1. THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS

1.1. Aim

The consultation in Geneva was the first step in a consultative process on inter-agency security collaboration in the field, initiated by the UN IASC (Inter-Agency Standing Committee) Working Group's Security Task Force. The aims were to identify informal and practical ways for such collaboration, with a special emphasis on the field, and to explore implementation options that could contribute to the enhancement of the security of humanitarian field workers.

1.2. Participants and invitees

The Consultation was comprised of informal round table dialogue, based on the experiences and perspectives of the participants themselves. An introductory presentation on "Challenges and Opportunities for Collaboration on Field Security among Humanitarian Actors" was given by Stephen Gwynne-Vaughan (CARE Albania) and Jean-Luc Siblot (WFP Geneva). The discussions in groups and plenaries were supported by reference material and Programme Notes by the Task Force Consultant.

2. DISCUSSION

2.1. Basic assumptions

The participants addressed the theme of the consultation with the following basic assumptions in mind:

• That the emphasis should be on security collaboration in the field.
• That inter-agency field collaboration on security is a necessity in so far as it enhances staff security.
• That a precondition for inter-agency security collaboration is mutual respect for and understanding of each others' roles and mandates, the resulting operational opportunities for common action, and restraints to such common action.
• That guidelines and principles for common action would be practical, informal, and based on trust, i.e. not legally binding.
• That field security collaboration should be separate from operational partnership arrangements.

2.2. Main issues

The discussions in plenaries and groups centered around three main issues. One was the question of partnership, what it involves, and who are the partners. The second was the relationship between the identities, roles, and responsibilities of humanitarian actors, which find themselves working together in a field situation. This is seen, for example, in the relationship between the independence and relative flexibility of most non-UN parties and the unified, though still complex, UN security system. The third major issue was the problem of perceptions of parties to the conflict of the organisational characteristics and commitments of the various humanitarian actors.

2.3. Partnership reviewed

It was felt that the term partnership needed a broader definition. The traditional understanding of partnership is now moving beyond the idea of "implementing partners" towards a relationship based on common goals and commitments. For example, the UNHCR-NGO Framework for Operational Partnership (FAOP) extends the term "partnership" to include all NGOs, (i.e. operational and advocacy-oriented NGOs) involved in refugee operations, not just those which are implementing partners under a sub-contract with the refugee agency.

In terms of the demands for security collaboration in the field it was stressed that partnership implied mutual respect and trust. This required active participation from all those involved, not dependency by one side on the other, as was sometimes seen to be the case with NGOs vis-à-vis the UN security system.

While dependency by some international NGOs on the UN security system might be a necessity for smaller agencies, all those interested in opting for partnership in security collaboration should be encouraged to work actively for the development of their own security preparedness and resources. They should equally be encouraged to become more pro-active in participating in the local security collaboration and resource sharing, e.g. around the Humanitarian Coordinator/Designated Official (DO).

It was recognised that certain humanitarian actors choose to develop their own security systems independently of collaborative arrangements or are obliged by their mandates to do so. Practice in the field shows, however, that these actors would often opt for a degree of local collaboration or regular communication. This experience supports the idea of a more structured "menu of options" for security collaboration at the field level.

Partnership in security would also mean that the security plan should be developed, and continuously revised, jointly with all agencies that had opted for security collaboration. This shared planning should begin at an early stage. The partnership in security planning and development would have to respect a degree of confidentiality, for security reasons.

2.4. NGO independence and flexibility, and the UN security system

There was general agreement on the necessity to differentiate among humanitarian NGOs. The terms humanitarian NGOs and "humanitarian community" cover a wide range of independent agencies, different organisational identities, mandates, and administrative structures.

In terms of day-to-day field security collaboration, it is therefore unrealistic, undesirable, and impossible to include all actors. First, all do not want to be included, and secondly, among those who do want to be included, all would not be able to honour the mutual obligations of committed security collaboration.

