Working Paper No. 2: Complaints

1. Consideration of individual complaints1. is an important part of the work of most U.N. human rights supervisory bodies. In these systems, individuals or groups can effectively appeal to an international protective mechanism which is empowered to "do justice"2. , to the individual or group when national mechanisms and protections fail.3.

2. This classic function of a complaint mechanism is arguably less critical in the refugee law context than in the implementation of other human rights obligations. In the context of refugee law, the institutional competence of UNHCR and its presence around the world already provide an international source of intervention to enforce refugee rights, of a kind that exists under no other human rights treaty. UNHCR's field operations, which protect refugees by providing needed humanitarian resources as well as by acting as liaison between refugees and asylum nations, can provide direct protection that mechanisms under other human rights treaties cannot provide. Nonetheless, there are examples of situations in which not only individuals, but also groups of refugees find that at the end of the day they are without an effective mechanism for vindicating their Convention rights.4.

3. The importance of an individual complaint mechanism is not, however, restricted to the ability to do justice to individual refugees. A complaint mechanism also provides a means by which to inject the voice of refugees into the overall supervision of the Convention. A holistic commitment to supervision includes the creation of an international environment conducive to the realization of human rights; the elaboration of norms and standards; education, teaching, training, research and the dissemination of information, and the provision of advisory services in the field of human rights.5. The stories and experiences of refugees can aid in grounding and interpreting the treaty for state parties and individuals in light of individual and group experiences.

4. The above function, which might be understood as "indirect protection", rather than "direct protection" or doing justice for the individual, should be an important component of any new mechanism to supervise refugee rights. Understanding and interpreting a treaty must be informed by the personal experiences and realities of those who have suffered from its violation. An interpretation of an article within a human rights treaty may be of little use if the interpreters do not genuinely understand how rights abuse is experienced. Scrutiny of a state report will be lacking if the voices of the citizens of that state are not reflected in the questions and conclusions of the supervisory body. Without a mechanism that integrates the voices of refugees, refugee law runs the risk of becoming too distanced in its focus from the real needs of real people.

5. Moreover, at least in the most serious of situations, there is reason to doubt the ethicality of the view that an international supervisory mechanism ought not, at least at the outset, to include a provision to receive complaints directly from the persons affected. Even if the complaints system cannot realistically be expected to provide a remedy for every violation, the overall supervision should be informed by the direct testimony of the intended beneficiaries of the protection system - namely, refugees themselves.

6. One option to implement indirect protection under new supervisory mechanism, to be developed below, is to draw on the experience of the International Labor Organization ("ILO") and the European Social Charter ("ESC"). Both the ILO and the ESC allow selective complaints alleging a violation of treaty obligations by those representing significant numbers of persons comparably situated, which are then considered by the supervisory body. The complaints are integrated into the analysis of state reports; the complaints can further inform whatever general comments a supervisory body generates.

7. In essence, this process ensures that the supervisory body hears the voices of those affected when it is engaged in the review of state reports and the production of general comments, thereby helping to ground their work in the real dilemmas confronting refugees. Moreover, complaints provide for at least a minimal international response to the needs of significant numbers of persons seriously affected by denials of refugee rights not otherwise remediable in their host state.

8. This working paper will first discuss individual complaints system in several UN human rights treaties, and will then look at the efficacy of that system in "doing justice" to the individuals. The following section will focus on the complaint system in regard to providing indirect protection. The concluding section will propose a possible complaint system for the Refugee Convention.

A. Individual Complaints in UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies

9. This section will review the individual complaint systems of the major UN human rights treaty bodies, focusing on the efficacy of this system in attempting to do justice to individuals. Broadly speaking, individual complaints provide direct protection by implementing a "system . . . designed to operate as an instrument of enforcement by which individual victims can seek international protection against their defaulting governments."6. Indeed, the individual complaint system, as a whole, "has had a beneficial impact on the development of human rights standards and their implementation at the national level, as well as leading to the resolution of a number of individual complaints."7.

