UNHCR is undergoing a restructuring exercise with the arrival of the new High Commissioner. This memorandum is to explain in short form what has happened so far during the exercise and what decisions remain to be taken. The restructuring exercise, and future decisions on funding and operations, will have often a critical impact on the ability of NGOs to perform their work.

The High Commissioner set up small internal groups to look at three areas of his Office’s work. These were called Actions.

Action 1 was meant to define UNHCR’s core activities: focusing on protection; examining UNHCR’s assistance and emergency capacity, the role of UNHCR staff in carrying out its mission, and in reaching out to partners.

Action 2 was meant to address immediate concerns, mostly in terms of savings; on the basis of priorities established in Action 1, recommending how best UNHCR can operate within its projected income for 2001.

Action 3 was meant to address fund-raising in its broadest sense; reviewing adequate funding mechanisms for a global multilateral organisation; focusing on the weight and potential of traditional and other donors; considering partnerships for undertaking activities of direct or indirect concern to UNHCR; making proposals to address the immediate problem of funding the Office’s programmes in 2001 and 2002.

The results of Action 1, deciding what UNHCR is about, were as follows:

• A core activity was defined as “one for which UNHCR has a central universal responsibility, as contained in its Statute and developed through subsequent General Assembly or ECOSOC resolutions. By its nature, a core activity will have a clearly established link to the international protection of refugees (and stateless persons) or the pursuit of durable solutions. A core activity includes the programme support, management and administration and related costs required to undertake it”.
• It was noted that a core activity does not necessarily mean that UNHCR has to implement it.
• Examples of core activities would include: refugee status determination; promotion/advocacy/advice on refugee law; supervision and monitoring of the Convention.
• Examples of non-core activities would include capacity-building which was not linked to protection or emergency preparedness or peace-keeping operations.
• Having defined core activities, Action 1 goes on to make priorities. These should be determined on the acuteness of need; a gap in national capacity; the existence of partnerships.

Action 1 goes on to further define how priorities will be determined in various circumstances. It is worth noting that women/gender equality, children/adolescents, elderly refugees, the environment, the safety/security of staff and of refugees were not singled out as separate activities but were seen as an integral part of every operation and activity.

At a meeting of the Humanitarian Liaison Working Group (HLWG) in March, the outgoing Deputy High Commissioner, Rick Barton, reported that Action 1 had not completed its task as originally envisaged. This may mean that the rather complex conclusions of Action 1 in terms of defining core activities and priority-setting have not produced the clear-cut and limited outcomes which were intended. It remains to be seen how the results will be translated into practice. In an exercise ostensibly designed to re-focus UNHCR on refugee protection there are rumours of some anachronistic outcomes, such as the liquidation of most of the Centre for Documentation & Research- a key protection tool.

On Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), operations are described as a non-core activity. Any exceptions must be made on the basis of existing UNHCR policy. In addition, funding should be assured for the duration of any operation involving IDPs.

The results of Action 2, finding savings, were as follows:

• Cuts were made to all geographical areas of operations in the field, although the total budget still far outweighs projected contributions.
• Minimal cuts have been made at headquarters (HQ).
• Decisions about operations in Africa have not yet been taken. This is because the review of operations there has been complicated by the debate over decentralisation and recentralisation of operations. A more thorough analysis has been called for and decisions are expected to be taken at the end of April.
• There are expected to be deep staff cuts at UNHCR, although the High Commissioner feels that, owing to previous staff cuts, HQ is reaching its optimal size as compared with field operations.
• By the end of April, final decisions will be taken but the expected level of staff reductions is in the region of 1200 staff.

At present, there are 4 129 posts in the field. The majority of the staff cuts are expected to be the “floaters”, those UNHCR currently without assignment, and staff which do not show up in the records because they are on short-term contracts or are locally hired without reference to HQ. However, it does seem that a number of operations in the field will be scaled down or eliminated. It is estimated that there is currently one protection officer for every 60 000 refugees in the World, and it is unlikely that any cuts will ameliorate this statistic or help protection officers fulfil their jobs.

The results of Action 3, concerning funding, were as follows:

• The funding base has to be widened. Currently, 6 donors contribute 75% of UNHCR’s funding. There will be consultations aimed at increasing the base of a bilateral nature, as the notion of a single donor group is only theoretical.
• States interests will still have to be taken into account when seeking funding and it is unlikely that UNHCR will achieve the level of un-earmarked funds it needs.
• Non-traditional sources of funding, e.g. the corporate sector, should be approached.
• UNHCR will have to balance needs against resources when submitting a budget, rather than presenting requirements which are never likely to receive funding. Due to late pledges by donors, UNHCR operates on the assumption that only 80% of its budget will be funded, leading to activities being dropped.
• Predictable and higher funding from the European Commission and EU Member States will be sought. Austria, France, Germany, Italy and Spain are described as “defaulting”donors.
• There is an urgent need to bring recognised and efficient NGOs as full partners in the strategic planning process.
• UNHCR should aim to get wealthy States to make “normative” contributions to the budget, based on US$1 million per million inhabitants, with a minimum contribution of 0.005% of GNP, which minimum would not exclude higher contributions. This calculation would result in funding of over US$1000 million. A poor donor like France would have to increase contributions by a factor of 7, while good donors like Sweden and Switzerland could cut contributions significantly (but they will be encouraged to maintain existing levels of support).

The funding situation at UNHCR is obviously critical. The High Commissioner has made this his top priority and has already signalled his intention to the member states of the UNHCR Executive Committee to get them to fund the budget they set. There must be considerable doubt, however, whether UNHCR’s formula for assessing contributions will be accepted by states, especially if it requires them to increase their contributions significantly.