SENIOR INTER-AGENCY NETWORK MISSION TO ANGOLA BRIEFING PAPER¹

The context

Since the war for independence in 1963, Angolans have seen little peace. Internal conflict has ravaged the country for nearly forty years, leading to the displacement of an estimated 3.8 million persons. The majority of displaced persons have been forced to flee their homes during the course of the last three years. Since 1998 alone, as many as 2.7 million persons are estimated to have been displaced from their homes as a result of violence between government and opposition troops; another 340,000 persons are said to be refugees in neighboring countries (UNSC October 2000).

The worst of the fighting in Angola broke out in 1992 following the electoral victory of the government ruling party, MPLA, and its subsequent rejection by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). From 1992 to 1994, between 1.3 and 2 million persons were forced to flee their homes. By 1994, it was hoped that the Lusaka Peace Protocol might end the violence, but this did not prove to be the case. The demobilization of UNITA troops envisaged by the peace process was never completed and sporadic fighting continued throughout the country. All-out war resumed by the end of 1998 with increased fighting between government and UNITA troops, particularly in the north and east as well as in the central highlands.

Since the resurgence of violence in late 1998, hostilities between government troops and UNITA rebels have continued unabated. By the year 2000, the government had succeeded in regaining control of several traditional UNITA strongholds, but these military feats failed to combat the chronic insecurity that continued to plague throughout the country. In response to the strengthening state military response, UNITA forces simply began to employ guerrilla tactics with greater frequency. Over the course of the year, rapid infiltration attacks as well as hit-and-run ambushes became more commonplace, making it difficult to guarantee the security of civilians anywhere in the country.

Figures

Given the length and pervasiveness of the conflict in Angola, estimates of the total number of displaced persons are constantly changing and do vary. Figures of the Government of Angola, considered by some observers to be inflated for the purposes of aid assistance, reach a staggering 3.8 million (USCR 2000). Estimates of the UN and other agencies rest at 2.7 million but do not include those persons dispersed for many years in and around Luanda (UNHCR April 2000). Of these numbers, only some 1.1 million persons have been registered by humanitarian organisations, leading to major gaps in assistance.

Though global figures of internally displaced persons remain staggering in Angola, the UN did report a dramatic decrease in the number of newly displaced persons during the course of 2000. Only 338,000 persons are said to have been newly displaced in 2000 as compared to the approximately one million persons displaced in 1999 (UN November 2000). However, these newly displaced populations are highly vulnerable as a large number of them have not been registered and are, therefore, not receiving humanitarian assistance.

Patterns of displacement

It is hard to say which regions of the country are hardest hit by conflict in Angola, so widespread is the violence that affects its inhabitants. During a UN Inter-Agency Assessment Mission to Angola in April 2000, six areas were reported to have the most critical needs. These areas included Huambo, Cuando Cubango, Negage, Caluquembe, Cambondo and Kuito (OCHA 15 April 2000). However, since that time, reports of newly displaced populations have come in each week, highlighting the suffering of thousands of Angolans in various regions across the country. The most recent reports indicate that there are some 36,000 internally displaced persons in Cambulo, Luanda Norte and another 24,000 persons in Ebo, Cuanza Sul, the majority of whom are in a desperate state (AFP/PANA).

The traditional movement of displaced populations has been from the countryside to state-controlled provincial capitals. There, individuals are able to find protection from some - though not all - of the war's violence. A relatively insignificant 393,000 displaced persons are reported to be living in camps and transit centres; another 500,000 are said to reside in areas inaccessible to international agencies (RI 11 January 2001). Displaced persons - and in particular women and children - are vulnerable to attack, rape, kidnapping and forced conscription by government as well as UNITA forces in all areas of the country. Furthermore, some displaced populations have been obliged to pay bribes to local authorities in order to receive humanitarian assistance. Others have been forced to resettle involuntarily in the outskirts of provincial cities deemed unsafe due to their proximity to military camps and/or minefields.