10. Four UN human rights treaties presently utilize a complaint procedure, with a fifth system in planning. The treaties currently using a complaint procedure are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"), the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ("CERD"),8. and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women ("CEDAW"). A draft protocol to establish a complaint mechanism for the International Covenant on Economic, Racial, Social and Cultural Rights (IESCR) has been circulated. While each supervisory body has some unique features, the basic framework for all of the mechanisms is the same.

11. The original model for individual complaint mechanisms is that established under the ICCPR. In this system, individuals may submit complaints to the Human Rights Committee ("HRC") alleging violations of any of the rights set forth in the ICCPR in regard to States that have ratified the Optional Protocol.9. In order to be admissible, the individual must have exhausted all reasonable domestic remedies10. ; however the HRC has not required exhaustion if the remedies are unreasonably prolonged .11. The application cannot be anonymous. The HRC will not consider the complaint if the same matter is being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement.12. Once the HRC reaches a conclusion on the merits of the complaint, it forwards its "views" to the state concerned and the individual.13. There is no provision setting forth the precise legal effect of "views".14. An institutional mechanism has been established to determine what follow-up should take place once the HRC has issued its views. The CAT and CERD procedures are substantially the same.

12. The procedure contemplated for CEDAW contains some differences from the HRC model. For example, an individual can request interim measures,15. and a specific provision exists requiring reports by state parties of their compliance with the views of the supervisory body.16.

13. There are several strengths in an individual complaint system with a "do justice" orientation. First, and perhaps most obviously, it provides an opportunity for the individual concerned to seek direct enforcement of his or her rights. In theory, the complaints procedure acts as an international remedy for violations of human rights. National protection has failed the complainant, and the international supervisory mechanism can fill the gap left by lax protection on the part of the state party. In this sense the complaints procedure fulfills an ethical obligation to provide some form of social justice to the aggrieved individual.

14. Second, when the supervisory body delivers views on the merits of the complaint, it providse an impetus for state action. A finding of a treaty violation by the supervisory body may spur the nation to take remedial action in favor of the individual complainant and similarly situated persons in order to ensure compliance with treaty obligations. Experiencing the shame of a negative finding on the merits of a complaint may help to bring about changes to whatever laws and practices within the state violate the treaty. States may solidify national adjudicatory procedures and take care to make sure that the remedies available in fact address the obligations undertaken when ratifying a human rights treaty. In this sense, a complaints procedure "will act as an incentive for Governments to take a fresh look at the means of redress that are currently available…at the domestic level."17.

15. Third, even where the state subject to the complaint does not choose to act, publicity of a negative finding by a supervisory mechanism may shame a state into compliance. International attention may be turned to the violating state, which may cause it to discontinue the violative measure in its application to the individual complainant and others. Shaming, in this sense, also acts a deterrent for other state parties who want to avoid negative publicity and the submission of a complaint against them.18.

16. Fourth, a complaints procedure can also "initiate a positive dialogue, resulting in an amicable resolution between the complainant and the state concerned, which remedies the prejudice complained of." 19. This dialogue may aid in repairing the connection between citizen and state.

17. Notwithstanding these strengths, individual complaint systems do not always effectively serve as a useful tool to do justice to individuals. First, delays and backlog, already a major problem for supervisory bodies when dealing with state reports,20. may also prevent the proper assessment of individual complaints.21. For example, an expert commentator on the Human Rights Committee recently estimated that "under present procedures . . . Committee [can] issue a maximum of ten views a session," which places the Committee at a backlog of three or more years.22. If every state party to the ICCPR's Optional Protocol generated just one complaint per year, the backlog of the HRC "would soon become intolerable."23.

18. Potential backlog may prevent contemporaneous adjudication of the issue at hand so that a violation happens without any check. Under treaties like the CAT, in which delays create opportunities for the disappearance or extra-judicial execution of a torture victim,24. delays can literally be fatal.

