, and the UN security system

There was general agreement on the necessity to differentiate among humanitarian NGOs. The terms humanitarian NGOs and "humanitarian community" cover a wide range of independent agencies, different organisational identities, mandates, and administrative structures. In terms of field security collaboration, they range from implementing partners to "rogue" agencies excluding any form of inter-agency relationships.

However, rather than seeing the independence of humanitarian NGOs and their individual mandates/missions vis-à-vis the UN security system as an obstacle to security collaboration, it was felt that one might instead emphasise their corresponding operational flexibility. Thus, collaborative arrangements, while typically anchored in the UN system, should reflect the multi-faceted NGO reality in the field and maximise its advantages.

For the humanitarian community to move forward towards mutual commitment to security collaboration the participants in the two IASC WG consultations supported a legally non-binding, pragmatic and flexible approach in the form of a list or "menu" of options for UN/non-UN security collaboration in the field. From this "menu", humanitarian actors would identify those fitting into their specific field situation. The individual options were perceived as checklists that also had to be adapted to the local context.

While the participants stated that no organisation in principle could relinquish its organisational independence and managerial responsibilities, a menu of options would enable non-UN humanitarian actors to participate in local security arrangements by committing themselves to a range of options for security collaboration which would be in accordance with their specific mandate and the scope of their operational involvement. It would be a self-opting process for participating agencies. Opting-in would preferably entail acceptance by the collaborating agencies of certain general, locally adapted and mutually agreed humanitarian ground-rules, like the Sierra Leone Code of conduct. The menu of options could consist of:

1. Convening UN/non-UN fora for field security collaboration
2. Including UN/non-UN staff security concerns in the CAP
3. Meeting common security-related needs
4. Sharing resources
5. Collaborating in UN/non-UN security planning
6. Facilitating inter-agency telecommunication
7. Sharing information
8. Collaborating and consulting in security training
9. Identifying minimum security standards
10. Seeking adherence to common humanitarian ground-rules

It was noted by the participants in the consultations that as humanitarian operations became more and more dangerous, an increasing number of non-UN humanitarian actors improved their own security management and preparedness. Particularly risky field operations also appeared to engender enhanced collaboration among humanitarian actors. In a few cases, such as Angola and South Sudan (OLS), NGOs have entered security arrangements with the UN that resemble the 1996/97 MoU between UNSECOORD and NGOs, and which have included the acceptance of UN security phases and (as in South Sudan) cost sharing of security officers.

A trend in the opposite direction might result from the implementation of the Brahimi report's recommendations on peace building11 . Civilian tasks, such as the restoration of the rule of law in a state vacuum (police, judges, lawmaking, respect for human rights), would be carried out by entities that are part of UN-led peace building initiatives. Humanitarian actors, collaborating with the UN, might also be perceived as part of such initiatives. Some might choose to stay away from collaborative arrangements and distance themselves from the UN and its (political) peace-building efforts in order to maintain their impartiality and independence, as laid out, for example, in the Red Cross-NGO Code of Conduct (presently signed by about 150 non-UN humanitarian actors).

2.5. Perceptions of organisational identities

Generally, the participants found that the way local authorities, civil society, and militant non-state entities perceive the mandate, role and behaviour of humanitarian actors had to be taken into account as a security factor. Emblems and flags no longer provide protection. The parties to many recent conflicts make few, if any, distinctions between humanitarian actors. Actions and attitudes attributed to a few organisations could have serious consequences for all, especially for the most visible or lead agencies.

2.6. Cost / Resource sharing

The participants agreed that partnership requires mutuality. The UN system has traditionally extended its security umbrella to non-UN humanitarian actors, with varying participation from NGOs. However, major humanitarian NGOs increasingly commit funds to security efforts. It was found that this trend needed to be extended to all NGOs, involving both their own security measures and common security arrangements in the field, according to the scope of each agency's involvement and its mandate/mission.

Thus, non-UN agencies may raise the budgetary priority of their own internal security-related expenses, for example for vehicle equipment, communication, or training, which eventually contribute to common field security. In specific cases, especially in high-risk field operations, NGOs may join cost-sharing arrangements for common security services. They may also, at HQ level, engage in joint advocacy for increased awareness of, and financial support to, staff security in the field.

2.7. Continuation of the consultative process

Participants in the two consultations were concerned that, for the sake of the security of their field staff, the findings of the consultative process be communicated to the field without delay. They noted that the IASC Working Group is the formal carrier of the process on UN/non-UN security collaboration within the UN system, through its Staff Security Task Force, and is a focal point for the suggested recommendations. They did, however, also urge that other humanitarian actors concerned with field staff security, and especially the participants in the consultations, be kept informed of the continuation of the consultative process. This would allow them to participate in the dissemination of the findings and recommendations emanating from it, and initiate some practical follow-up in the field parallel to the process in the IASC WG.

