Working Paper No. 1: Reporting

1. On the 50th anniversary of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, it is fitting to reflect on the successes of the treaty thus far. The Convention has brought numerous states together under one impressive international regime with the aim of recognizing and ameliorating the plight of refugees. Countless refugees fleeing persecution have found protection within the borders of state parties to the Convention.

2. The 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol have been officially implemented by the governments of state parties in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The relationships between these entities have often been cooperative and productive in ensuring the protection of refugees.

3. It is also appropriate to critically assess the strengths and weaknesses of the regime as it functions today. Acceptance of asylum seekers, the fulfillment of their basic needs, and the protection of their human rights, are complex concerns in every national political environment. These difficulties are shared worldwide, and necessitate a discussion of additional mechanisms to ensure refugee protection.

4. In considering how best to reinforce the commitment to fulsome implementation of the Refugee Convention, it is appropriate to seek to learn the lessons of human rights protection in other parts of the U.N. system. Most human rights treaties are overseen by a supervisory body which engages in some combination of reviewing and commenting on state reports; receiving complaints from affected individuals; and issuing general comments on how treaty provisions should be interpreted. This paper addresses the first of these three widely used methods for treaty supervision, and explores its usefulness in the context of the Refugee Convention. An evaluation of the existing mechanisms within the human rights treaty monitoring system leads to the identification of approaches that could be useful under the Refugee Convention.

A. The Current Situation

5. Although there is currently no reporting system, UNHCR has relied upon Article 35(2) of the Convention and Article II (2) of the Protocol to request specific information and responses to questionnaires from states as part of its protection activities. These attempts at fact gathering have not been entirely fruitful, as they have not generally elicited significant numbers of replies. This may be because the requests are not made at regular intervals, nor are states held accountable to address concerns identified in their responses.1. Even when successful, these information requests are used more to support UNHCR's daily operational activities than systematically to define a protection agenda designed to influence domestic law and practice.

6. By contrast, a reporting system aims to advance comprehensive policy reform. The process typically involves the formulation of guidelines, review of reports, formal dialogue with state representatives, and issuance of concluding observations.2.

7. A conflict could arise between the work of UNHCR and the implementation of a reporting system. Adding a reporting system to the workload of UNHCR would be likely to overburden the agency, possibly to the detriment of the essential services (eg. legal advocacy, emergency intervention, and relocation coordinator) it is in a unique position to provide. UNHCR may also legitimately fear that its staff might be expelled from host countries subjected to criticism, and that its rapport with states might deteriorate if the critiques of state practice are made public.3. This is one significant reason that present practice is that the responses to requests for information are kept confidential. UNHCR must also maintain good relationships with governments; diplomatic considerations normally require confidentiality of communications between UNHCR and state parties. Overall, it may be best that UNHCR will continue to maintain confidentiality in its institutional information-gathering interactions with states.4.

8. For an effective reporting system to operate with transparency and regularity, however, public knowledge of the timing and content of reports is advantageous.5. It may be necessary, therefore, to consider the possibility of introducing an autonomous body to oversee a reporting system that would address the broader questions of national political implementation of the provisions of the Convention. Unburdened by the indispensable protection activities of UNHCR, a new supervisory body could monitor the application of treaty provisions at all levels of government policy.6.

B. The Aims of a Reporting System Generally

9. There are several reasons that the mechanisms usually used by human rights treaty bodies to monitor state implementation of obligations almost always include some sort of a reporting system.7. Appreciating the general motivating factors behind using a reporting system informs the present discussion of whether a comparable system would be useful for the Refugee Convention.

10. One fundamental goal of reporting systems is for states to take ownership of their compliance obligations under treaties they have signed.8. Through the reporting process, states must take the initiative to assess their own progress toward domestic conformity with treaty standards. Self-assessment can be the most constructive way to discover problem areas in extant methods of treaty implementation.9. The gaps between the reality of the national situation and treaty requirements should become clear when states scrutinize policy and practice to develop their reports.10. After all, the practical effects of treaty obligations depend on state actors as "all roads lead back to state responsibility." 11.