19. Second, the only remedy available to supervisory bodies which adjudicate complaints is to issue "views" on an alleged violation; these have no binding force. The "attitude of some states [is to ignore] these views and the lack of any enforcement mechanism may lead to a conclusion that these views are mere recommendations deprived of any legally binding force."25. Supervisory bodies will "never be able to control violations in all parts of the world through complaints procedures."26. Instead, the body relies on moral suasion in order to have the state party implement its findings on the conclusion.27. Thus, the individual's rights are not necessarily vindicated by the conclusions of the supervisory body, as there is neither extra-legal enforcement of the views through mechanisms like sanctions, nor any legal ability for the supervisory body to make a state comply.

20. One of the strengths of the complaint system is the belief that a negative finding will spur a government into action. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. For example, since the CAT Committee's request are non-binding, "the majority of States will not comply, not only because they are assured that no punishment can be imposed on them, but also because of fears that remedial action in response to the Committee's request would be considered an admission that they practice torture."28. The inability of any supervisory body to make legally binding decisions may shield states against possible abuse by the supervisory body ,29. but also prevents whatever views dispensed by the body from effectively providing direct protection to the individual at risk.30.

21. Third and related, individual complaint systems rely on certain domestic conditions in the state party. A state must "have a minimum degree of democracy or its government should be sincerely committed to democratic reform and protection of human rights."31. This is because, in the end, "the views or decision of these bodies need to be implemented through certain domestic mechanisms and procedures." 32. Without a functioning national government or a judiciary, the supervisory body's views will likely not be implemented at all.33.

22. Fourth, the existence of an individual complaint mechanism may lead to a misdistribution of scarce international resources in favor of the developed world. Because experience demonstrates that a seriously disproportionate percentage of claims will emerge from highly legalized societies in which there is both an awareness of rights and greater access to legal advice, it is refugees in the developed nations who will most likely use the complaint system.34. Given the endemic shortage of both time and resources for the international enforcement of refugee and other human rights, the logic of such a focus may be doubted.

B. Complaint Procedures and Indirect Protection

23. For the reasons noted above, a complaint system structured to provide justice to individuals faces often severe challenges. But the value of a complaint system is not limited to doing justice; it can be also be a highly instrumental means of providing indirect protection. Indeed, human rights litigation itself is not often meant simply, or even principally, to be a means to secure particularized remedies, but is rather "focused on creating larger structural changes" to prevent similar occurrences in the future.35.

24. Specifically, a complaint system, by establishing a venue in which to discuss treaty obligations and alleged rights violations by states, creates an international atmosphere that is conducive to the realization of human rights. The simple process of receiving and reviewing complaints may create an environment in which [individuals] are able to enjoy all their rights fully…"36.

25. Additionally, individual complaints can bring concrete and tangible issues into relief for the supervisory body, and allow it to focus on a particular issue and to scrutinize thoroughly a contested piece of legislation or a social practice.37. Individual complaints allow both the treaty body and the state party more clearly to understand how particular circumstances may or may not violate treaty obligations.

26. A complaint procedure also enhances the profile of the treaty at issue, thereby generating a greater awareness of the obligations of the state party, particularly at the national level.38. This form of indirect protection impacts both the nation against which a complaint is brought and other state parties who may have similar laws or practices.

27. As stated earlier, indirect protection undertaken by a supervisory body must be grounded in the everyday realities facing individuals within a contracting state's territory. Both state reports and general comments are better served when the supervisory body receives complaints from individuals or affected groups.39. The supervisory body can use the complaints submitted to aid in interpreting the treaty, and as a tool with which to engage in a dialogue with states, NGOs and inter-governmental organizations, advocates, scholars and students.40.