3.1. Introduction

The following recommendations are a reflection or a further development of the findings and recommendations that emerged from the two UN/non-UN consultations organized by the IASC Working Group Staff Security Task Force.

The recommendations in 3.1., "It is recommended…" correspond to those submitted by the IASC WG Staff Security Task Force and endorsed, with a few changes, by the IASC Working Group on May 11, 2001. Those in 3.2. have come up in my research outside the framework of the two consultations but are still related to UN/non-UN security collaboration. To all recommendation I have added ideas for action, proposals for actors/facilitators as well as observations based on my findings during the consultative process.

3.2. IASC WG Recommendations of 11 May 2001 and Consultant's commentaries

These IASC WG recommendations are proposals for practical, informal field security arrangements and action, and are not intended to be legally binding.

4.1. Introduction The following recommendations reflect the Consultant's findings outside the direct scope of the findings and recommendations of the IASC WG Staff Security Task Force consultations in Geneva and Washington DC, which are reflected in the Task Force's recommendation to the IASC WG.

4.2. Supplementary recommendations

4.2.1. Including mutual secondments of security staff in security training
To all humanitarian actors

It is recommended: That UN/non-UN humanitarian actors second selected staff, preferably at field management level, to each other's main security sections, with due consideration of matters of confidentiality. Such security staff exchanges might be incorporated as a component of security training in agency collaboration.

Recommended implementation: To incorporate security staff secondments and/or exchanges as part of individual agencies' security training as well as of inter-agency collaboration on security training.

Observations: There is a need for humanitarian actors collaborating on security to understand each other's operational hows and whys. Participating in concrete day-to-day security work and bringing in an outside perspective may help all parties to break down pre-conceived notions and establish an understanding of the complexities of each other's work. This knowledge will facilitate collaboration when the former secondees are posted in the field.

The Task Force members found that although this recommendation had merits it would be difficult to implement in view of the prevailing shortage of staff in most humanitarian agencies. One might however argue that an exchange of staff for training purposes does not reduce the number of people. While it may for a while add to the responsibilities of the host agencies' staff in terms of availability and learning lessons, such exchanges / secondments may contribute to broadening the basis for inter-agency understanding and, thereby, for collaboration. The benefits will hopefully outweigh the costs.

4.2.2. Anticipating threats and minimizing risks
To all humanitarian actors

It is recommended: That humanitarian actors preparing to engage, or already engaged, in high-risk operations, work together to improve their capacity to anticipate potential threats to staff security and adopt a proactive stance to minimize risks37 .

Recommended implementation:

1. To share each other's expertise in joint preparatory missions, security context analyses and assessments;
2. To include external expertise when carrying out such analyses and assessments.

Observations: Major decisions on humanitarian action, such as entering or leaving a territory, starting repatriation, establishing relationships with non-State actors, separating presumed rebels from civilian refugees, etc. need to be made on the basis of critical, objective background analysis and security assessment. Such analyses would benefit from involving not only all parties in any given operation, but also external actors that are not parties to the crisis, for example certain specialized university departments, or independent institutions like the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.

All involved or potentially involved humanitarian actors should participate in the elaboration of the terms of reference. They may serve as an essential baseline for day-to-day joint security decisions and planning in specific field operations.

Such joint security assessments and analyses may also be commissioned without an immediate crisis at hand, but in crisis-prone areas.

4.2.3. Mediating conflict between humanitarian actors
To all humanitarian actors in the field

It is recommended: That humanitarian actors seek to reduce staff security risks caused by inter-agency conflict.

Recommended implementation: To call upon impartial, external mediators to assist the humanitarian community in a given area of operation in managing inter-agency conflicts which threaten to jeopardize the security of humanitarian actors, and which the parties involved have not been able to solve.

Observations: Tensions or conflict between humanitarian actors is not only detrimental to agency collaboration, but risks seriously affecting a humanitarian operation and jeopardizing staff security, for example in cases where agencies do not respect basic humanitarian ground-rules. Instead of letting such tensions and conflicts fester, the humanitarian actors involved, as well as the whole humanitarian community, may benefit from external go-betweens that are not, and are not perceived to be, parties to the conflict. This would preferably be people who are already familiar with the area of concern, e.g. professional mediators from the region, or an internationally trusted body such as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.