However, rather than seeing the independence of NGOs and their individual identities vis-à-vis the UN security system as an obstacle to security collaboration, it was felt that one might instead emphasise their corresponding operational flexibility. Collaborative arrangements should reflect the multi-faceted NGO reality in the field and maximise its advantages.

The participants supported a differentiated approach to security collaboration, which they translated into a "menu of options" for security collaboration. While it was stated that no organisation could relinquish their organisational independence, NGOs would be able to commit to local security arrangements at different levels. It would be a self-opting process for agencies, but opting in would entail an acceptance of certain specified mutually agreed principles and guidelines and areas of collaboration. One important area would be the development of a local security plan.

It was noted that as security situations became more and more dangerous, an increasing number of non-UN humanitarian actors (1) improved their own security management and preparedness, (2) sought closer collaboration with the UN security system and other humanitarian actors at the field level, including the acceptance of UN security phases.

A trend in the opposite direction might result from the implementation of the Brahimi report's recommendations on "peace building". Civilian tasks, such as the restoration of the rule of law in a "state vacuum" (police, judges, lawmaking), would be carried out by entities that are part of UN-led peace building initiatives. Humanitarian actors, collaborating with the UN, might also be perceived as part of such initiatives. Some might choose to stay away from collaborative arrangements and distance themselves from the UN and its (political) peace-building efforts in order to maintain their impartiality and independence, as laid out, for example, in the Red Cross-NGO Code of Conduct (presently signed by about 150 NGOs).

2.5. Perceptions of organisational identities

Generally, the participants found that the perceived images of humanitarian actors, by local authorities, civil society, and militant non-state actors had to be taken into account as a security factor. Emblems and flags no longer provide protection. The parties to many recent conflicts make few, if any, distinctions between humanitarian actors. Actions and attitudes attributed to a few organisations could have serious consequences for all, especially for the most visible or lead agencies.

3. CONTINUATION OF THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS

It was noted that the IASC Working Group is the formal carrier of the process on UN-non-UN security collaboration, through its security task force, and is the focal point for the suggested further studies and collaborative developments. It was, however, also stressed that other humanitarian actors interested in field security and especially the participants in the consultations should be kept informed and be invited to participate in the dissemination of the findings of the consultative process. Practical follow-up of some of the ideas could begin parallel to the process in the IASC-WG.

It was felt that the original expectation of a "framework agreement" or a "baseline document" as expressed in the last meeting of the Task Force did not respond to the needs for inter-agency field collaboration on security as identified in this consultation. Priority was given to a pragmatic and flexible approach to field collaboration that would move the "humanitarian community" forward, e.g. a "menu of options" for security collaboration, allowing varying degrees of formal/informal inter-agency relationships, and a set of practical tools, e.g. security collaboration "templates" for the Humanitarian Coordinator/DO, or shared security training.

The expected outcome of the first stage of the consultative process is a general report by the Consultant based on this consultation and a similar consultation in Washington, D.C. on 11 January 2001, to be presented to the Task Force in February 2001. A Progress Report will be presented to the IASC-WG in February. A set of recommendations from the Task Force will be presented to the IASC-WG at its meeting in May. The whole process is expected to be finished by the end of 2001. The Consultant's contract expires on March 17th, 2001.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1. Recommendations on field security collaboration

• Regular consultation should be encouraged between members of UN Security Management Teams (SMT) / Disaster Management Teams (DMT) and non-UN humanitarian actors such as ICRC and NGOs (or NGO Security Focal Points), acting as informal collaborative security teams.
• NGOs committed to security collaboration should, to the extent possible, identify an NGO security focal point from among those NGOs present in the area of operation.
• The UN Humanitarian Coordinator/DO's role in security collaboration should be reviewed. This could involve:

  1. That the HC/DO selection process take into consideration the stated need for a HC/DO profile with skills in creating an environment conducive to inter-agency security collaboration.
  2. That the HC/DOs should be provided with an array of security collaboration "templates" that could be applicable to their specific situation. These templates would be based on successful experiences of collaboration elsewhere and could include, inter alia, the following options:

     1. Security Plan development. Humanitarian actors committed to security collaboration should, to the extent possible, participate in the development and constant updating of the security plan for their area, starting from the early stages of planning.
     2. Conditions/criteria for evacuation/relocation. Part of the Security Plan development would be the development of common criteria and conditions for participation in evacuation and relocation.
     3. Communication. A common security channel/frequency could be established for operational and other partners in humanitarian action.
     4. Incident mapping. Humanitarian actors should commit themselves to report all security incidents to the security focal point as a basis for shared risk and threat assessments.
     5. Information sharing. This could be done, for example, through regular UN-non-UN briefings, military briefings, and joint evaluations, respecting the necessary confidentiality required when dealing with sensitive information.
     6. Common field-specific baseline training and exercises. Trainers could be both UN and non-UN expert staff.
     7. Capacity ("tools") sharing. A "resource center" could be developed locally for the sharing of the different humanitarian actors' special security capacities, e.g. trauma treatment, and stress management, or specialised equipment.
     8. Minimum security standards. Standards for operational and management "good practices" in security could be developed by humanitarian actors working together in a specific field context and/or by sector (e.g. regarding the need for stress management; behaviour at roadblocks, etc).
     9. Regional (or local) security focal points. In isolated areas of operation where the central security management system may not have full access to relevant security information, semi-autonomous security networks could be established.

• A security "menu of options", together with shared principles and guidelines for security collaboration, should be developed by the humanitarian actors operating in a given area.

  A security "menu of options" would allow those humanitarian actors which are committed to the shared principles to opt for security collaboration at different levels and degrees.

  Among the principles and guidelines to be developed could be:

  • Transparency of non-UN humanitarian actors' independence, flexibility, and commitment.
  • Common UN/non-UN understanding of the UN unified security system, especially phase four.

  Issues to be included in a "menu of options" could be:

  1. Day-to-day security

     • Cost-sharing (e.g. through a central fund; through the CAP process).
     • Security (including contingency) planning (staff, office and residential, and operational).

  2. Evacuation/relocation

     • Cost-sharing related to evacuation.
     • Guidelines and procedures for evacuation/relocation (e.g. whom to include).

• Information networks on field security should be reinforced. Such field based UN-non-UN information networks on security could include, for example,

  • the sharing of field observations, background documentation, and context analyses (national, global, and historical);
  • the building of institutional memory at the field level.

• Humanitarian actors should collaborate in exercising their commitment to "duty of care" for their staff by sharing resources, e.g. in stress management.

4.2. General ideas and proposals on security collaboration

• Regular, broadly based country and regional security round tables including all humanitarian actors should be organised with the aim of maintaining security awareness and bringing it closer to the humanitarian actors at the field level.

• Further UN/NGO studies/developments should be pursued on:

  • field security collaboration models (e.g. S. Sudan, Sierra Leone)
  • information sharing models, e.g.:

    • web-based information networks;
    • radio networks;
    • databases, e.g. on incident reporting, (e.g. HSPN);
    • analysis development (e.g. context analyses, threat analyses).

• Security training should receive or maintain high priority in security collaboration. Humanitarian actors such as WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, as well as UNSECOORD and NGOs with security training expertise (such as RedR) should, to the extent possible, at HQ and field level:

  • Organise joint security training, e.g.:

    • Streamline existing baseline security handbooks and training modules.
    • Supplement joint baseline training with country specific training.
  • Supplement joint baseline training with agency-specific training.
  • Ensure that all staff assigned to high risk operations receive appropriate security training prior to assignments, as well as context-specific training on site.

• UN and non-UN humanitarian actors should explore common positions on:

  • Use of armed escorts for humanitarian activities.
  • Widening the concept of partnership.

• The IASC-WG should ensure that the IASC-WG consultative process on staff security in the field is linked to similar consultative processes on the Brahimi report.

22.01.2001/Anne Paludan