11. Reporting systems also aim to mobilize various concerned actors within states to work together to promote the human rights agenda, especially if various agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) contribute to the reporting process.12. When working toward improved compliance with treaty provisions, concerned organizations should be involved in investigating and monitoring domestic situations.13. Reporting is not just a formal obligation, but may facilitate advocacy on many levels by encouraging cooperation among concerned actors within states.14.

12. Another goal of reporting is to encourage progressive reform of policy.15. Even if a state does not have the resources to formulate possible solutions to implementation problems, with the assistance of a supervisory body meaningful and long-lasting solutions may be possible.16. A supervisory body's ability to "react and clarify" may help a government to better tailor its policies to achieve long-lasting and effective results.17. Additionally, analysis of concerns through collection of state parties' reports lays the groundwork for general comments, allowing a supervisory body to make realistic and positive suggestions applicable globally.18. If over time a supervisory body can increase the strength and forcefulness of its general comments, it may stimulate hard analysis of states' practice in favor of progressive compliance.19.

13. Establishing a reporting system may also serve to prevent "backslide." Once states demonstrate through reports that they are capable of achieving a degree of conformity with treaty provisions, they may find it difficult to justify a subsequent retrogression to a supervisory body. In this way, it is hoped, states will be held accountable to progressively improve upon respect for their treaty obligations.

C. The Need for Reporting under the Refugee Convention

14. Incorporation of the Refugee Convention into domestic policy may be improved by instituting a reporting procedure. "It is obvious that the implementation of international refugee law would be considerably strengthened if the objectives of reporting . . . could be achieved in this area."20. Monitoring states' efforts to incorporate treaty obligations into domestic policy and practice, followed by steps to inform states as to their reform options, could be central to ensuring true regard for refugee rights.21. Also, reports generated by states would provide a supervisory body with information with which to begin the long-term monitoring of treaty compliance.22. Identification of possible solutions to common obstacles faced by many states might be possible through drawing from successful policies in one state to inform recommendations for another.

15. There are also several challenges specific to implementation of the Refugee Convention that would be addressed by a reporting system. Currently, interpretation of both the definition of who is a refugee under the treaty and what rights they hold are not uniform among state parties. States with disparate understandings do not share the responsibility of accepting and protecting refugees equally. Uniformity of practice might better be achieved through comparison of global practices when reviewing state reports. By issuing concluding observations and general comments, a supervisory body would make harmonization of global treaty interpretation more viable. 23.

16. Because refugees in some host states rely on NGOs and the UNHCR for protection and assistance, the host government may not be aware of their needs and concerns. Via the process of compiling information for a state report, governments and direct service providers would ideally cooperate, in thereby providing an opportunity to enhance the services provided to refugees, and further creative solutions.24.

17. In addition to collaboration among actors within states, a reporting regime would promote stronger relationships with external organizations concerned to further refugee protection. Providing for the rights of refugees in domestic laws and practices, especially in developing nations, is often a complicated and overwhelming dilemma. It is sometimes difficult for states to envision ways in which the welfare of both citizens and refugees can be assured. Assistance in devising strategies for national policy reform might be an achievable goal of a reporting system supervised by a body independent of government actors, and open to the voices of a broad range of advice and support.25.

D. Problems with Reporting

18. Reporting in the context of the Refugee Convention could clearly assist states better to monitor conformity with the treaty. However, it is important to acknowledge the practical and substantive problems that have at times afflicted some other reporting systems. Some difficulties are endemic to the very notion of reporting, which places formal obligations on sometimes unwilling state parties. Yet at least the most serious hurdles may be avoided or at least minimized by creating a reporting system which takes account of experience elsewhere in responding to known challenges.