28. The state reporting system mechanisms can be complemented by the complaint system as a tool with which to further explore the obligations of states under the treaty. The European Social Charter supervisory functions, for example, were organized with the interplay between mechanisms in mind. The ESC established the complaint system detailed in the Additional Protocol as a "complement to the examination of governmental reports".41. These two mechanisms work together to allow a supervisory body to more fully provide indirect protection.

29. Specifically, national reports prepared by governments do not necessarily give a rounded picture.42. A complaint system aids in the review of state reports by providing a more complete picture of country situations, and informing the supervisory body of the realities of life in the state party. An example of the complaint procedure aiding in the review of state reports comes from the practice of the HRC. The HRC only discovered inconsistencies between the internal legislation and practice of Finland and France and the ICCPR by considering individual complaints from citizens of those countries.43. Consideration of state reports alone had not revealed anything amiss.44.

30. States may also saturate a report with so much information, that key details are lost. In situations like these, "it is only with the consideration of . . . complaints that the complete conformity of national legislation and practice with the requirements of international law can be assessed."45. A complaint procedure illustrates how a practice or law is implemented on the ground and how and why it may violate a treaty obligation. Complaints can fill in the blanks for a supervisory body when looking at a piece of legislation or practice.

31. Much of what a supervisory body may learn about a state law and practice will be from hearing complaints, which in turn will focus the questions and concerns asked during a reporting cycle.46. Once alerted to a larger problem through the complaint system, the supervisory body can invite the state parties to the treaty to address the issue in a reporting cycle.47. It may be that other state parties are grappling with the issue presented in the complaint, and by requesting reports that speak to the alleged violation the supervisory body will be able to make a more informed and decision.48.

32. A complaint system can aid the supervisory body when creating general comments as well. The exchange between general comments and complaints is two-way. Through the amassing of reports and complaints, general comments can address the issues that actually actively concern states and individuals. General comments issued by a supervisory body "put a gloss" on the treaty's substantive provisions to inform individuals and states on the general understanding of the treaty, and aid them in the formation of complaints.49. Additionally, the supervisory body could draw the attention of state parties to the issues presented in the complaints mechanism through a general comment. 50.

33. The supervisory body can choose which issues or obligations to address by looking at issues repeatedly brought to the attention of the body through the complaints mechanism or egregious acts by states upon individuals or groups. Since complaints grow out of "concrete controversies and facts" they can enrich the discussion of treaty obligations, set the boundaries for a general comment, and lend a reality to the supervisory body's comments.51. They can provide the contextual analysis of a provision of the treaty, and the general comment will be richer by pointing to specific situations in which the treaty issue was discussed and decided upon. The complaints would give the supervisory body an opportunity to explore and explain the Convention, and act "as a deliberative body seeking to illuminate and advance understanding of the [Convention] rather than to apply it summarily case by case."52.

C. A Model for Reception of Complaints from Broadly Affected Groups of Refugees

34. Any supervisory body for the Refugee Convention should provide indirect protection, integrating the experiences and voices of refugees into its work. A complaint system would be a workable tool by which to meet this objective. Complaints will give any supervisory body for the Refugee Convention an opportunity to explain and interpret articles of the Convention, paving the way to a "detailed jurisprudence and practice" which can guide further action under the Convention, making it a "living instrument capable of meeting the changing needs for protection" of refugees.53.

35. Refugee scholars and activists, when discussing a proposed supervisory body for the Convention, have already suggested the possibility of a complaint mechanism or a judicial component of some form. The Cambridge Expert Roundtable, organized by the UNHCR and the Lauterpacht Research Center, suggested an "informal system of review by judges" to offer a forum in which to "discuss the interpretation and implementation of the Convention."54. Other commentators have suggested an individual complaints system for the Refugee Convention,55. or a more consistent use of judicial and administrative procedures by UNHCR.56.