4.2.4. Adopting international standards of staff security
To all humanitarian actors at HQ and at field level

It is recommended: That humanitarian actors at HQ and at the field level commit themselves to international standards for staff security in the field.

Recommended implementation: To adopt the People in Aid Code, principle 7: "We take all reasonable steps to ensure staff security and well-being"38 .

Observations: The participants in the Geneva and Washington consultations, in view of the growing insecurity in field operations and the inter-dependence of humanitarian actors in the field, identified their need for collaboration, for example through mutual commitment to basic principles on staff security. The adoption by humanitarian actors of the People in Aid Code, Principle 7 on security, both at HQ and in specific field situations, could become a step in the development of common UN/non-UN standards of security collaboration.

The consultative process on staff security has confirmed that practical inter-agency security collaboration happens all the time at the field level. It varies from place to place, but has been, so far, mostly of an ad hoc nature and often dependent on personalities. The Task Force recommendations do not emanate from and will not be implemented in a collaboration vacuum.

The consultative process has also confirmed that lack of consultation and lack of transparency still create or maintain misunderstandings and agency stereotypes, both at HQ and in the field. However, stereotypes have in many instances been overcome and misunderstandings been cleared up. Irrespective of the final product: the matrix of 19 recommendations endorsed by the IASC WG, the lengthy process of humanitarian actors wrestling together with complex issues towards a common understanding, be it in the Task Force meetings or in the Geneva and Washington consultations, has in itself made a difference in UN/non-UN relations.

The difficulties that have surfaced have revealed themselves both in facts and in attitudes. Many of them, if not most, appear to be related to different approaches to partnership. Some approaches would weigh benefits against restraints on agency independence in specific field situations. Others would routinely view the contribution of outside actors to a security arrangement as interfering with internal decision-making mechanisms, or disregard any suggestion of "representative partnership" (e.g. in the form of an NGO focal points representing the views of other NGOs). Others again would see collaboration as the more resourceful UN agencies "pledging assistance" to the (perceived) less resourceful NGOs, or "including" them under their own security arrangements. This approach would again differ from the one which is based on a view of partnership as a relationship between different but equal actors serving the same people, with different roles and responsibilities, but all with a contribution to make to the humanitarian community.

At the outset of the consultative process the issue at stake was seen as one of UN/non-UN relations. Reality is much more complex, and the difficulties just mentioned are as much an issue to be reckoned with in NGO-NGO or UN-UN relations. An example of the latter was the discussions in the Task Force as to which agency or function should be proposed as overall facilitator of field security collaboration. If the emphasis was seen to be on UN/non-UN collaboration, some UN agencies felt the UN Humanitarian Coordinator should be the facilitator. If security were seen to be the key concern some felt the UN Designated Official (DO) for security would be the obvious choice, except for the fact that the DO's terms of reference do not include non-UN agencies. The compromise reached and reflected in recommendation 6 represents a new development in UN/non-UN relations and a fresh start in their security collaboration, based on practical needs in the field. That is what the Task Force set out to achieve.

Many have expressed skepticism about the feasibility of field security collaboration, referring to the fact that there are too many humanitarian actors, especially NGOs, and that they are too different. The sense I got from people in the field was that the situation for humanitarian action is getting so risky for people and programs that agencies feel it is imperative to try to find ways to collaborate regardless of their number and their differences. UN/non-UN fora and NGO security focal points are stepping stones in that process. The "one-stop", one plan approach to security collaboration in the field favoured by some may be the ideal solution, but the challenge in view of the "organizational multiculturalism" of most field situations appears to be an informed, transparent and participatory planning process involving a number of security plans - UN, Red Cross Movement, NGO families etc - rather than one common plan39 .

One practical area of common concern ("option") where agencies may start working together is security training in its many forms, preferably at the field level. It is, incidentally, an area that has the attention of a number of donors, some of whom realize that they themselves need to increase their awareness of the complexities of staff security. As a first step, UN and non-UN humanitarian actors involved in security training may consider developing a training component on security collaboration. The training process itself may nourish a collaborative spirit. People from different agency cultures and security practices and analyses working together may test their respective stereotypes against reality, exchange analytical tools, and may gradually develop a common security language.

The Task Force recommendations on field security collaboration, as endorsed and adopted by the IASC WG on May 11th 200140 , are now available for broad dissemination among IASC WG members and all interested humanitarian actors. Irrespective of the organizational fate of the recommendations at different HQ levels, humanitarian workers at the field level who are able and willing, and perhaps under enough pressure by insecure contexts, to collaborate may well begin implementing them; ("nothing focuses the mind as the prospect of immediate hanging41 "). Even if they may not be able or willing to implement all of the recommendations, they may start with the ones they can agree on. And experience shows that once there is a nucleus of determined actors, others may follow. It is however essential that ways be found to exchange the lessons learnt along the way among field workers, who are the ones that are most directly concerned by these recommendations.