19. The most obviously debilitating problem that has arisen in the functioning of reporting systems is that states do not turn in reports, or turn them in woefully late. This is a problem in almost all reporting systems, rationalized by states as the consequence of resource limitations and overburdening due to overlapping reporting obligations under several treaties.26. In truth, member state apathy is a real problem, and is referred to as "ratify and forget." 27. Reporting is largely based on self-criticism and good faith, and although the benefits of state initiative can be significant, the problem of state delinquency is all too real.28. The treaty monitoring bodies have seen a progressive deterioration in compliance, and with no provisions for censure, states are able to circumvent their legal obligations. 29. If a reporting system relies entirely on state reports, the supervisory body is incapable of reviewing compliance when states are delinquent in turning them in.30.

20. Even when states submit reports, they may not receive effective responses due to overburdened, understaffed, and disorganized supervisory committees.31. There are frequently long delays between the date of submission of a report and its consideration. Second, committee time-management problems can result in delayed responses to those few reports that are actually submitted.32. If a committee must read through an lengthy, detailed report to identify key issues for discussion, it needs to spend a great deal of time simply preparing for the actual review and dialogue with the state. Yet if it is not diligent in its preparations, the review will be of minimal value to the states.33. Finally, identifying violations of treaty provisions, researching possible solutions, and composing recommendations to state governments is time consuming, particularly when the supervisory body lacks adequate support staff.34.

21. The content of the reports that are submitted has also hindered the practical success of reporting systems. For example, the broadness of information of general, periodic reports handed in to the supervisory body, particularly when unaccompanied by or NGO input, renders the reports practically meaningless. Inconsistency in reports and lack of standardization in the organization and inclusion of substantive material can make it difficult for a committee to chart progress within a state. States sometimes fail to report significant problems within their borders to satisfy their own political interests, rendering the report of little use. 35. Committees have complained that reports that are submitted are sometimes of poor quality.36. In response, concluding observations may be vague and unhelpful.37. What resources a state may have are often spread thinly because of overlapping reporting obligations to various treaties, thereby over-burdening states.38.

22. The reality of some current mechanisms has resulted in a hesitation to create a reporting system for the Refugee Convention.39. However, a reporting system under the Refugee Convention could dramatically improve the global protection of refugees by encouraging state initiative, intra- and interstate cooperation, uniformity of treaty interpretation, and long-term national and global solutions. For these reasons, development of a system that responds to common operational problems is worth serious consideration. We attempt to outline such a system in Parts 'E' - 'H'.

E. General Periodic Reports

23. Comparing the various approaches taken by human rights treaty bodies to the process of reporting should provide a springboard for discussion of the most suitable reporting system in the context of the Refugee Convention. There are two basic categories of reporting mechanisms: general and thematic.

24. General, periodic reports typically include states' representations of developments in laws, regulations, and practices relating to domestic implementation of obligations under the provisions of a treaty. This method ideally extracts a comprehensive picture of efforts toward domestic implementation. General reports under many treaties are expected to cover as many of the various provisions and articles within the treaties as possible to prevent states from omitting discussion of any obligations.40. With this type of inclusive examination, states engage in a broad-ranging form of self-assessment intended to encourage general, progressive implementation. A supervisory body receiving general periodic reports normally responds to the reported measures being taken by states, and assists the government to devise long-term strategies intended to further domestic implementation of the treaty. Without general reporting, neither the states nor the supervisory body is likely to have a comprehensive view of the status of domestic conformity with treaty obligations.

25. Unfortunately, general reporting faces a number of real obstacles. It is difficult for most states to meet the burden of performing an exhaustive assessment of the developments in all relevant areas of law and policy due to time and resource restrictions. Periodic general reports are expected every five years of state parties to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), every four years of parties to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and every two years of parties to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).41. The brevity of the interval between general reports contributes both to late submission of reports by states, and to incomplete review by the supervisory committees.

26. Nonetheless, in devising a new reporting system for the Refugee Convention, general reports would provide an essential empirical backdrop to meaningful scrutiny. The challenge is to consider means to address both the time and resource dilemmas involved with periodic general reporting.