36. The complaint mechanism proposed by this paper in the section below admittedly does not conform in all respects to the call for an individuated system or an informal judicial forum for interpretation, but attempts to meld these objectives into a more workable system that will take into account the strengths and weaknesses of complaint systems in other contexts. Its key objective is to ground interpretation of refugee law in the real experience of refugees. A collective complaint system, modeled in part on the experiences of the ILO and the ESC, may answer many of the practical concerns associated with a full-blown system of individuated complaints, while still allowing for the injection of refugee voices into the work of the supervisory body. The collective complaint system described below is meant to provide the supervisory body with a tool to inform its work on state reports and general comments by reference to the lived experiences of refugee groups who may be affected by Convention violations. A group-based complaint system may avoid some of the pitfalls of an individuated complaint system, while advancing many of the strengths.

37. Kälin's paper exploring the supervision of the Refugee Convention states several concerns about individual complaints procedures. Kälin seems to agree that complaints procedures in other contexts have increased state party compliance, but believes that the practical import of the procedure is limited.57. Additionally, Kälin states that the institutional capacity of the bodies has reached its limit and the procedures are too long.58.

38. The collective complaint system outlined below seeks to address Kälin's concerns. First, the complaints procedure would be focused on indirect protection. Because it is not based on a "do justice" approach, the non-binding nature of the views given would not affect its ability to supervise effectively. Second, the supervisory body would be able to self-regulate by choosing to consider only certain complaints, and thus would not be stretched to its institutional limits by a massive caseload.

39. Specifically, the complaints received by the supervisory body should relate to general situations rather than individual cases.59. Such an approach allows the procedure to provide a remedy to at least some significant problems. But because its primary goal is to ground supervisory work in the reality of refugee experience, a collective complaint mechanism is not as susceptible to concerns of resource misallocation. Group complaints will highlight the "big picture" of country conditions. An individual complaint may be anomalous, while a group complaint shows a pattern.60.

40. The objective of the collective complaint system envisaged here is broadly similar to that of the Res.1503 procedure of the UN's Commission on Human Rights. In this system the Commission examines complaints pertaining to "situations which appear to reveal a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human rights."61. The Res.1503 procedure does not provide an international remedy for individuals alleging a violation, but allows the Commission to receive information and compile a better picture of country conditions.

D. Admissibility

41. Exhaustion of domestic remedies is a prerequisite that should probably be adopted in a complaint procedure under the Refugee Convention adopted. This requirement ensures that the complainants have attempted to address the alleged violation in the host state, giving the state party a chance to alleviate the problem before international mechanisms are set in motion.

42. Who will be allowed to submit a complaint to the supervisory body? There are three options: the complaint could be submitted by the refugee group directly; the complaint could be submitted by national or international NGOs or comparable agents on behalf of the refugee group; or the supervisory body could accept submissions from either the refugees or NGOs.

43. Under the first option, refugees themselves would organize the complaint for submission. This model allows for the most direct representation of refugee voices in the supervisory body. However, this model does raise some concerns. Refugee groups in some situations, like state controlled refugee camps, may not be allowed to organize amongst themselves in order to formulate a complaint. Also, it may be unrealistic to expect refugees be in a position to communicate with international bodies.62. There may also be problems with legal knowledge, or access to the UN system.

44. The second option, NGO organized complaints, might take the group complaint procedure of the ILO63. , (already largely adopted under the ESC) as its model. This procedure allows complaints to be submitted to the treaty body by international and national organizations of employers and trade unions and other international and national non-governmental organizations.64. Under this option, NGOs are effectively working as community organizers, either acting as the catalyst for the complaint or responding to the needs of the refugee population.

45. This option has several strengths. Strong NGO participation in the system may help build links between the supervisory body and the national and international organizations concerned with the rights of refugees.65. Additionally, NGO participation and responsibility for organizing the complaints may diminish concerns regarding the problems of publicity of the right to complain, the language differences between a UN system and the complainants, and the need for legal expertise and knowledge in order to exhaust domestic remedies. National and international NGOs would have easier access to the mechanisms of the UN, and are more likely to be familiar with treaty rights and the procedural ins and outs of the judicial system, or can be trained to be so.