Subsistence needs and coping strategies

In the provincial centres, the continual influx of displaced persons has placed a heavy burden on state health and sanitation systems as well as on the limited resources of resident populations. Only 30% of all Angolans have access to basic health care, and maternal and infant mortality rates are reported to be the worst in Africa. Countrywide, less than one-third of the population has access to safe drinking water. In displaced persons camps and transit centres, the situation would appear to be still worse. It is estimated that in 90% of areas with concentrations of displaced persons, water sources are contaminated or inaccessible. Malnutrition levels among displaced populations are estimated at 60% as compared to the 40% malnutrition experienced among resident populations.

While some two million displaced persons continue to rely on food distributions for survival, many displaced populations have come to depend on kinship and other informal networks to feed their families. One of the primary obstacles to self-sufficiency amongst displaced populations is the lack of access to agriculture land. With very few exceptions, these populations lack access to land and agricultural inputs. Moreover, they are often forced to work the land of others for little or no wages (OCHA 15 April 2000).

Return movements

While some modest return and resettlement movements took place in 2000 as a result of the extension of state administration to new areas, UNITA guerrilla attacks continue to complicate the long-term security of returnees. During the year, pilot resettlement took place in Huambo, Luena, Menongue, Malanje and Matala by which some 187,000 persons were reportedly relocated (UN November 2000). Displaced persons also resettled in other areas either spontaneously or with the assistance of the government. The transit centres in Caala, Huambo - infamous for their poor living conditions and inadequate services - were closed, and displaced persons were resettled to nearby villages.

Humanitarian access

Access to vulnerable populations increased during 2000 as a result of the extension of state control over certain areas. At least six major road corridors were opened, and perimeters expanded around eight provincial centres (UN November 2000). Still, humanitarian access remains a major problem, and over 500,000 persons were reportedly displaced in inaccessible areas by the end of the year. At the same time, air transport continued to be required for more than 70% of all humanitarian aid. While access is generally better in areas of government control, landmines, poor roads and badly damaged airstrips impede the delivery of goods into these areas as well (OCHA 15 April 2000).

National and international response

National

According to the UN, the Government of Angola showed an increased commitment to improving the humanitarian conditions of displaced persons during 2000. A major accomplishment of the year was the development of Minimum Operational Standards for Resettlement and Return (MINOPS), or NORM as they have most recently been termed, in concert with UN OCHA. In addition, the government pushed forward with the implementation of the National Programme for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance (PNEAH) under the auspices of which some US$ 13 million of aid has been dispatched since July 1999. In August 2000, the Government announced that another US$ 17 million would be allocated for the second phase of the Programme. The aim of the second phase of PNEAH is to promote sustainability of communities through land distribution, resettlement, agricultural inputs and rehabilitation of social infrastructures.

International

On the international front, the UN established a Sanctions Committee in April 2000 to study the level of compliance to sanctions against UNITA. Among other recommendations made in its December 2000 report, the Committee emphasized the need to continue to deprive UNITA of its diamond income. It underlined the use of illegal diamond income to purchase arms via its bases in West Africa. In January 2001, the UN Security Council voted to extend the mandate of the Monitoring Mechanism, and a follow-up report is expected in April 2001.

During the course of 2000, official visits were made to Angola by the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Mr. Richard Holbrooke, by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator a.i., Ms. Carolyn McAskie, and by the UN Representative on Internally Displaced Persons, Dr. Francis Deng. A UN Inter-Agency Rapid Assessment Mission was also dispatched to Angola in April 2000. Overall, visitors observed the existence of gaps in international assistance to internally displaced persons. These gaps were blamed on lack of coordination, lack of funding and lack of access.

In June 2000, presumably in response to the severe criticism of humanitarian coordination in Angola, the Technical Working Group for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (TWG) met for the first time. The TWG is composed of technical representatives from the Government of Angola, UN agencies, donors and national and international NGOs.