27. First, the submission deadlines for general reports could be extended to approximately every ten years. That is, every ten years, instead of five, four, or two years, an overall assessment of domestic implementation of all provisions of a treaty would be due. This would give both the states and the supervisory body adequate time to compose and review the reports. The major concern with such an approach is that a significant lapse of time between reports might mean that emergency situations would escape notice during the interim period. However, because UNHCR presently handles emergency response, intervention, and advocacy on behalf of refugees, there is no need for a reporting mechanism to fulfill that operation. A complaints procedure might also provide the body with important information during the intervals between general reports.42.

28. Second, the supervisory body could provide state parties with general guidelines on format and substantive areas of concern it wishes to be given particular emphasis in a state's report. Guidelines are helpful to states and to committees, and should be included if possible in any reporting mechanism.43. This could reduce both time and financial resources spent by states and the supervisory body on the reporting process by reducing guesswork, redundancy, and disorganization.

29. Some states might require technical assistance to facilitate the production of timely and thorough reports. Reporting inevitably requires expenditure of financial resources by states. Most treaty bodies, have a mechanism in place for states to seek assistance to facilitate reporting.44 . Simply providing states in need with an upgrade in technological resources would allow them to post documents and communicate with NGOs, other states, and the supervisory body.45.

F. Occasional Thematic Reports

30. A concern with the content of general reports is that states sometimes tailor their reports to evade discussion of significant issues because of the amount of material that must be discussed in recapitulation of several years worth of activity.46. This problem could be attenuated by supplementing a general reporting system with a thematic reporting system.47.

31. Thematic reporting involves the submission of reports every two or three years which speak specifically to a single or related set of treaty obligations.48. This serves to reduce the length of reports, minimize duplication, enable problem areas to be dealt with in depth, and facilitate follow-up of concluding comments, both for the committee and for the state.49. The major problems with periodic reporting (lack of state resources, slow consideration of reports, and vague recommendations) are mostly eliminated under this approach.50.

32. For example, thematic reporting addresses the common problem of state delinquency in reporting due to resource constraints. Giving a state the opportunity to focus its efforts on a specific issue lessens the burden on governments of financing research and compilation of reports. The CERD Committee has recently acknowledged this potential benefit, suggesting that the reporting burden on states could be greatly eased by asking states for specially-tailored, thematic reports.51. A clearer focus for research and reporting should allow states to produce more in-depth information on relevant problem areas in treaty implementation.52.

33. It follows also that a treaty body would be better able to provide specific policy recommendations and prompt, realistic feedback in response to focused reports. Developing strategies for domestic implementation of treaty obligations is more likely to be relevant to a particular state's concerns if the report is thorough and in-depth. The various stages of the reporting process would also become streamlined as a result of focusing on specific topics, including the dialogue and the issuing of concluding observations. This would reduce the overall time that the process would take, enabling more reports to be reviewed.

34. The greater depth of thematic reports may also be more useful as a basis for the drafting of general comments. The thematic approach attempts to tackle the root causes of challenges to national incorporation of treaty standards on a worldwide level.53. Looking at a treaty in terms of the major relevant issues, the treaty body can better identify uniform definitions of treaty obligations. Under the CRC, for example, the thematic method highlights the indivisibility of the rights embodied in the treaty and "encourages a holistic approach to children in respect of legislation, policy and practice."54. Due to its own improved clarity of vision of the common problems with implementation of a treaty, a supervisory body can more readily suggest global recommendations for policy reform.

35. The benefits of utilizing thematic reports are significant, but the pitfalls of such an approach must be addressed if the Refugee Convention is to adopt the most effective reporting system. Any given thematic report will, by virtue of its focus, not provide a comprehensive overview of refugee rights concerns. There are at least two possible solutions to this problem. First, general reports submitted approximately every ten years would provide the treaty body with the comprehensive picture of the status of implementation of all the treaty obligations it may require. Second, establishment of a complaints system could bring to the attention of the supervisory body any serious issues that must be resolved. Also, any emergency protection activities will continue to be handled by UNHCR. Issues arising out of these situations could become the subject of a future thematic report to prevent recurrences.