46. Making NGOs responsible for complaints may also relieve some fears on the part of refugees. Because refugees themselves are not organizing the complaint, the fear of retaliation by the home or asylum state might be lessened. Many refugees, having experienced a complete breakdown of trust with their home government, may be unwilling to trust an international system. NGOs can serve as a shield and a safeguard so that refugee groups are more likely to proceed with a complaint.

47. Complete reliance on an NGO-initiated system, however, has its flaws. In countries where NGO participation is limited or is highly contingent on friendly relations with a host government, NGOs may not be inclined to risk access to refugees in order to pursue claims against a state. Also, NGOs may be concerned with other aspects of refugee protection, like humanitarian aid, and may not have the time or resources to allocate to the submission of complaints.

48. A complaint system that allows both refugee groups and NGOs to submit complaints may reconcile most of the concerns discussed above. In this system, either concerned group could take the initiative to submit a complaint. This option, however, runs the risk of subjecting the supervisory body to a barrage of complaints and may overload the system.

E. Selectivity

49. If the complaint procedure is not to overwhelm the supervisory body, and if the complaints are to be entertained in order to assist in the consideration of reports and preparation of general comments, then a mechanism must be established to filter collective complaints received. For example, the supervisory body could choose to focus the consideration of complaints thematically. Here, complaints would be accepted in a given year which address a concern under particular scrutiny, such as economic rights or the rights of refugee children. Acceptance of complaints could be limited to questions concerning these rights in preparation for a general comment on the theme, while thematic state reports would be comparably focused.

50. Alternatively, the supervisory body might choose to limit collective complaints to refugee-specific concerns, such as definitional questions under of Art. 1, or core rights under Articles 31-33 of the Convention. This could be justified on the grounds that whereas refugees can bring complaints in regard to others, more generic concerns to other treaty bodies exercising jurisdiction over cognate rights, only the supervisory body for the Refugee Convention is in a position to consider these rights which are uniquely held by refugees.

51. This model does not mean that individuals will be without relief. Individuals may still be able to seek redress internationally through one of the complaints procedures established through HRC, CAT, CERD, or CEDAW. Since these procedures are structured to provide direct protection, an individual refugee may choose to proceed with a complaint alleging a violation of an individual right through another mechanism.

52. A collective complaints model would enable the supervisory body to regulate and control its caseload, thereby avoiding overload and unnecessary delays in the process.66. Given the time and monetary constraints that press on any treaty supervisory body 67., a collective complaint system that controls its caseload should allow the supervisory body to focus only on the most significant complaints, and will thereby preserve the efficacy of the mechanism.

53. Second, a collective complaint system that is structured to inject the voices of refugees into the supervisory body, as a facet of the indirect protection provided by that body, avoids many of the concerns which states might voice in relation to a "do justice" individual complaint system. The supervisory body is not providing an international remedy as such, but utilizes the complaints to more fully understand country conditions and to aid in the understanding of the Convention.68. This may also be a more realistic approach, since the non-binding effect of the "views" becomes less of a concern.

54. The procedure suggested here might be seen as overly academic, based on the view that protection of persons should be more important than interpreting the Convention when considering complaints. Without a doubt, in the best of all worlds, a supervisory body would afford individuated relief to each refugee denied Convention rights in his or her home state, and who could not secure an effective remedy there.

55. But the collective complaint mechanism described here would in no sense foreclose the possible future establishment of a complaints mechanism that would "do justice" for individuals. It attempts to provide a compromise among the ethical imperative of requiring some consideration of at least the most persuasive risks faced by refugees; Kälin's concern for pragmatism when proposing a supervisory mechanism; the need for a context specific understanding of refugee rights interpretation; and the political importance, which was recognized at the Cambridge Roundtable, of leaving the door open for a more aggressive form of intervention to protect individual refugee rights in the future.