Anne Paludan,

May 15th 2001.
modifications made September 2001

The titles below are only a small section of the reference material that has been used. For more details I refer to the footnotes, both in this report and in my previous "Programme Notes".

A selected bibliography on humanitarian coordination will appear in: Reindorp, N. and Wiles, P. (2001) Humanitarian Coordination - Lessons from recent Field Experience: A study commissioned by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (Overseas Development Institute: London).

An important selection of references to coordination / collaboration is found in the footnotes in: Sommers, M. (2000) The Dynamics of Coordination, Occasional Paper 40 (Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International studies: Providence, Rhode Island).

The main work on security management is: Van Brabant, K. (2000) Operational Security Management in Violent Environments: A Field Manual for Aid Agencies (Humanitarian Practice Network, Good Practice Review 7. Overseas Development Institute: London).

A list of references to documentation on security management are found in: Van Brabant, K. (2001) Mainstreaming the Organisational Management of Safety and Security: A review of aid agency practices and a guide for management (Humanitarian Policy Group, Humanitarian Practice Network Report 9. Overseas Development Institute: London).

RedR UK (London) has collected a list of References on Security for Humanitarian Relief Agencies

People in Aid (London), in its Statement of Principles, has an appendix with selected references on the management and support of relief and development workers.

Selected references

Bennett, J. (1994) NGO Coordination at Field Level: A Handbook (ICVA NGO Coordination Project. ICVA: Geneva).

Bennett, J. et al (1995) Meeting Needs: NGO Coordination in Practice (ICVA. Earthscan Publications Ltd: London).

Bruderlein, C. (2000) People's Security as a New Measure of Global Stability (Work in progress. Presented to: The International Security Forum, Geneva).

Burnham G. et al (2000) Deaths of 382 humanitarian workers between 1985 and 1998 (Center for Refugee and Disaster Studies, John Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public health, and World Health Organization).

Churcher, B. (1999) Security in ECHO (Article 20 of the Council Regulation (EC) no. 125/96 Evaluation - Security in ECHO - Phase Three - Recommendations).

Code of Conduct for Humanitarian Agencies in Sierra Leone. Revised November 21st 1998.

Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief (Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response: Geneva).

Commission of the European Communities (1998) Security of relief workers and humanitarian space (Commission Working Document, SEC (1998) 797 final).

Curtis, D. (April 2001) Politics and Humanitarian Aid: Debates, Dilemmas and Dissension. Report of a conference organised by ODI, POLIS at the University of Leeds and CAFOD, London, 1 February 2001 (Humanitarian Policy Group Report 10. Overseas Development Institute: London).

Dind, P. (1999) Security in ICRC Field Operations (Forced Migration Review, vol. 4).

Eguren, L. E. (2000) Beyond Security Planning: Towards a Model of Security Management: Coping with the Security Challenges of the Humanitarian Work (Unpublished).

Greenaway, S. and Harris, J. (1998) Humanitarian Security: Challenges and Responses (Presented to: Forging Peace Conference, Harvard University, Massachusetts, USA).

Hendrickson, D. (1998) Humanitarian Action in Protracted Crises: The New Relief "Agenda" and its Limits (RRN Network Paper 25. Overseas Development Institute: London).

Humanitarian Assistance in Liberia: Principles and Protocols for Operation [May be obtained through OCHA]

Humanitarian Safety and Protection Network (2000) HSPN Tools and Objectives.

Levine, E. (1997) Promoting Humanitarian Principles: The Southern Sudan Experience (RRN Network Paper 21. Overseas Development Institute: London).

Longford, S. (2000) Statements of Principles of Humanitarian Action (Unpublished. WFP: Rome).

Macnair, R. (1995) Room for Improvement: The Management and Support of Relief and Development Workers (RRN Network Paper 10. Overseas Development Institute: London).

Martin, R. (1999) NGO Field Security (Forced Migration Review, vol. 4).

Martin, R. (2000) A More Proactive United Nations' Role in the Security of NGO Staff? (Forced Migration Review, vol. 9).

McClellan, J. (2000) Statement on Field Security to the UNHCR Standing Committee, on behalf of a number of NGOs (Geneva, 27 September 2000).