36. Another criticism of thematic reporting noted in the practice of the CRC, is thatsome articles of the treaty do not fall neatly within any proposed analytical categories.55. A way to avoid this issue is to tailor the themes so that they are not rigid groupings of articles, but are instead areas of relevance to the implementation of the treaty.

37. Despite these few, largely avoidable concerns, it would be advantageous to include thematic reporting as a way for states and a supervisory body to focus their cooperative effort to implement the Refugee Convention. There appears to be a clear trend developing in the direction of utilizing thematic reporting in treaty monitoring. It has been suggested that several more treaty bodies, including those overseeing the ICESCR56. and CEDAW, should begin to focus reports on only a limited range of issues which would be identified by the relevant committee in advance of the preparation of the report.57.

G. Initial Reports

38. In addition to periodic general and thematic reporting, most treaties require initial reports. The CERD, CEDAW, and CRC, for example, all ask that a state submit a self-assessment of domestic treaty implementation within a year or two after ratifying the treaty. This serves the goals of state-initiated supervision, and state reflection and consideration of policy reform, and therefore is likely a necessary part of a plan for improved implementation of the treaty. The state initial report should be fairly comprehensive, including a description of the pertinent legislative and administrative regulations. This initial report allows the relationship between the state and the supervisory body to begin on a note of cooperation.

39. Of course, initial reports impose a burden on states. The reports can be so comprehensive that they require overwhelming amounts of time and money, and can cause immediate back-up in the review process because of their length. The CRC Committee assists states in preparation of initial reports by issuing detailed guidelines, which ultimately serve to minimize the resources of the states as well as of the supervisory body in review.58. Also, staggering the timeline for submission of initial reports could provide a simple solution to the delays in review. Initial reports could provide an important starting point in the cooperative reporting process, and simple measures can be taken to help states avoid beginning their efforts to comply with treaty provisions already behind schedule.

H. Preparation and Review of Reports

40. In sum, a reporting system under the Refugee Convention might include staggered and guided initial reports, followed by periodic thematic reports, and occasional general reports. The combination of these approaches would not overburden either states or a supervisory body because focused guidelines and longer reporting cycles could ease the pressure while actually improving the productivity of the interactions between a supervisory body and states.59.

41. Of course, despite the reduced burden on states, there may still be a tendency toward state apathy. One tactic that is sometimes used in international legal settings is the public naming of the party that does not comply with reporting obligations. The Convention against Torture (CAT) Committee publishes lists of non-complying states in its annual reports.60. The Committee for the ICESCR sends lists of defaulting states to the UN and letters to governments.61. The ICESCR committee also threatens on-site investigations when a state does not submit its report.62. Some treaties, particularly the environmental agreements, impose fines upon delinquent states. That is not likely to be a workable solution under the Refugee Convention due to the scarcity of resources in many state parties who host refugees. A viable response to non-submission of a state report under the Refugee Convention would be to collect information from NGOs and other sources and proceed with the review of the state without its submission.63.

42. Once the reports have been received, the second stage of the process takes place: review by a supervisory body. In order to balance the various interests at stake in a way most advantageous to refugee rights protection, a supervisory body should be independent and transparent.64. A body that is independent and open to public scrutiny would be best suited to oversee treaty implementation and engage in a constructive dialogue with states.65.

43. The first stage in the review process for many treaty bodies is the pre-sessional meeting. This meeting generally serves to preview state reports and put together lists of issues or important topics so that the supervisory committee can focus its review efforts. CEDAW developed such a procedure because the committee would not otherwise have the time to consider all the reports that come in. 66. To ensure that the quality of the review, the dialogue, and the recommendations are specific enough to allow the committee to make useful suggestions, the list of issues can be more easily updated with current state information than a lengthy and detailed report.67. The ICESCR pre-sessional working group sifts out the important issues to send to the states so that their representatives will be prepared for the constructive dialogue portion of the review process.68. Inter-sessional working groups which prepare the dialogue and notify the reporting state of the issues to be raised aids the working of the CERD Committee. The pre-sessional meetings would be beneficial in the general reporting context, and if staffing were available it would speed up review of thematic reports as well.