F. Summary

• Individual complaint systems are currently available under most of the UN human rights treaties. In principle, these systems are meant to do justice for the individual complainant by providing an international remedy where domestic remedies have not proved effective.
• In practice, however, the individual complaint systems are riddled with problems. For example, the treaty bodies are unable to ensure state compliance with the views given at the end of a complaint consideration, delays are the norm, and valuable resources may be expended on the adjudication of complaints of little or no general significance, emanating disproportionately from developed countries.
• Although a collective complaint system does not provide all individuals adversely affected with particularized justice, it can still respond to the most acute concerns of the most significant members of refugees without succumbing to the practical problems of an individual complaint system.
• Most important, adoption of a selective system for receiving collective complaints form refugees will ensure that the entirety of the supervisory process - including the review of state reports and the elaboration of general comments - is firmly grounded in a contextualized appreciation of the reality of the human rights abuse experience by refugees.

1.This paper will consistently use the term "complaints", which is intended to include "petitions" or "communications" in the parlance of some human rights treaties, when referring to individual or group complaints to a supervisory body alleging a violation of a treaty.

2.Doing justice for the individual can be defined as the "intercession of an international entity either at the behest of a victim or victims concerned, or by persons on their behalf, or on the volition of the international protecting agency itself to halt a violation of human rights." B.G. Ramcharan, The Concept and Present Status of the International Protection of Human Rights: Forty Years after the Universal Declaration (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1989) p. 17.

3.The "idea that justice in the individual case - or vindication of the rule of law in this special field of adjudication - constitutes the principal purpose of the [ICCPR's] Protocol finds further support in the fact that the jurisdiction of the HRC to decide the dispute is mandatory." Henry J. Steiner, "Individual Claims in a World of Massive Violations: What Role for the Human Rights Committee?" in The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (ed. Philip Alston and James Crawford, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000), p. 32

4.See, for example, the recent treatment of Indonesian refugees off the coast of Australia.

5.Ramcharan, supra note 2, p. 17.

6.A. Boulesbaa, The U.N. Convention on Torture and the Prospects for Enforcement, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1999), p.286.

7.A. Byrnes and J. Connors, "Enforcing the Human Rights of Women: A Complaints Procedure for the Women's Convention?" 21 Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 1996, p. 701.

8.Ramcharan, supra note 2, p. 21.

9.D. Weissbrodt and I. Hortreiter, "The Principle of Non-Refoulement: Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Comparison with the Non-Refoulement Provisions of Other International Human Rights Treaties", 5 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review, 1999,

10.Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171, Art. 2.

11.Weissbrodt and Hortreiter, supra note 9, p. 45.

12.999 UNTS 171, Art. 2(a).

13.Weissbrodt and Hortreiter, supra note 9, p. 45.

14.H. Steiner and P. Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) at p. 739.

15.Byrnes and Connors, supra note 7, p. 764.

16.H. Steiner and P. Alston, supra note 14. p. 777.

17.H. Steiner and P. Alston, supra note 14, p. 777.

18.Steiner, supra note 3, p. 36.

19.C.A. Odinkalu, "The Individual Complaints Procedures of the African Commission on Human and People's Rights: A Preliminary Assessment", 8 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, 1998, p. 374.

20.See discussion in Working Paper No. 1, "Reporting".

21.J. Crawford, "The UN Human Rights Treaty System: A System In Crisis?" in The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (ed. Philip Alston and James Crawford, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000), p. 5.

22.Steiner, supra note 3, p. 33.

23.Crawford, supra note 24, pg. 8-9.

24.W. Nagan and L. Atkins, "The International Law of Torture: From Universal Proscription to Effective Application and Enforcement", 14 Harvard Human Rights Journal, 2001, p. 105.

25.Mullerson, supra note 29, p. 36.

26.T. Opsahl, "The Human Rights Committee" in The United Nations and Human Rights (ed. P. Alston, New York, Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 421.