OCHA, Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola. Coordination and facilitation of humanitarian assistance (OCHA-Online Homepage)

Ockwell, R. (1999) Full Report of the thematic evaluation of: Recurring Challenges in the Provision of Food Assistance in Complex Emergencies: The Problems and Dilemmas Faced by WFP and its Partners (WFP, Office of Evaluation: Rome).

People in Aid Code of Best Practice in the Management and Support of Aid Personnel (RRN Network Paper 20. Overseas Development Institute: London).

RedR Seminar Report: NGO Security Policy and Practice (February 1st 2000).

Reindorp, N. and Wiles, P. (2001) Humanitarian Coordination - Lessons from recent Field Experience: A study commissioned by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (Overseas Development Institute: London). [Draft]

Sommers, M. (2000) The Dynamics of Coordination, Occasional Paper 40 (Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International studies: Providence, Rhode Island).

Statements of Principles of Humanitarian Action (WFP: Rome).

UN Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (A/RES/49/59. New York, December 9th 1994).

UN General Assembly (2000a) Implementation of the Report of the Panel on the United Nations Peace Operations (UN General Assembly, 55th session, agenda items 86, 117 and 153).

UN Humanitarian / Resident Coordinators' Consultations: Recommendations (1999).

UN Secretary General (October 18th 2000) Report on Safety and Security of United Nations Personnel (A/55/494).

UNHCR (1996) Partnership: A Programme Management Handbook for UNHCR's Partners.

UNHCR (2000a) Report on PARinAC and Plan of Action (UNHCR/NGO Unit: Geneva). UNHCR (2000b) Framework Agreement for Operational Partnership between the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and XYZ (Non Governmental Organization) (UNHCR: Geneva)

UNHCR (2000c) Enhancing Staff Security (Extracts from report of Task Force on Staff Security) (UNHCR: Geneva).

UNHCR (2000d) This Could Happen to Any of Us. What are We Going to Do About It? (Dialogue. Published by the UNHCR Staff Council, Geneva. Special Issue, September 2000).

UNHCR (2000e) Too high a price? (Refugees, Volume 4, no. 121, 2000. UNHCR: Geneva)

UNSECOORD (1996/97) Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and IGO/NGO implementing partners Regarding Coordination of Security Arrangements (United Nations Security Coordinator, Security Directive. Inclusion of International Staff of International and Nongovernmental Organizations in United Nations Security Arrangements, SD/1996/2 of 16 January 1996 and Addendum 1 of 16 December 1997).

Van Brabant, K. (1997) The Coordination of Humanitarian Action: The Case of Sri Lanka (Relief and Rehabilitation Network paper 23. Overseas Development Institute: London).

Van Brabant, K. (1999) Opening the Black Box. An outline of a framework to understand, promote and evaluate humanitarian coordination (Humanitarian Policy Group. Overseas Development Institute: London).

Van Brabant, K. (2000) Operational Security Management in Violent Environments: A Field Manual for Aid Agencies (Humanitarian Practice Network, Good Practice Review 7. Overseas Development Institute: London).

Van Brabant, K. (2001) Mainstreaming the Organisational Management of Safety and Security: A review of aid agency practices and a guide for management (Humanitarian Policy Group, Humanitarian Practice Network Report 9. Overseas Development Institute: London).

Vaux, T. (2001) Private Security Companies and Humanitarian Agencies: Summary of a short review for International Alert (Humanitarian Initiatives, International Alert, March 2001).

World Food Programme (2000) Statement by Mrs. Catherine Bertini, Executive Director, WFP, to the UN Security Council, February 9th 2000.

Handbooks, manuals, guidelines from the following sources

ARC - Care - Danish Refugee Council - ICRC - InterAction - Jesuit Refugee Service - RedR - Save the Children UK - Sphere Project - United Nations - UNDP/ERD - UNHCR - UN Mine Action Service - World Vision

Programme Notes to the ICVA - WFP security consultation on Inter-Agency Collaboration on Field Security for Humanitarian Actors, Geneva, December 6th-8th 2000. [Discussion Paper]

Programme for the ICVA - WFP security consultation on Inter-Agency Collaboration on Field Security for Humanitarian Actors, Geneva, December 6rh-8th 2000.

Report, ICVA - WFP security consultation on Inter-Agency Collaboration on Field Security for Humanitarian Actors, Geneva, December 6th-8th 2000.

Report, WFP-InterAction Roundtable on UN-NGO Staff Security Collaboration, Washington DC, January 11th 2001.

"Menu of Options" - a flexible approach to UN/non-UN field security collaboration (May 2001).