44. CEDAW also utilizes pre-sessional working groups to prepare states for its next reporting cycle. At the end of each session, the working group reviews the reports submitted by states to be considered next, and prepares a list of questions which the state should be sure to answer in its upcoming report. This significantly minimizes the guesswork involved in preparing for a general reporting cycle. It has been criticized, however, for narrowing the scope of the report too dramatically to the exclusion of important issues.69. This same process is utilized by the CRC, with an emphasis on NGO participation in the process.70.

45. In actually scrutinizing reports, it is increasingly accepted that a supervisory body must take into consideration submissions from concerned NGOs. Indeed, all stages of the process may be enhanced by work contributed by NGOs. Preparation of a supplementary report by an NGO may serve to alert the public through media or NGO networks and to increase awareness of problems relating to rights breaches. Various treaty bodies already utilize NGO input to supplement reports and to contribute to the deliberation process. The committees for CRC, CEDAW, CAT, and ICESCR all actively encourage NGOs to submit alternative reports providing the committees with fuller and often more critical analyses of the status of governmental implementation of international treaty obligations.71. NGOs might be given formal consultative status, so that they are always involved in the various stages of the process.72. NGOs may provide a balance in perspectives as a supervising body considers state reports that are not always accurate.

46. The constructive dialogue is the next crucial step in the reporting process. Once the supervisory body has reviewed states' reports, it engages representatives of states in a conversation about the substance of their reports. This is the opportunity for the body to pose direct questions to the state representative in preparation to make its recommendations. This process is necessary to make sure that the concluding observations will be detailed, relevant to state concerns, and progressive.

47. This phase of the process serves the goal of encouraging state initiative and accountability, since the state representative must stand before the supervisory body, usually in a public conversation, and field questions about any gaps in the state report. The dialogue is also intended to facilitate cooperation between the states and the body.

48. A significant downside is the time-consuming nature of the constructive dialogue which can lead to the common problem of delays between submission of reports and the receipt of recommendations. Unstructured oral discussions can be lengthy and unproductive.73. This problem can be resolved by better preparation by both states and the supervisory body. To ensure that there is a structure to the dialogue, guidelines and time limits should be instated. Questions should be submitted by members of a committee ahead of time and transmitted to the state representatives sufficiently in advance to ensure that the dialogue itself runs smoothly. Participants in the dialogue should be limited. In CERD dialogues, a country rapporteur is the only person speaking on behalf of the Committee, which greatly reduces time and confusion during the dialogue and has increased the number of reports considered at each session.74. The CRC committee is reinstating its country rapporteurs in order to streamline the conversations and make them more productive in a shorter amount of time.75.

49. The supervisory body, having considered the report and the dialogue with the state concerned, then issues concluding observations. This final stage of the reporting process is crucial, since states should expect to receive specific and concrete suggestions to aid in domestic incorporation of international obligations. The meeting during which the committee deliberates and arrives at its recommendations is generally closed, to allow for a full and frank discussion.

50. Concluding observations are the most direct and tangible result of the reporting process. It is important that, like the concluding observations adopted under the CAT on each state report, the recommendations be concrete and responsive to the queries and problems at issue in the reports.76. Observations should be comprehensive, forceful, and useful, as they are when issued by the Human Rights Committee (HRC), the treaty body for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).77. They should also be relevant to the specific difficulties of implementation of treaty provisions in a particular state.78. To achieve the goals of accountability and cooperation, these observations should be made public.79.

51. A reporting system is unhelpful if the concluding observations are so general that they lose any realistic chance of being implemented.80. The thematic reports should, in particular, allow for in-depth review and analysis of specific issues, leading to concrete policy reform recommendations.