27.Weissbrodt and Hortreiter, supra note 9, p. 17.

28.Id., at p. 291.

29.Boulesbaa, supra note 6, p. 117.

30.Weissbrodt and Hortreiter, supra note 9, p.117.

31.R. Mullerson, "The Efficiency of the Individual Complaint Procedures: The Experience of CCPR, CERD, CAT and ECHR" in Monitoring Human Rights in Europe (ed. A. Bloed, L. Leicht and A. Rosas, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1993), p. 32.

32.Id., p. 32.

33.According to Benedetto Conforti, the application of international law by municipal courts and other domestic legal operators is the keystone of international law. M. Schenin, "Domestic Implementation of International Human Rights Treaties: Nordic and Baltic Experiences," in The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (ed. Philip Alston and James Crawford, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000), p. 231.

34.Mullerson, supra note 29, p. 32

35.M. Pinto, "Fragmentation or Unification among International Institutions: Human Rights Tribunals, 31 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 1999, pg. 835-36.

36.Steiner and Alston, supra note 14, p. 777.

37.Byrnes and Connors, supra note 7, p. 11.

38.Id., at p. 11.

39.Indeed, all three mechanisms, contain significant interpretations of the treaties and should carry considerable weight" for state parties. Y. Iwasawa, "The Domestic Impact of International Human Rights Standards: The Japanese Experience," (ed. Philip Alston and James Crawford, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000), p. 258.

40.Steiner, supra note 3, p. 31.

41.Council of Europe, Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter providing for a system of collective complaints and explanatory report (Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 2000), p. 9.

42.D. Harris, "Lessons form the Reporting System of the European Social Charter", in The Future of Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (ed. P. Alston and J. Crawford, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000), p. 359.

43.Mullerson, supra note 29, p. 26.

44.Id., p. 27.

45.Id., p. 26.

46.Harris, supra note 46, p. 359.

47.T. Zwart, The Admissibility of Human Rights Petitions: The Case Law of the European Commission of Human Rights and The Human Rights Committee, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1994), p. 39.

48.Id., p. 39.

49.Pinto, supra note 39, p. 840.

50.Zwart, supra note 50, p. 39.

51.Steiner, supra note 3, p. 52.

52.Steiner, supra note 3, p. 18.

53.Boulesbaa, supra note 6, p. 292.

54.UNHCR and the Lauterpacht Research Center for International Law, Summary Conclusions - Supervisory Responsibility (Cambridge Expert Roundtable, 9-10 July 2000), at para. 10(e).

55.L. MacMillan and L. Olsson, "Rights and accountability", (FMR, 10 April 2001), http://www.fmreview.org/fmr1012.htm.

56.Global Consultations on International Protection, San Jose Regional Experts Meeting - Conclusions and Recommendations, (7-8 June 2001), at para. 30.

57.W. Kalin, "Supervising the 1951 Refugee Convention: UNHCR's Role under Article 35 CSR51", at para. 58.

58.Id., at para. 57 - 58.

59.Harris, supra note 46, p. 358.

60.The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has been able to use "general" cases to transcend particular circumstances and effectively address systemic or gross violations of human rights. Also, the views in these cases are integrated into state reports. A. Trindade, "Reporting in the Inter-American System of Human Rights Protection," (ed. Philip Alston and James Crawford, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000), p.343.

61.Steiner and Alston, supra note 14, p. 612.

62.Mullerson, supra note 29, p. 33.

63.Council of Europe, supra note 45, p. 9.

64.Id., at p. 11.

65.For further discussion on NGO linkages, see Working Paper no. 5, "NGO/National Linkages".

66.By detailing complaint requirements in the first instance, the supervisory body can avoid the preoccupation of managing their workload and focus on considering the complaints. T. Zwart, supra note 50, p. 1.

67.Crawford, supra note 24, p. 7.

68.Steiner, supra note 3, p. 39.