AP Final Report 300601

1The term collaboration was preferred by the participants in the Geneva and Washington DC, as "coordination" to many had connotations of "control". See also the discussion of the term coordination in Marc Sommers, The Dynamics of Coordination (Thomas J.Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Occasional Paper #40: 2000), p. 1.

2In this report, humanitarian actor indicates UN and non-UN humanitarian agencies and organizations that are operational at the field level.

3See the editorial "The 'Invisible Shield' of protection disappears" in Refugees, Vol. 4, no. 121, 2000, Too high a price? p. 2: "The job of helping others has always been inherently dangerous. But for years, the great majority of humanitarian workers appeared to be protected from the obvious risks of their profession by an almost invisible shield. Effectively, belligerents in conflicts across the globe came to a tacit agreement that while they would continue to shoot at each other, relief workers could pursue their work in relative safety amid the booming guns, assisting hapless civilian victims…The situation changed sharply with the end of the cold war…The old rules of the game were jettisoned by groups with little respect or use for the existing agreements."

4See Koenraad van Brabant, Operational Security Management in Violent Environments (ODI Humanitarian Practice Network, Good Practice Review, June 2000).

5. "…the attention which has focused traditionally on the balance of power between fighting groups should be devoted to the security needs of the civilian population, in terms of food, health, education, employment, and the environment. The latter concerns have been considered to be "developmental" in essence, to be postponed to a later stage when peace will be re-established and political institutions are in place. The main aim of human security strategies is to question this incremental approach and push people's security to the forefront of any security endeavour." Claude Bruderlein, Director of the Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University, in: People's Security as a New Measure of Global Stability, a work-in-progress paper presented to the International Security Forum, Geneva, 15-17 November 2000.

6.See for example Dylan Hendrickson, Humanitarian Action in protracted crisis: the new relief 'agenda' and its limits (RRN Network Paper 25. Overseas Development Institute: 1998), p.24.

7.See the Code of Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Response Programmes, principle no 1: The Humanitarian imperative comes first…The prime motivation of our response to disaster is to alleviate human suffering amongst those least able to withstand the stress caused by disaster. When we give humanitarian aid it is not a partisan or political act and should not be viewed as such.

8.These and other current concerns of humanitarian action relevant to security collaboration were discussed at a recent conference on "Politics and Humanitarian Aid" organized by ODI, POLIS at the University of Leeds and CAFOD, 1st February 2000 in London, UK. See for example the introduction to the conference report: "How important is it to uphold traditional humanitarian principles, such as neutrality, impartiality, independence and universality? Does the new humanitarianism result in a loss of perceived neutrality, which in turn may jeopardize the security and independence of aid personnel? Devon Curtis, Politics and Humanitarian Aid: Debates, Dilemmas and Dissension (ODI, HPG Report 10: London, April 2001).

9.Operational partner in this report reflects a broad understanding of partnership, including all humanitarian actors working together in the same field operation, as opposed to the narrower, contractual relationship implied in the term "implementing partner".

10.Humanitarian community in this report refers to the totality of humanitarian actors in a given place, addressing the same humanitarian crisis, whether or not they form operational partnerships or collaborate in other ways.

11.SCHR, Some NGO Views on the Humanitarian Implications of Implementing the Brahimi Report, 7 November 2000. See also Nicola Reindorp and Peter Wiles, Humanitarian Coordination - Lessons Learnt from Recent Field Experience (ODI: 2001) Draft, p. 51.

12.See Koenraad van Brabant, Mainstreaming the Organisational Management of Safety and Security: A review of aid agency practices and a guide for management (ODI Humanitarian Policy Group, November 2000).

13.Article VII of the UNHCR-NGO Framework Agreement reads: "VII. Security and Communications 22. In insecure and isolated areas the Partners recognise the mutual dependence of all humanitarian workers at the field level for their security and communications strategy, and the potentially adverse impact the actions of one partner may have on the other. The Partners are committed to working closely to ensure information sharing, cooperation and coordination in both these areas, and will ensure that, where appropriate, all staff in the field are fully briefed on the security situation, the security plan, restrictions and other security measures in force. Partners are responsible for the behaviour and action of their own staff and ensuring their compliance with agreed security procedures. [UNHCR will assist, to the extent possible, the NGO partner to have access to both telecommunications equipment and training.]"

14.Among the key responsibilities of the Security Adviser of one major NGO is the following: "To contribute to key international debates around the security of humanitarian workers, and maintain links with other agencies, donors, and experts in the field of security."