52. Concluding observations are often adopted by consensus. This is helpful for state parties because they can be reassured that any recommendations made by the committee are backed by all members. The CERD and ICCPR operate in this manner so as to express the opinions of the committee as a whole and put more force behind their conclusions.81. Yet consensus decision-making can present obvious difficulties, including inconsistencies if attendance is sporadic, veto power exercised by politically influenced members, and time consumption.82. Lengthy deliberations and inefficiency could nonetheless be reduced if the draft conclusions were prepared ahead of time and circulated for approval at the next meeting.83. The overall goal of the decisions of the supervisory committee - to prepare concluding comments that are specific, comprehensive, and tough - requires careful preparation of this kind.84.

I. Summary

• The reporting process fosters self-evaluation by state parties, mobilization of governments and non-governmental actors, and encourages the progressive reform of national policies.
• Under the Refugee Convention, there is a need for a reporting system. Because UNHCR would perhaps be constrained in implementing such a system because of its diplomatic responsibilities and emergency response activities, an independent body would likely be better placed to supervise a reporting system.
• A new reporting mechanism under the Refugee Convention, structured to avoid the common downfalls of reporting systems under human rights treaties, would further the goals of good faith treaty implementation.
• General reports provide critical, comprehensive information on state conformity to treaty obligations. Increasing the time between reporting cycles to approximately ten years, establishing clear guidelines for reporting, and providing technical assistance would reduce the burdens on states and a supervisory body.
• Thematic reports, submitted every few years, would supplement general reports by allowing states and the supervisory body to focus their efforts and resources on particularly problematic issues. Greater depth of information contained in the reports would yield more useful concluding observations for long-lasting reform.
• Delinquency in submission of reports is a recurring problem, so review of state conformity to treaty provisions should proceed even without a state's statement of progress toward implementation of treaty obligations, relying on NGO submissions.
• Official NGO participation in the reporting process is essential to provide balance in reporting and review.
• The process of review by an independent supervisory body should be efficient, transparent, and critical.
• The dialogue between states and the supervisory body should reflect preparation and commitment to resolution of serious impediments to the well-being of refugees.
• With a view to ameliorating the situation of refugees, a supervisory body should advocate forward-looking and clear suggestions of policy changes to catalyze progress through its concluding observations.

1.Id., p. 6.

2.Id., p. 18.

.L. MacMillan and L. Olsson, 'Rights and Accountability', FMR 10 April 2001, p. 3.

4.R. Brett, 'Monitoring the Protection of Refugees: Some Thoughts and Comments on Walter Kalin's Paper', p. 3.

5.Kalin, supra p. 18.

6.MacMillan, supra p. 3.

7.Kalin, supra p. 17.

8.G. Lansdown, 'The Reporting Process under the Convention on the Rights of the Child', in The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (ed. P. Alston and J. Crawford, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000), p. 125, (emphasizing the importance of national action by soliciting reports from states, citing the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna).

9.A. Gallagher, 'Making Human Rights Treaty Obligations a Reality: Working with New Actors and Partners', in The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (ed. P. Alston and J. Crawford, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000), p. 201.

10.Lansdown, supra p. 114.

11.MacMillan, supra p. 5; E. Klein, 'The Reporting System under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights', in The Monitoring System of Human Rights Treaty Obligations (ed. E. Klein, Berlin 1998).

12.Lansdown, supra p. 114.

13.MacMillan, supra p. 3.

14.B. Simma, 'The Examination of State Reports: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in The Monitoring System of Human Rights Treaty Obligations (ed. E. Klein, Berlin 1998), p. 43.

15.Klein, supra 17.

16.M. Bustelo, 'The Committee on the elimination of Discrimination against Women at the Crossroads', in The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (ed. P. Alston and J. Crawford, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000), p. 85.

17.M. Banton, 'Decision-taking in the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination', in The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (ed. P. Alston and J. Crawford, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000), p. 75.