As concerns funding, actual pledges for the UN Consolidated Appeal for 2000 reached only 52% of its revised requirements (UN November 2000). As a result, humanitarian agencies were forced to cut back drastically on their programming. WFP, for example, was only able to feed one million war-affected persons as opposed to its targeted one and a half million. For the purposes of the 2001 UN Consolidated Appeal, approximately 3.7 million persons have been categorized as war-affected though the number requiring emergency assistance is expected to drop to an estimated one million. The Appeal calls for US$ 225,846,859 in assistance for emergency and emergency recovery programmes (UN November 2000). Food agencies are expected to move from general food distributions to targeted assistance during the year 2001 (WFP 2000).

The scope and exigency of the situation of internal displacement in Angola makes it difficult to limit those issues requiring careful consideration by the Senior Inter-Agency Network mission. This said, the NRC Global IDP Project would recommend that, as a priority, mission representatives take the time during the course of their visit to explore the following areas with government, UN and NGO officials:

1. Registration of internally displaced persons: As stressed by the UN Special Representative on Internally Displaced Persons, Dr. Francis Deng, following his visit to Angola in October 2000, many populations are going without assistance due to lack of registration. It is estimated that only 1.1 million persons have been registered out of the total 3.8 million persons internally displaced in the country. In particular, it has been noted that a significant number of the newly displaced in 2000 - some 338,000 persons - have not been registered and are, therefore, not receiving humanitarian assistance. Also of concern is the large number of displaced persons living in urban centres with little support.

2. Strengthened approach to protection: The UN Special Representative on Internally Displaced Persons, UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies have all underlined the importance of a reinforced approach to the protection of internally displaced persons. Though emergency life-saving intervention activities remain imperative in many parts of the country, they should not detract the attention of the international community and the Government of Angola from the general situation of physical security and human rights, particularly in the country's provinces.

3. Continued efforts to increase access to vulnerable populations: Though the UN reported an overall improvement in humanitarian access over the course of 2000, the fact remains that well over 500,000 internally displaced persons are still outside the reach of humanitarian aid. Greater access to those areas hardest-hit by the conflict must be pursued if the most vulnerable populations are to benefit from humanitarian assistance.

4. Minimum standards of security as a precondition for the resettlement of internally displaced populations: There has been some disagreement within the humanitarian community about the appropriateness of resettling internally displaced populations living in poor conditions when the security of resettlement sites cannot be guaranteed. It must be underlined that the full security of internally displaced persons is a precondition for an resettlement plans, and that actors at both the national and provincial levels must commit to the safe and voluntary resettlement of internally displaced populations. To this end, the Government of Angola must move forward to finalize and distribute to provincial authorities the Minimum Operational Standards for Return and Resettlement (MINARS).

5. Coordinated support for increased self-sufficiency of displaced persons: Given that both WFP and ICRC have announced that they will cut back on the distribution of emergency food aid in 2001 in exchange for more targeted assistance, there must be some assurance that the majority of internally displaced populations will indeed have established a minimum of coping mechanisms by the end of the major harvest season in April. Though efforts have been made to provide displaced populations with agricultural land in a handful of provinces, the majority of displaced persons do not possess land or the agricultural inputs to be able to feed themselves and their families.

   It is the concern of many humanitarian organizations that many displaced persons who have not developed proper coping mechanisms may venture out to insecure areas in search of food if emergency distributions are ended. In order to avoid a situation where internally displaced persons are forced to put their security at risk, WFP should develop transparent criteria on which targeted assistance is based following the April 2001 harvest. At the same time, some evaluation should be made of the Government of Angola's ability to fill the gap in food assistance should it be necessary. In particular, the progress of the National Emergency Programme for Humanitarian Assistance (PNEAH) should be considered.

6. Reinforced humanitarian coordination: A lack of coordination on the part of humanitarian agencies in Angola was a major criticism of international observers during 2000. Certainly, the effectiveness of the Technical UN-GoA Working Group for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (established in June 2000) should be reviewed as well as any other coordination mechanisms in existence.