15."…the decision whether to try and collaborate and coordinate should not be left to the discretion of country representatives, as is current practice, often at the mercy of personal likes and dislikes." Cf. Koenraad van Brabant, The Coordination of Humanitarian Action: the case of Sri Lanka (RRN Network Paper no. 23, ODI Relief and Rehabilitation Network, December 1997), p. 21. See also Nicola Reindorp and Peter Wiles, Humanitarian Coordination - Lessons from Recent Field Experience (ODI: 2001) Draft, p. 52.

16.Cf. para. 38: "…it was agreed that the key element was to select Resident Coordinators who were qualified to perform as Designated Officials and to put in place mechanisms to monitor performance."

17.See for example Recommendations of the Humanitarian / Resident Coordinators' Consultations (1999).

18."A well-functioning, integrated security management team is critical to the sound implementation of inter-agency security coordination. Security training for designated officials and members of the security management team is, therefore, a critical element in ensuring the security of staff and, by decision of the Administrative Committee on Coordination, this training is mandatory" (UN General Assembly (2000) Safety and Security of Humanitarian Personnel and Protection of United Nations Personnel (UN General Assembly. 55th session, agenda item 20. SG Report para. 46).

19.Ex officio here refers to the fact that representatives of non-UN humanitarian actors are not bound by, nor participate formally in, SMT decisions on UN security policy.

20.Le Reseau in Burundi has often been cited as an example of a well-functioning NGO forum.

21.See for example the ICVA handbook "NGO Coordination at Field Level" by Jon Bennett (ICVA: Oxford, 1994), p.20 f. and p.46. The handbook deals with the question of security in general terms in connection with the government's responsibility to assure the safety and security of humanitarian agencies and their staff and properties, but not specifically as an issue of inter-agency collaboration.

22.Cf. the example of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS): "In each location where OLS-collaborating NGOs maintain more-or-less permanent bases, a focal point for security has been designated from among the resident NGO personnel (usually the officer-in-charge of the agency with the most personnel based at the location concerned). See Ron Ockwell, Full Report of the thematic evaluation of Recurring Challenges in the Provision of Food Assistance in Complex Emergencies. The Problems and Dilemmas faced by WFP and its Partners (WFP Office of Evaluation: Rome, September 1999).

23.See also Ron Ockwell, Full Report of the thematic evaluation of recurring Challenges in the Provision of Food Assistance in Complex Emergencies. The Problems and Dilemmas faced by WFP and its Partners (WFP Office of Evaluation: Rome, September 1999), Recommendation 10-2(c): "[WFP, in consultation with UNSECOORD and in collaboration with OCHA, UNHCR and UNICEF, should] work at country level with the Humanitarian Coordinator and NGO partners, in consultation with the Designated Official and other members of the SMT, to ensure maximum consistency and complementarity between NGO and UN approaches to security and responses to security incidents[.]"

24.See for example OCHA, Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola [1993-1995], p. 3: "(Humanitarian Coordinators) can either attempt to unilaterally define the framework within which a problem will be approached or they can work with all relevant partners to define the nature and scope of the problem and how each actor's skills can be used to best advantage. The latter approach is invariably more successful."

25. See for example the note on "WFP experience in negotiating humanitarian access. Principal issues", p.4: "Implementing NGOs: play a vital role for WFP in gaining and maintaining access for its operations, especially when the UN security rules do not permit UN staff to be deployed in an affected country or to the interior or when WFP's own capacity or access to resources is inadequate to meet the needs."

26.Cf. draft recommendation 8.7, 3. in Nicola Reindorp and Peter Wiles, Humanitarian Coordination - Lessons from Recent Field Experience (ODI: 2001) Draft, p. 53: "OCHA should further strengthen the CAP as an interagency analysis and strategy setting process including working with country teams to provide analysis tools and facilitation for the process. NGOs, the Red Cross movement and UN political and military actors should be actively included in the process."

27.The "Code of Conduct for Humanitarian Agencies in Sierra Leone. Revised 21st November 1998" is a reflection of an inclusive CAP process. It is described in the following way: "A year round intensive strategic planning and fund-raising process requiring all UN Agencies to consult widely with stakeholders to determine key priorities, establish shared objectives, identify competencies and capacities, and develop principled approaches." Among the advantages of this approach are: "Joint ownership of CHAP; Advocacy for timely and flexible resources; Harmonization of programs and plans; A coherent and principled approach; A strategic monitoring system/lessons; Linkages with HQ/GOSL/NGOs."

28.See for example the Humanitarian Coordinator's Terms of Reference in which "facilitating the provision of key support services for the larger relief community, such as telecommunication…" is part of his/her role to negotiate matters of common humanitarian concern with the government.

29.Some agencies have introduced a 2% earmarking of personnel costs for training, which also covers security training.