18.See Bustelo, supra p. 80, (discussing importance of reports in making broad policy recommendations under CEDAW).

19.Banton, supra p. 70, and see Working Paper no. 3, "General Comments."

20.Kalin, supra p. 28.

21.Id., pp. 26-27.

22.The International Council of Voluntary Agencies, 'Comments on Professor Kalin's Paper', The Lauterpacht Institute, University of Cambridge, 9-10 July 2001.

23.MacMillan, supra p. 4.

24.Id., p. 2.

25.Id.

26.See Simma, supra p. 32 (discussing the possibility of harmonizing human rights treaty obligations).

27.J. Crawford, 'The UN Human Rights Treaty System: A System in Crisis?', in The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (ed. P. Alston and J. Crawford, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000), p. 11; Simma, supra p. 32.

28.S. Leckie, "The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights: Catalyst for Change in a System Needing Reform', in The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (ed. P. Alston and J. Crawford, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000), p. 130; Crawford, supra pp. 7-8.

29.Leckie, supra p. 130; Crawford, supra p. 4.

30.R. Bank, 'Country-oriented Procedures under the Convention against Torture: Towards a New Dynamism', in The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (ed. P. Alston and J. Crawford, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000), p. 148.

31.Bustelo, supra p. 86.; Simma, supra p. 42.

32.Lansdown, supra p. 125.

33.Crawford, supra p. 5.

34.Id., p. 7.

35.Leckie, supra p. 131.

36.Bank, supra p. 147.

37.Leckie, supra p. 132.

38.Simma, supra p. 32.

39.Kalin, supra p. 28.

40.H. Steiner, 'Individual Claims in a World of Massive Violations: What role for the Human Rights Committee?', in The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (ed. P. Alston and J. Crawford, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000), p. 22.

41.Lansdown, supra p. 113; Bustelo, supra p. 80.

42.See Working Paper no. 2, "Complaints."

43.Simma, supra p. 33.

44.Gallagher, supra p. 220; Simma, supra p. 33.

45.Crawford, supra p. 7.

46.N. Valticos, 'Once More about the ILO System of Supervision: In What Respect is it Still a Model?' in Towards More Effective Supervision by International Organizations, Essays in Honor of Henry G. Schermers, Vol.1 (ed. N. Blokker and S. Muller, Dordrecht, 1994).

47.Simma, supra p. 34.

48.Lansdown, supra p. 115.

49.Bustelo, supra p. 87.

50.M. Nowak, 'Country-Oriented Human Rights Protection by the UN Commission on Human Rights and its Sub-commission', in Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, Vol. XXII, 1991, p. 43.

51.Banton, supra p. 71.

52.Bustelo, supra p. 87.

53.Nowak, supra p. 44.

54.Lansdown, supra p. 116.

55.Id., p. 117.

56.Id.

57.Bustelo, supra p. 87.

58.Lansdown, supra p. 114.

59.Global Consultations on International Protection, San Jose Regional Experts Meeting - Conclusions and Recommendations (7-8 June 2001), at para. 23.

60.Bank, supra p. 148.

61.Simma, supra p. 33.

62.Id.

63.Bank, supra p. 148.

64.MacMillan, supra p. 3.

65.Id.

66.Bustelo, supra p. 82.

67.Id., p. 85.

68.Simma, supra p. 35.

69.Bustelo, supra p. 89.

70.Lansdown, supra p. 119-120.

71.Leckie, supra p. 134.

72.The International Council of Voluntary Agencies, supra pp. 2-3.

73.Bustelo, supra p. 91.

74.Banton, supra p. 60.

75.Lansdown, supra p. 124.

76.Bank, supra p. 150.

77.Steiner, supra p. 22.

78.Simma, supra p. 38.

79.Bustelo, supra p. 94.

80.Leckie, supra p. 132.

81.Banton, supra p. 63; Steiner, supra p. 22.

82.Banton, supra p. 63.

83.Bustelo, supra p. 96.

84.Simma, supra p.42