30.Koenraad van Brabant, in: The Coordination of Humanitarian Action: the case of Sri Lanka (RRN Network Paper no. 23, ODI Relief and Rehabilitation Network, December 1997), p. 21-22, though talking about coordination, advocates a number of skills that are equally relevant for people and agencies engaged in inter-agency collaboration. He observes: "Knowing how to foster coordination is not a professional skill that is commonly required of aid workers, nor is the experience and model of coordination part of organizational memory and professional training. Rather, making coordination happen is entirely dependent on the motivation and skills of individuals. These skills include diplomacy, consultation, trust, chairing effective meetings, maintaining a sense of direction with a continuously relevant agenda and developing and articulating a shared vision".

31.See correspondence from DFID to RedR, 24 November 2000: "…DFID considers security of personnel to be of paramount importance, and we wish to ensure that organisations working in the field are properly resourced to ensure that security. To this end, project proposals should, where appropriate, include details of the security policies and procedures relating to the area of operations. Operations should state in their proposal whether they have sufficient resources in-country to meet their security needs and, if not, they should specify what funding will be required to achieve the necessary standards. We will then consider this as an integral part of the proposal and take it into account when allocating funds."

32.As an example, the UN M.O.S.S. proposes a minimum standard on training of personnel as follows: "All staff prior to deployment to the field will have training in: Personal security; Hostage survival; Office/residential security; Use of communications equipment; Basic first aid; Mine awareness." In addition, as appropriate: "Use of body armour; Use of fortified bunker; defensive driving."

33.Cf. Paul Currion (2001) New Lamps for Old: The Role of Information Management in Humanitarian Assistance (Talk Back, ICVA Newsletter 3-1, 28 February 2001).

36.See for example ICVA's handbook on NGO Coordination at Field Level by Jon Bennett, p.33, The Renegade NGO, which addresses the common problem of humanitarian actors that for a variety of (more or less justifiable) reasons decide not to commit themselves to security (or any other) collaboration: "Among other things they may consider security collaboration to constitute a security risk. The roles and responsibilities of these agencies would therefore remain unclear, and their actions and behavior may consequently at times become a security risk for other actors. To prevent this, collaborative efforts, e.g. headed by the HC, may have to be taken by other agencies, such as peer pressure, information or persuasion. If no solution is found the problem may have to be brought to the attention of donors or the host government." About such donor involvement, see Marc Sommers, The Dynamics of Coordination (Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Occasional Paper #40: 2000), p. 108: "The CFA in Sierra Leone, born out of a shared agency conviction that arrangements beyond business-as-usual were imperative, benefited from the requirement by donors that agencies receiving food aid actively participate in the coordination process."

37. Cf. UNHCR's Addendum to 2001 Global Appeal: Supplementary Programmes and Security-Related Requirements. Prepared by Donor Relations and Resource Mobilisation Service, December 2000, p.6: "To improve UNHCR's capacity to anticipate potential threats to staff security and adopt a more proactive stance to minimize risks, UNHCR will improve its capacity to carry out situational analyses of the context in which it is or will be operating and prepare security assessments. Internal and external expertise will be used to carry out such analyses and assessments. Early preparatory missions will also be undertaken to high-risk areas."

38.The key indicators of the People in Aid Code, principle 7 are: - "Programme plans include written assessment of security and health risks specific to country or region. - Before the assignment begins, field staff and families accompanying them receive oral and written briefing on country or regional security, emergency evacuation procedures and insurance arrangements. - Briefing before an assignment includes training in the use and maintenance of any vehicle, equipment or procedure essential to personal, family and team safety and security. Briefings are updated in the field when new vehicles or equipment are purchased or procedures amended. - The agency maintains records of work-related injuries, accidents and fatalities, and uses these records to help assess and reduce future risk to field staff. - Security, health, insurance provision and emergency evacuation procedures are regularly reviewed, and information to staff is updated. - Field staff and families accompanying them know how to identify health risks in the country or region, how to protect against illness, injury and stress, and how to obtain support or medical treatment following incidents that cause distress."

39.See Nicola Reindorp and Peter Wiles, Humanitarian Coordination - Lessons from Recent Field Experience (ODI: 2001) Draft, p. 31-32.

40.With reference to its unique mandate, the Red Cross Movement refrained from associating itself with the collaborative arrangements in recommendations 6 and 7, but supported that "[R]egular consultation should be encouraged between members of UN Security Management Teams (SMT) / Disaster Management Teams (DMT) and non-UN humanitarian actors such as ICRC and NGOs (or NGO Security Focal Points), acting as informal collaborative security teams."

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